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This thesis is about the role that values play in science. I argue that science can 
benefit from what I call ‘Queer Feminist Values’. I begin by considering feminist 
approaches that appeal to underdetermination of theory by data in order to argue 
that feminist values can contribute to good science. I argue that this is an 
undesirable move for feminist philosophers not only because this sets additional 
obstacles to furthering the feminist normative claim that feminist values can 
contribute to good science, but also because this limits the role that feminist 
values are able to play in science. I then move on to consider two proposals for 
the role that values can play in science that do not appeal to underdetermination. 
I argue that while these proposals are certainly more desirable than proposals 
that appeal to underdetermination, there is room for expanding the role that 
feminist values can play in science. In order to explore this proposal, I develop a 
case study that focuses on genetic explanations of sexual orientation. I argue that 
we should push for legislation that ensures that topics that are beneficial and of 
interest to marginalised groups get the funding they need and that this legislation 
should ensure that these groups are included in the research. I also argue that one 
of the most beneficial roles that values can play in science resides in the choice of 
concepts that are embedded in the methodology and that this choice will be 
determined by the goals that one has. To demonstrate this, I develop two 
different concepts of sexual orientation that are needed for two different goals: 
carrying out genetic studies and addressing social injustice issues. 
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This thesis is about the role that values play in science. I argue that science can 
benefit from what I call ‘queer feminist values’. I follow in the footsteps of a rich 
tradition of feminist philosophers of science who have developed case studies to 
1) showcase the role that values play in science and 2) argue that feminist values 
can contribute to good science. Many of these case studies have focused on 
scientific research to do with sex and gender. I explore a new area of research that 
has received very little attention in the philosophy of science literature: sexual 
orientation. I focus on genetic studies that aim to explain the causes of sexual 
orientation. 
It is important to identify the stages of the scientific research process 
where values are legitimately able to play a role in order to be in a better position 
to challenge illegitimate appeals to values that often play a role in reinforcing 
harmful stereotypes about women and other subordinated groups. It is also 
important to identify the stages of the scientific process where values can play a 
legitimate role in order to be in a better position to advocate for the interests of 
these groups. This is what motivates this thesis.  
In the first chapter, I consider feminist proposals that appeal to 
underdetermination of theory by data in order to argue that feminist values can 
contribute to good science. These proposals are important to consider because 
proposals that appeal to underdetermination remain popular choices amongst 
feminist philosophers when it comes to making a case for  values in science. I 
divide this chapter into two sections. In the first section, I introduce 




the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ sometimes get used synonymously. Some feminist 
philosophers have appealed to the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ in order to argue that 
feminist values can contribute to good science. I show that Duhem’s and Quine’s 
proposals are actually quite different from each other and that because of this, 
appealing to the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ in order to argue that feminist values can 
contribute to good science is problematic. This is because it is not clear what idea 
they are actually appealing to. In the second section, I move on to review three 
feminist proposals that appeal to some version of underdetermination. Lynn 
Hankinson Nelson’s Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism (1990), 
Elizabeth Potter’s Modeling the Gender Politics in Science (1988), and Janet 
Kourany’s A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century 2003). In this 
second section, I outline individual problems with each of these accounts. I argue 
that even if we ignore some of the problems that arise from these individual 
accounts, the alleged role for feminist values suggested by underdetermination is 
quite limiting because these considerations only come into play after all empirical 
considerations have been exhausted. 
In the second chapter, I explore proposals that do not appeal to 
underdetermination in order to argue that feminist values can contribute to good 
science. I engage with two accounts. The first is a proposal put forth by Janet A. 
Kourany in Philosophy of Science after Feminism (2010) and the second one is a 
proposal put forth by Heather E. Douglas in Science, Policy, and the Value-Free 
Ideal (2009). I argue that while these proposals are certainly more desirable than 
proposals that appeal to underdetermination, there is room for expanding the 




social values as well as epistemic values should control all aspects of the scientific 
research process (2010). While I am sympathetic to her proposal, I argue that as 
it stands, it raises many questions that pose serious problems. The first of these is 
that it is unclear whether Kourany is claiming that values should play an indirect 
role throughout all of the scientific research process or whether she is claiming 
that values should play a direct role throughout all of the scientific research 
process. I argue that this distinction is important because it helps us set up 
important restrictions that allow us to ensure that science is producing reliable 
knowledge. Douglas’ proposal is much more detailed. She proposes basic criteria 
that every scientific theory must meet: internal consistency and predictive 
competence and three value categories: ethical, social, and cognitive. She argues 
that all of these value categories can either play a direct or indirect role in the 
scientific research process. The direct role is limited to the first two stages of the 
scientific research process: when deciding what scientific research projects to 
pursue and when deciding what methodology to use. The indirect role is reserved 
for cases of uncertainty and when consequences of error must be considered. This 
applies when making methodological choices, in the collection and 
characterisation of data, and in the interpretation of the final results. I am very 
sympathetic to Douglas’ proposal. Her proposal provides a more detailed guide 
about the role that values play throughout the scientific research process. 
Additionally, I think it is a good option that does not require appealing to 
underdetermination in order to argue that contextual values (that are important 
to feminist philosophers) can contribute to good science. I do, however, think that 




that values play in the problem selection and the methodology selection stages. I 
argue that one of the most important roles that feminist values can play in the 
scientific research process is precisely during these stages. I propose that values 
should be playing a more active role in the first stage and that one of the most 
important role for values in the second stage resides in the choice of concepts 
embedded in the chosen methodology.  
In the third chapter, I develop a case study that allows me to explore this 
proposal. The case study focuses on genetic explanations of sexual orientation. 
This research area allows me to explore my proposal for the direct role that values 
can play in the first two stages of the scientific process (problem selection and 
methodology selection). In the problem selection stage, I argue that we should 
push for legislation that ensures that topics that are beneficial and of interest to 
marginalised groups get the funding they need and that this legislation should also 
ensure that these groups are included in the research. Furthermore, I argue that 
one of the most beneficial roles that values can play in the second stage 
(methodology section) resides in the choice of concepts and that this choice will 
be determined by the goals that one has. In order to carry out this task I begin by 
providing an introduction to the scientific research that studies sexual orientation. 
This includes looking into the historical and political context in which current 
sexual orientation categories such as heterosexual and homosexual were 
developed. After providing some historical and political context, I analyse the role 
that values play in the problem selection stage, where I argue that we should push 
for legislation that would encourage scientists to pursue scientific research that is 




analyse the role that values play when it comes to making methodological choices. 
I begin with an introduction to the genetic research that looks into the 
underpinnings of sexual orientation. I then take up a specific genetic study: A 
Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual 
Orientation, by Hamer et al. (1993). After reviewing this study, I point to the 
specific instances where values can play a role in concept choice. The first has to 
do with the relationship that one’s concept of sexual orientation refers to. Sexual 
orientation is usually understood to refer to some kind of attraction, desire, or 
fantasy toward a person at least partly on the basis of their sex and/or gender. In 
this sense, there are important decisions to be made about whether sexual 
orientation refers to sex, gender, or both. I argue that these decisions will be 
based on the aims that one has. The second instance in which values can shape 
concept choice is when making choices about what the concept of sexual 
orientation describes. Does it describe sexual attraction? Sexual desire? Sexual 
behaviour? Again, I argue that values can shape one’s choices and that these will 
be determined by the goals that one has. In order to demonstrate this, in the last 
two chapters I develop two different concepts of sexual orientation that are 
needed for two different goals: carrying out genetic studies and helping asylum 
seekers.  
In the case of genetic studies, I argue that geneticists should move away 
from behaviour-based understandings of sexual orientation and that they should 
prioritise internal sexual orientation markers such as sexual desire, attraction, and 
fantasies. I also argue that they should take into account both the sex and gender 




this person desires, fantasises, and is attracted to. This chapter begins with a 
detailed analysis of the relationship between sex, gender, and sexual orientation. 
I then move on to survey four different genetic understandings of sexual 
orientation. Within this section, I analyse each of the studies and point to critical 
problems with their understanding of sexual orientation. After this, I dedicate a 
section that points to the problems associated with behaviour-based 
understandings of sexual orientation (which many of these studies use as a 
marker of a person’s sexual orientation). I conclude by arguing that geneticists 
should adopt an internally focussed understanding of sexual orientation that 
includes self-identification as an important marker of a person’s sexual 
orientation.  
If one’s aim is to address social injustice issues, such as the difficulties that 
LGBTQI+ people face when seeking asylum, then a different understanding of 
sexual orientation is needed. I propose a political cluster approach. According to 
my proposal, sexual  orientation relies heavily on a person’s social and political 
context and consists of three main sexual orientation markers. These markers are 
self-identification, behaviour, and internal manifestations. Furthermore, I 
propose that we should take into account both the sex and gender of the person 
we are ascribing sexual orientation to as well as the sex[es] and gender[s] this 
person desires, fantasises, and is attracted to. Note that an importance difference 
here is the inclusion of behaviour. I begin this chapter by providing some context 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the impact that this has had on people that 
seek asylum on the basis of sexual orientation. I then move on to think about the 




discussion will provide us with conceptual tools that will aid us in thinking about 
the kind of sexual orientation concept that we need in order to be in a better 
position to address some of social injustice issues that LGBTQI+ people face on 
the basis of sexual orientation. Following this, I review four metaphysical accounts 
of sexual orientation: self-identification, behaviourism, ideal dispositionalism, and 
bidimensional dispositionalism. Drawing from Haslanger’s method of 
ameliorative analysis (2012), I argue that if we centre the concerns of some of the 
most marginalised groups in the LGBTQI+ community, these four sexual 
orientation accounts fail at being able to address these concerns. I conclude by 
arguing that what we need in order be in a better position to address social 















1. Why Feminists Should Abandon Underdetermination Arguments 
In this chapter I argue that relying on underdetermination does not help advance 
the feminist normative claim that science would benefit from adopting feminist 
values. In fact, it seems that relying on underdetermination serves as an obstacle 
to proving the epistemic legitimacy of feminist values in scientific inquiry.  
 Underdetermination, very generally speaking, is the idea that empirical 
evidence alone is not enough to determine theory choice. That is, theory choice 
is underdetermined by empirical evidence. Feminist philosophers such as Lynn 
Hankinson Nelson, Elizabeth Potter, and Janet Kourany have relied on some form 
of underdetermination in order to a) point out how contextual values (the 
personal, social, cultural, political, etc., values that belong to the social context in 
which science is done (Longino, 1990, p. 4)) influence scientific inquiry and b) to 
advance the feminist normative claim that science would benefit from adopting 
feminist values.  
In the feminist philosophy of science literature, there are two main 
projects: a descriptive one, which demonstrates how contextual values influence 
scientific inquiry and a normative one, which argues for the importance of 
feminist values in science.  The first project has to do with exposing how scientific 
practice is vulnerable to the influence of contextual values. This project has been 
a successful one. There have been many feminist philosophers who have written 
countless articles on how science seems to be influenced by contextual values. 
Some examples of this type of work are: Reflections on Gender and Science (1995) 
by Evelyn Fox Keller, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has constructed a 




Pre-Theoretical Assumptions in Evolutionary Explanations of Female Sexuality 
(1993) by Elisabeth A. Lloyd. The second project has to do with advancing the 
feminist normative claim that science would benefit from adopting feminist 
values.  
In this chapter, I will look at some of the underdetermination accounts that 
feminist philosophers have appealed to in order to justify the claim that science 
would benefit from adopting feminist values. While I am convinced that science 
would benefit from adopting feminist values, relying on underdetermination in 
order to claim that science would benefit from adopting feminist values is not 
going to help advance the project. Relying on underdetermination will only set 
additional obstacles to fulfilling this goal. It is my goal in this chapter to show just 
how problematic it can be to rely on underdetermination as a means to further 
the feminist normative claim. 
In order to carry out this task, I begin by introducing the topic of 
underdetermination. I then take a closer look at Duhem’s and Quine’s accounts, 
separately. With this, I aim to draw some important distinctions between 
Duhem’s rendition of underdetermination and Quine’s rendition of 
underdetermination. I argue that it is problematic for feminist philosophers of 
science to appeal to the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’, because the two accounts are 
quite different. Secondly, I argue that even if feminist philosophers appeal to 
these accounts separately, the point feminist philosophers want to make (i.e. that 
science is value-laden) does not follow from Duhem’s or Quine’s account of 




The second part of this chapter begins by asking how science is influenced 
by contextual values. After we have a clear idea of how science is influenced by 
contextual values, I take a detailed look at the work of Lynn Hankinson Nelson, 
Elizabeth Potter, and Janet Kourany in order to see the role that 
underdetermination plays in their respective proposals. I argue that it is 
undesirable for feminist philosophers to appeal to underdetermination not only 
because this sets additional obstacles to furthering the normative feminist claim, 
but also because this limits the role that feminist values are able to play in science.  
 
1.1 An Introduction to Underdetermination of Scientific Theory 
Put simply, underdetermination of scientific theory is the idea that empirical 
evidence is not enough to determine theory choice. If scientists test a hypothesis 
and the results are not favourable, scientists then have to make a decision about 
whether they want to hold on the hypothesis and adjust some of their auxiliary 
hypotheses or whether they want to abandon the hypothesis and leave their 
auxiliary hypotheses untouched. This idea is what is usually referred to as the 
‘Duhem-Quine thesis’. The idea that we do not test hypotheses in isolation.  
 The ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ is usually extracted from two historical and 
celebrated works, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, originally published 
in 1914 by the French physicist, historian and philosopher Pierre Duhem and Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism published in 1951 by the American philosopher W.V.O. 
Quine. 
Together, these two historical pieces of work, were, and continue to be, 




case that science is value-laden. The idea generally extracted from both Duhem’s 
and Quine’s work is that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. 
The consequences of this thesis, according to some feminist philosophers, is that 
if empirical evidence is not the only factor that determines our beliefs, then there 
must be other non-accounted for factors that also have an influence. Some of 
these non-accounted for factors, according to some feminist philosophers, are 
cultural, political, and social values. 
 However, while Duhem and Quine seem to be saying similar things 
regarding underdetermination, their accounts differ in ways that might have 
important consequences for feminist philosophers who appeal to ‘the Duhem-
Quine thesis’. To help with this part of my analysis, I draw from the work of 
Vuillemin on On Duhem’s and Quine’s Theses (1998). Vuillemin identifies several 
distinctions between Duhem and Quine, including:  
 
‘[…] 1) the methodological foundations of “the” thesis, 2) the width of its 
scope, 3) the kind of articulation it introduces into the body of scientific 
laws, and 4) the nature of the resulting ontic commitments, which dictate 
in turn the relation between philosophy and science’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 
598).   
 
In this chapter, I focus on 1 & 2, which, as I will argue, have significant 
consequences for feminist analysis.  
To begin, it might be useful to introduce a distinction which might be 




This distinction is between holist underdetermination and contrastive 
underdetermination. “Holist underdetermination […] arises whenever our 
inability to test hypotheses in isolation leaves us underdetermined in our 
response to a failed prediction or some other piece of disconfirming evidence” 
(Stanford, 2017). Contrastive underdetermination, on the other hand, “[...] 
involves the quite different possibility that for any body of evidence confirming a 
theory, there might well be other theories that are also well confirmed by that 
very same body of evidence” (Stanford, 2017). According to this distinction, holist 
underdetermination supports the idea that evidence alone is not enough to 
determine our response to a failed prediction. In this sense, holist 
underdetermination helps support the idea that if evidence is not the only factor 
that determines how we respond to a failed prediction, then there must be other 
non-accounted for factors that do. Contrastive underdetermination is the idea 
that one body of evidence cannot be used to confirm one scientific theory over 
another; this is because there is a possibility that this same body of evidence can 
be used to confirm other rival theories just as well. In this sense, contrastive 
underdetermination helps support the idea that if evidence is not the only factor 
which determines theory choice, then there must be other non-accounted for 
factors that do.   
It is important to mention that these distinctions were not created by 
Duhem or Quine. There is no mention of holist or contrastive underdetermination 
in their respective accounts. These distinctions were created after and have been 
helpful in teasing apart problems in the underdetermination literature. In this 




accounts and their appeal to underdetermination. It will help identify which 
specific underdetermination accounts feminist philosophers are appealing to. 
  
1.1.1. Duhem’s Aim and Structure of Physical Theory 
Duhem argued that there is a difference between sciences like physics and 
physiology. According to Duhem, in sciences like physiology, ‘[…] the comparison 
between the deductions of a theory and the facts of experiment is subject to very 
simple rules’(Duhem, 1954, p. 180).  To develop this idea he quotes Claude 
Bernard: ‘The first condition that has to be fulfilled by a scientist who is devoted 
to the investigation of natural phenomena is to preserve a complete freedom of 
mind based on philosophical doubt’ (as cited in Duhem, 1954, p. 180).  According 
to Duhem, in sciences like physiology, experiments are a good guide for checking 
ideas. This is because when there is an experiment involved, the scientist is always 
able to test their ideas through that experiment. The experiment will dictate 
whether it is a correct idea (hypothesis) or an incorrect one. In the meantime, 
though, the theory should ‘[…] stay outside the door of the laboratory […]’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 180). This will allow the scientist to impartially carry out the 
experiment and assess the results. Duhem, along with Bernard, seem to think that 
the scientist (in this case the physiologist), is able to completely separate the 
experiments from the theory) and assess the facts ‘objectively’. This process, 
however, seems to work very differently for the physicist.  
 In the case of physics, ‘[…] it is impossible to leave outside the laboratory 
door the theory that we wish to test, for without the theory it is impossible to 




182). This is because, according to Duhem, the physicist is unable to disassociate 
their theory from physical tools. He labels the first the schematic and abstract 
apparatus and the second the concrete apparatus. This inability to disassociate 
has important consequences for the physicist carrying out experiments. This is 
because the inability to disassociate prevents the physicist from carrying out 
experiments without thinking about theory at the same time. They are unable to 
do this because they are unable to dissociate the schematic and abstract 
apparatus from the concrete apparatus.  
It is true, of course, that other scientists, such as the physiologist, also 
appeal to (or rely on) theory when conducting experiments. The physiologist, for 
example, might rely on instruments like the thermometer to deliver and assess 
results (Duhem, 1954). When using instruments like this, the physiologist 
implicitly admits ‘[…] the accuracy of the theories justifying the use of these pieces 
of apparatus as well as of the theories giving meaning to the abstract ideas of 
temperature, pressure, quantity of heat, intensity of current, and polarized light, 
by means of which the concrete indications of these instruments are translated’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 183). The difference between the physiologist and the physicist 
though, is that the instruments the physiologist uses to carry out experiments 
belong to the domain of physics (Duhem, 1954). Without these instruments, the 
experiments carried out by the physicist wouldn’t have any meaning. In this sense, 
the relationship between the physiologist and the physicist seems to be an 
asymmetrical one: the physiologist must trust the work of the physicist in order 
to carry out their experiments, but not the other way around. The physicist must 




schematic and abstract apparatus fails to disassociate with the concrete 
apparatus in physics.  
Duhem argues that ‘The physicist who carries out an experiment, or gives 
a report of one, implicitly recognizes the accuracy of a whole group of theories’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 183). This means that the experiment and experiment results 
only make sense if the physicist is willing to accept the theories that give meaning 
and validity to the experiment. Duhem distinguishes between two different types 
of experiments: experiments of application and experiments of testing. 
Experiments of application are experiments intended to solve a practical problem. 
Duhem gives the example of lighting an incandescent bulb. If one were tasked 
with lighting the bulb, one would draw from accepted theories that would tell us 
how to light an incandescent bulb. The intent of an experiment like this, however, 
is not to tell us about the status of any of our scientific theories. Its intent is to 
help us solve a more practical problem (in this case to help us light the 
incandescent bulb) (Duhem, 1954).  
Experiments of testing, on the other hand, call into question the status of 
theories. ‘A physicist disputes a certain law; he calls into doubt a certain 
theoretical point’ (Duhem, 1954, p. 184).  F. E. Neumann, for example, ‘[…] 
assumed that in a ray of polarized light the vibration is parallel to the plane of 
polarization […]’ (Duhem, 1954, p. 184). Many physicists, however, called this into 
question. Duhem argues that there isn’t an experiment that can prove F.  E. 
Neumann’s proposition to be accurate or inaccurate. This is because physics 
doesn’t work like maths, where reduction to absurdity is common. It’s a bit more 




physicist carries out an experiment, they are not only using the proposition in 
question in their quest to prove the accuracy or inaccuracy of said proposition. 
They are also making use ‘[…] of a whole group of theories accepted by him [sic] 
as beyond dispute’ (Duhem, 1954, p. 185). For example, anyone wanting to prove 
that in a ray of polarized light the vibration is not parallel to the plane of 
polarization would need to accept theories about optics way beyond the scope of 
the initial proposition (Duhem, 1954). The only thing the experiment would teach 
us ‘[…] is that among the propositions used to predict the phenomenon and to 
establish whether it would be produced, there is at least one error; but where 
that error lies is just what it does not tell us’ (Duhem, 1954, p. 185). This is because 
when the physicist performs the experiment, they are relying on the accuracy of 
other theories (in this case, other optic theories). Therefore, if the experiment 
yields negative results, it is difficult to say whether the proposition in question is 
the one in error, or whether one of the many theories they are relying on in order 
to carry out the experiment is the one in error. Duhem’s idea here is that we can 
never test an isolated hypothesis. We can only test groups of theories.  
In addition to this, Duhem argues that the physicist cannot rely on 
induction from direct observation. He refers to this as the Newtonian method. 
This is because in his Principia, Newton argued that in ‘[…] physics every 
proposition had to be drawn from phenomena and generalized by induction’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 191).  
To illustrate this, Duhem develops the example of Universal Gravity. 
Newton claims that Universal Gravity is derivable by generalisation and induction 




gravity not derivable by generalisation and induction, it also contradicts Kepler’s 
laws of planetary motion (which Universal Gravitation relies on). If one takes the 
sun as the reference point and calculates the magnitude and direction of forces 
between the planets and the sun, one will find a contradiction between the 
principle of universal gravity and Kepler’s first law (Duhem, 1954). Secondly, if one 
sets out to ‘determine the magnitude and direction of each of the forces between 
Jupiter and its satellites when we refer all the motions to the planet, assumed to 
be fixed, […] one will notice that these forces are not what our second statement 
would require’ (Duhem, 1954, p. 193) (Kepler’s second law of planetary motion). 
In this way, Duhem claims not only that Newton’s law of Universal Gravitation 
does not derive entirely from Kepler’s laws of planetary motion (which are 
supposed to be based on observation), it also contradicts them (Duhem, 1954). 
According to Duhem, in order to justify the law of Universal Gravitation, 
the physicist will need to resort to other resources, aside from Kepler’s laws of 
Planetary Motion. This includes different theories and considerations. In this 
sense, 
 
‘It is no longer a matter of taking, one by one, laws justified by observation, 
and raising each of them by induction and generalization to the rank of a 
principle; it is a matter of comparing the corollaries of a whole group of 
hypotheses to a whole group of facts’ (Duhem, 1954, p. 194).  
   
With this, Duhem wants to make a more general claim. He takes Newton’s law of 




fails (Duhem, 1954). According to Duhem, physical laws cannot be inductively 
deduced from empirical phenomena.  
  If this is right and laws and theories do not follow an inductive method, 
then it is unclear how physicists should discriminate between hypotheses. One 
way, according to Duhem, is through ‘good sense’. ‘When certain consequences 
of a theory are struck by experimental contradiction, we learn that this theory 
should be modified but we are not told by the experiment what must be changed’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 216). So how should the physicist go about figuring this out? 
According to Duhem, there is no ‘one way’ of going about this. Physicists are free 
to go about this differently, as long as the methods followed are experimentally 
justifiable (Duhem, 1954).    
  
‘Pure logic is not the only rule for our judgements; certain opinions which 
do not fall under the hammer of the principle of contradiction are in any 
case perfectly unreasonable. These motives which do not proceed from 
logic and yet direct our choices, these “reasons which reasons does not 
know” and which speak to the ample “mind of finesse” but do not to the 
“geometric mind”, constitute what is appropriately called good sense’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 217).  
 
It is Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’ that allows the physicists to discriminate 
between hypotheses.  This, however, has the consequence that physicists might 
disagree about what hypotheses to hold on to and which to let go of, but this 




comes a day when good sense manifests itself so clearly ‘[…] that the other side 
gives up the struggle even though pure logic would not forbid its continuation’ 
(Duhem, 1954, p. 218). This ‘good sense’, however, must be kept completely 
separate from ‘passions and interests’, according to Duhem. As this will only serve 
to cloud judgement and delay any scientific progress.  
 To be clear, Duhem’s proposal is a holistic form of underdetermination. He 
proposes that in physics, we can never test an isolated hypothesis. He proposes 
that if the results for such a hypothesis were to come back as negative, the 
scientist might have no other choice but to resort to their ‘good sense’ in order to 
discriminate between hypotheses. 
  Up to here, I have (very briefly) outlined some of Duhem’s claims that 
might help make clear why his account is not very relevant to feminist claims 
about underdetermination. For one, his focus is on physics. Duhem insists that 
this branch of science is different from other sciences. He is interested in 
problems that arise in physics and how the physicists can address these. In 
contrast, feminist philosophers are concerned not just with physics, but with all 
of science, especially with areas like biology. Second, Duhem claims that in the 
case that theories are underdetermined by evidence, the physicist should use 
‘good sense’ to discriminate between hypotheses. This might, at a first glance, 
seem like it would be useful for feminist philosophers (if one ignores the fact that 
Duhem is only talking about physics), but upon closer examination, it turns out 
not to be so helpful. This is because Duhem also thinks that a scientists’ ‘passions 
and interests’ should not interfere with their good sense. It is not exactly clear 




is a difference between extra scientific interests and scientific interests, and he 
thinks that the former shouldn’t interfere with the latter. In contrast, some 
feminist philosophers of science who appeal to underdetermination claim that in 
cases of underdetermination, the scientist should be justified in appealing to extra 
scientific interests, including social, cultural, and political values. 
 As we will see in the next section, Quine is a bit more flexible regarding 
the first claim. He extends his account to cover all knowledge claims, including 
areas like psychology. However, even in that case, Quine’s account might prove 
to be problematic for feminist philosophers. 
 
1.1.2. Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), Quine argues for two claims. The first has to 
do with the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the second has to do with 
reductionism. Quine argues against an analytic/synthetic distinction and against 
reductionism. He argues that there is no clear boundary between analytic and 
synthetic statements. ‘That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an 
unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith’ (Quine, 1951, p. 
34).This claim has consequences for knowledge claims. One consequence is that 
there are no ‘purely’ analytical statements. That is, there are no statements that 
are true independent of the world. There are only statements which are 
dependent on the world and thus, subject to revision.  
 Furthermore, when it comes to revising statements, this can only be done 
in connection with other statements, or part of other interconnected theories. 




experience not individually but only as a corporate body’ (Quine, 1951, p. 38). This 
means that a statement can’t be tested in isolation. This can be illustrated by 
Duhem’s example of polarization. Let us recall the example. According to Duhem, 
there is no way of proving or disproving that in a ray of polarized light the vibration 
is not parallel to the plane of polarization without relying on a whole lot of other 
theories. The idea here is that we can’t test this statement in isolation. We also 
have to test all other theories it is interconnected with. This means that when an 
experiment comes back with negative results, the only thing we know for sure is 
that there is an error somewhere in the interconnected web of theories, but the 
experiment doesn’t tell us exactly where.    
  Additionally, ‘[…] total science is like a field of force whose boundary 
conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions 
readjustments in the interior of the field’ (Quine, 1951, p. 39). This means that if 
we conduct an experiment to test theory ‘x’, and this experiment does not come 
back with positive results, we might need to revise or readjust other theories 
which theory ‘x’ possibly relies on or is associated with (these theories might not 
be as directly associated with experience). Furthermore:  
 
‘Having re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, 
whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether 
they be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total 
field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there 
is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light 





This means that in light of a ‘contrary experience’, scientists might be faced with 
a great number of possibilities for revision and it may not be so clear where to 
start. For example, if a physicist tests the following: in a ray of polarized light the 
vibration is parallel to the plane of polarization, and they come back with negative 
results, they might need to revise other aspects of polarization, for example. This 
is because the answer may not lie with the experiment itself. They may need to 
question other interconnected beliefs that are associated with the initial 
statement. 
 Furthermore, Quine claims that ‘No particular experiences are linked with 
any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through 
considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole’ (Quine, 1951, p. 40). 
According to this, it is not a question of whether one experience is linked or 
directly related to a particular statement, it is a question of whether experience 
fits well with the whole of our theories.  
  Quine, like Duhem, is concerned with the relationship between 
experience and statements. One thing they both agree on is that we can’t test 
hypotheses in isolation; we can only test the whole body of a theory. One obvious 
difference between them is that Quine is extending his analysis to cover all 
knowledge claims. ‘Total science, mathematical and natural and human, is 
similarly but more extremely underdetermined by experience’ (Quine, 1951, p. 
42). Quine thinks that all knowledge claims are underdetermined by experience.  
 In this sense, Quine’s account seems to be more useful to feminist 




cover all knowledge claims. This would cover sciences like biology, which is of 
central importance to feminist philosophers. However, appealing to Quine’s 
account is not without its problems. This is because Quine’s account of 
underdetermination is neatly tied in with some of Quine’s other views. This 
includes his idea that there is a sharp boundary between science and the role of 
such things like political values. 
 
1.1.3. Duhem’s and Quine’s Theses 
In On Duhem’s and Quine’s Theses (1998), Vuillemin begins by noting the 
agreement between both accounts. Duhem, like Quine, agree that ‘[…] scientific 
experiments are so much theory-laden that is it impossible, even in principle, to 
isolate which part in them belongs to theoretical constructions and which to 
empirical findings’ (Vuillemin, 1998, pp. 595-596). Both of them agree that it is 
impossible to locate which statements belong to theory and which belong to 
empirical findings.  
 However, Vuillemin argues that there are also some very important 
differences. The first has to do with the ‘methodological foundations of ‘the’ 
thesis’. Duhem wants to separate science from metaphysics, while Quine does 
not. ‘According to Quine, science starts from perception, which the logical 
operators and the constructs of our natural languages give form to, and gradually 
emerges into the  more abstract constructs of physics’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 599). 
Quine argues that there is no clear division between perception and language and 
science. He welcomes an interconnected web of statements, from the most 




a division and as a result believes that science can be kept separate from 
metaphysics (Vuillemin, 1998).  
According to Vuillemin, ‘This methodological opposition entails a dissent 
concerning the scope of the thesis’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 599). Duhem’s thesis is 
limited to physics, while Quine’s thesis covers all knowledge claims. I would like 
to zero in on the consequences for Duhem’s thesis. ‘Being limited to physics, the 
D-thesis involves a strict demarcation between science using mathematical 
language and the domain of common language (including physiology) which does 
not fall under the thesis’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 599). This highlights an important 
difference between Duhem’s account and Quine’s account for feminist 
philosophers of science. This is because the myth of ‘the Duhem-Quine thesis’ 
starts to fall apart. This is one important instance in which the two accounts differ. 
With this distinction in place, even if feminist philosophers only appealed to 
Duhem’s account, the thesis wouldn’t be very useful unless feminist philosophers 
want to limit their focus to sciences using mathematical language. Quine’s 
account, on the other hand ‘[…] fuses the analytic with the synthetic as it fuses 
theory with experience’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 600). In his account, there are no 
sharp distinctions.   
Vuillemin notes that Duhem and Quine also differ in regards to the 
relationship between science and ontology. ‘Duhem’s science conquered its 
autonomy with respect to common sense in the same way that the French State 
did with the “lois de séparation” as regards the Church’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 600). 
Science, for Duhem, became neutral and totally disconnected from metaphysics 




remnant of the first positivist dogma’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 601). Namely, that there 
is a clear distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. For Quine, any 
distinction was just a convention that experience would eventually decide 
(Vuillemin, 1998).  Vuillemin argues that Quine’s ontology differs from Duhem’s, 
as his does not support an opposition between science and metaphysics 
(Vuillemin, 1998).  
 
1.1.4. Vuillemin’s Analysis and Feminism 
I would now like to turn our attention to Vuillemin’s analysis and 
underdetermination’s usefulness for feminist philosophy. As noted above, Duhem 
and Quine seem to agree on some things, and if we join some statements 
together, we end up with a very general ‘thesis’. Namely, that ‘[…] isolated 
hypotheses are not severally verifiable by experience, only the whole body of a 
theory being able to be subjected to the test of experiment’ (Vuillemin, 1998, p. 
595).  
 However, Vuillemin points out some fundamental differences. These are 
differences which I would like to propose have important consequences for 
feminist philosophers. Feminist philosophers rely on ‘the Duhem-Quine thesis’ in 
order to claim that there are other factors, aside from empirical evidence, which 
also influence theory choice. Feminist philosophers also rely on ‘the Duhem-
Quine thesis’ in order to claim that in cases of underdetermination, scientists 
should favour feminist options. However, what feminist philosophers need in an 
account of underdetermination is an account which supports underdetermination 




philosophers need an account of underdetermination that supports the use of 
contextual values (i.e. social, cultural, and political values) in cases of 
underdetermination. Taking this into consideration, ‘the Duhem-Quine thesis’ is 
not up to the job. It might seem like it is at a first glance, but upon closer 
examination, we realise that it is not. 
 Feminist philosophers need an account that supports underdetermination 
cases made in all sciences, especially in disciplines like biology. However, ‘the 
Duhem-Quine thesis’ falls apart on this point. This is because Duhem restricts his 
analysis to physics only, while Quine extends his account to cover all knowledge 
claims. This is a problem for feminist philosophers. If ‘the Duhem-Quine thesis’ is 
not clear on this point, then they need to abandon it and search for an alternative 
account that does. Duhem, however, won’t be of much help, unless feminist 
philosophers want to restrict their analysis to physics only. However, this doesn’t 
seem like a viable option because feminist philosophers are also interested in 
other areas, especially in areas like biology. If feminist philosophers opt for Quine, 
they will find that his account favours a ‘clear’ distinction between science and 
social values. In this sense, Quine might not be a viable option either.   
 I suggest that feminist philosophers don’t need underdetermination in 
order to pursue the idea that science would benefit from adopting feminist values. 
In fact, I propose that feminist philosophers would be better off by abandoning 
any appeal to underdetermination. I will come back to elaborate on this claim in 
the next chapter. In this section, my aim was just to introduce the concept of 




general concept of ‘the Duhem-Quine thesis’. In the next section, I review specific 
feminist accounts that appeal to underdetermination.  
 
1.2. Feminism and Underdetermination 
Feminist philosophers such as Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Elizabeth Potter, and Janet 
Kourany have all argued that science would benefit from adopting feminist values 
by appealing to some form of underdetermination. In the following section, I 
analyse their proposals. 
 
1.2.1. Towards a Feminist Empiricism (Nelson) 
In Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism (1990), Lynn Hankinson 
Nelson makes an interesting case for moving towards a feminist empiricism. To 
do this, Nelson draws heavily from Quine, especially from his account of science. 
One of the things that Nelson wants to do in her book is to reconcile feminist 
science criticism with empiricism. To do this, she appeals to some interesting ideas 
from Quine, but challenges others, like individualism, for example (she argues that 
it is communities which know). In this chapter, I zero in on one of these ideas. That 
idea is underdetermination. However, before moving on to discuss this idea, I 
briefly outline and provide some context to her discussion. I then bring attention 
to her discussion of underdetermination.  
 In a section titled ‘Common Sense, A Coherence Theory Of Evidence, And 
The Underdetermination Of Science’, Nelson begins by saying that ‘We have two 
general reasons to doubt that “culturally determined” beliefs are not subject to 




observation], and, thus, to doubt that if science has anything to do with “common 
sense”, the connection between science and evidence is fundamentally 
compromised’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 244). In other words, Nelson wants to make the 
case that culturally determined beliefs are able to be empirically tested and 
consequently, that if science is influenced by common sense, then it also follows 
that our understanding of the connection between science and evidence will 
change. 
 The two reasons which Nelson gives to support the claim that culturally 
determined beliefs are subject to empirical control are 1) feminist arguments 
(which have been supported by feminist science criticism) that science is 
influenced by cultural beliefs and 2) Quine’s argument that common sense and 
science are interdependent. Briefly, feminist science criticism is the collection of 
feminist criticism that has shown that science is influenced by cultural (or also 
common sense) beliefs (e.g. the unfounded assumption that women’s sexuality is 
necessarily tied to reproduction). The second reason is based on Quine’s claim 
that common sense is just a continuation of science. In Quine’s words: 
 
‘Science is not a substitute for commonsense, but an extension of it. The 
quest for knowledge is properly an effort to broaden and deepen the 
knowledge which the man in the street already enjoys, in moderation, in 
relation to the commonplace things around him’ (Quine, 1957, p. 2). 
 
The idea here is that science is not separate from common sense, but that the two 




common sense. The idea behind this is that (as opposed to the layman) the 
scientist introduces a ‘system’ which then allows them to make sense of the 
available evidence. And in this way, science is able to systematise common sense.  
 One thing that Quine does not address, however, and which is central to 
feminist science criticism, is whether common sense can affect science: 
 
‘[…] whether, given a holistic account of empirical content and a 
coherence account of evidence, it follows that changes in beliefs and 
theories outside of science communities can affect scientific theory—
whether they can (at least for those whose beliefs have changed) lead to 
differences in the evaluation of scientific theories and have a bearing on 
scientific theorizing’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 245). 
 
The answer to this question would determine whether common sense can 
legitimately serve as evidence for scientific theories. Nelson argues that it can. 
She argues that this is an obvious consequence of Quine’s holism and the 
interdependency between common sense and science (which he argues for). 
 Secondly, and most importantly (for the purposes of this chapter), Nelson 
argues that Quine’s account of underdetermination ‘[…] commits us to the view 
that there is room for changes in all our theories—both those of common sense 
and science’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 245). The thought is that if scientific theories are 
fundamentally underdetermined, this then leaves room for change in theory, and, 




as legitimate evidence for theory evaluation, then this leaves room for common 
sense to legitimately play a role in scientific theories.  
This, Nelson argues, is important for feminist science criticism since ‘[…] at 
least part of what will propel the evolution in scientific theories can be changes in 
common-sense beliefs and theories’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 245). So for Nelson, part of 
the change begins with common sense. And in this way, it is important that 
common sense be able to play an epistemologically relevant role in science, so 
that if we change our common sense beliefs, these changes will be reflected in 
our scientific theories. 
Nelson also appeals to Quine’s account of why some theories are better 
‘insulated’ than others. ‘The special position of such theories (our larger 
ontological commitments, logic, and mathematics, for example) is due to the fact 
that they do not face sensory experience directly, but do so indirectly “via” more 
“low-level theories”’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 246). But this, however, does not mean 
that such theories are exempt from common sense. It just means that some 
theories are better insulated than others, according to Nelson.  
Nelson takes feminist science criticism to be common sense evidence that 
can and should play a role in scientific theories. As an example, she points to the 
‘man, the hunter theory’. According to Nelson, in this case: 
 
‘[…] we saw that some members of our science communities and our 
larger community have come to question the assumption, and all of the 
models and theories that incorporated it, that males’ activities are central 




human evolution, and that females’ activities are natural and exhausted 
by reproductive activities’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 246).  
 
This common-sense criticism, according to Nelson, is part of the evidence that is 
used for evaluating scientific theories (as shown by the ‘man, the hunter’ 
example). And that consequently, changes in these kinds of common sense beliefs 
will generate changes in science (Nelson, 1990).  
 But, as Nelson acknowledges, there is a problem here. Namely, that Quine 
seems to think about common sense theorising in terms of physical objects, and 
not in terms of ‘sex/gender and politics’, like Nelson argues. And not only this, 
Quine also maintains that politics have no place in science (Nelson, 1990).   
 So the issue here is whether Quine’s account can be extended to cover 
things other than physical objects.  Nelson argues that it should: 
 
‘If Quine does not recognize that the network of our connected and 
interdependent theories contains beliefs and theories beyond those 
concerned with physical objects and that common-sense theory is not 
static, then feminist criticism indicates that we must expand on his views—
and only later worry about the consequences for the constraints 
experiences can impose on our theories’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 247).  
 
For Nelson, feminist science criticism shows that sex/gender and politics are 




expand Quine’s discussion of common sense theorizing to cover not only physical 
objects, but also such things as sex/gender and politics.  
According to Nelson, even if we choose to ignore all of the evidence 
afforded by feminist science critics, Quine maintains that science and common 
sense are interdependent, and this, according to Nelson, is important to note 
because we also have common sense beliefs about sex/gender and politics. In this 
sense, common sense beliefs about sex/gender and politics are relevant to 
science, provided that we buy into Quine’s account of the relationship between 
science and common sense (and Nelson’s interpretation of it). 
To briefly sum up, in order to support her claim that common sense beliefs 
can be subject to empirical control, Nelson appeals to Quine’s account of the 
relationship between common sense and science as well as feminist science 
criticism. In doing so, she challenges Quine’s claim that there is a clear boundary 
between science and other common sense beliefs such as those influenced by 
political values. And, in order to support this claim, Nelson appeals to feminist 
science criticism as evidence that there is no such division. And lastly, Nelson 
appeals to Quine’s account of underdetermination in order to say that:  
 
‘There is “room” for alternatives to our going theories—alternative ways 
of describing the order we have found in nature, including our current laws 
of nature—and our adoption of such alternatives in one area of science or 
in our common-sense dealing with the world will eventually reverberate 





Based on all of this, Nelson claims that common sense beliefs, such as political 
views, can and should be subject to empirical control (Nelson, 1990, p. 248). This 
seems to be Nelson’s first premise: that political views should be treated as 
testable hypotheses. If we accept this, then feminist hypotheses become another 
option that scientists can appeal to amongst the range of other available options 
(this is where underdetermination comes in). Nelson argues that feminist science 
criticism has produced evidence; evidence that has revealed hidden assumptions 
in science; for example the idea that women’s sexuality is necessarily tied to 
reproduction.  
Nelson’s idea is that feminist science criticism questions theories based on 
evidence, including evidence about the underpinnings of the theories. The 
evidence are things like the detection of value-laden assumptions. For example, 
in the case of women’s sexuality necessarily being tied to reproduction, the 
evidence produced by feminist science criticism has revealed that, based on 
empirical evidence, it is not the case that women’s sexuality is necessarily tied to 
reproduction. It is this evidence which Nelson thinks can be subject to empirical 
testing. Nelson argues that feminist science criticism challenges the idea that 
science is an isolated enterprise and instead adopts and promotes the idea that 
things like political values are not only very much a part of science, but are also 
able to be subject to empirical control (Nelson, 1990).  
 We can break down Nelson’s proposal in the following way. Nelson wants 
to make the claim that common sense beliefs (such as those influenced by political 
values) can be subject to empirical control. In order to argue for this, she appeals 




sense theorizing. Secondly, she appeals to his account of underdetermination. In 
addition, she also appeals to feminist science criticism. And in doing this, she is 
forced to challenge Quine’s account of common sense theorizing. And all of these 
things put together, according to Nelson, support the claim that common sense 
beliefs can and should be subject to empirical control. Values are playing an 
indirect role here. The idea is that common sense beliefs are influenced by such 
things as political values. In this sense, by allowing feminist common sense beliefs, 
we would also be allowing feminist values to play role in science.  
 
1.2.1.1. Taking a Closer Look at the Role of Underdetermination in Nelson’s 
Proposal 
At the beginning of this chapter, I said I was interested in analysing some 
proposals put forth by feminist philosophers about the role of contextual values 
in science. The reason for this is that I want to advance the claim that science 
would benefit from adopting feminist values. However, while I endorse this claim, 
the way in which Nelson argues for this claim seems quite problematic. This is 
because the role of contextual values in her account (which is the key to 
developing an account of how science would benefit from adopting contextual 
values), when joined with Quine’s account of underdetermination, seems to be 
restricted to political motivations, which seem to have no epistemological 
relevance in science.  
 As we saw in the previous section, Nelson wants to make the case that 
common sense beliefs such as those influenced by political values can and should 




part of a scientific project, then it seems like they can and should be subject to 
empirical control. In this case, it seems like social values would have an 
epistemologically relevant and justified role within science (because they already 
form part of the scientific project). But, if political values are not part of a scientific 
project, then it is hard to see why they should be subject to empirical control. This 
is because political values, if not already part of a scientific project, would lack any 
epistemologically relevant role within the scientific project (other than a 
politically motivated one). Many philosophers often use the example of physics 
to ask how contextual values are or could have any relevance to the internal 
practices of this area of science. By asking this question, philosophers are 
challenging the idea that science and contextual values are interdependent in the 
strong sense that Nelson is arguing for. Nelson has responded to this objection by 
appealing to the idea that  
 
‘[…] it is possible, however unlikely it seems now, that changes in others 
of our theories will reverberate with sufficient resonance through the 
network of our going theories, to carry with them a need for a different 
logic, a different mathematics, or a different physics’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 
252). 
 
The idea is that contextual values do influence all of our scientific theories, even 
those which don’t appear to be influenced at first sight. This includes areas like 
physics, logic and maths. So the fundamental claim here seems to be the idea that 




 This is a problem because this is not how many areas of science appear to 
work. There seems to be a weak sense in which this is true: science is done in a 
social context. But this is not the same as claiming that contextual values are 
somehow interdependent with all of our sciences. It is true that feminist science 
criticism has provided us with valuable evidence about how contextual values 
have played a role in certain areas of science. But this evidence in no way allows 
us to extend the claim to cover all areas of science. In other words, we have no 
evidence or good reasons to think that the stronger claim is true.  
 But even if we ignore this problem and we agree with Nelson, her strategy 
is still a problematic one. This is due to her further appeal to underdetermination. 
Nelson’s idea is that Quine’s account of underdetermination allows for options 
and possible changes in science and also in our common sense beliefs (Nelson, 
1990). This is possible because according to Nelson: ‘Everything we say about how 
things are, Quine argues, is fundamentally underdetermined by the evidence we 
have –and could ever have—for saying it’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 245). I would like to 
zero in on the role that such an account plays in Nelson’s more general claim and 
on the consequences of adopting underdetermination. 
 
1.2.1.2. Problems with Underdetermination in Nelson’s Proposal 
Nelson appears to be appealing to both holistic and contrastive forms of 
underdetermination. On the one hand, she argues that underdetermination 
allows for changes in all of our theories (holistic underdetermination): ‘[…] 
commits us to the view that there is room for changes in all our theories—both 




she also argues that underdetermination allows for alternatives to our going 
theories (contrastive underdetermination): ‘There is “room” for alternatives to 
our going theories—alternative ways of describing the order we have found in 
nature, including our current laws of nature—[…]’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 248). In a 
clearer passage, she argues that ‘We can imagine alternative theories 
commensurate with most of our experiences, and incompatible with a going 
theory, for each of the theories we now maintain-including our most esoteric 
theories in subatomic physics and our common-sense theory about physical 
objects’ (Nelson, 1990, p. 245). This raises important problems. 
In both of these cases (holistic and contrastive underdetermination), there 
is a problem about how scientists are supposed to decide which theories to keep 
and which to reject  (in the case of holistic underdetermination) and which theory 
to choose (in the case of contrastive underdetermination). In the case of holistic 
underdetermination, Nelson appeals to Quine’s idea that we are not able to test 
an isolated hypothesis. This means that when a scientist is faced with negative 
results, they have two options. The first option is that they can choose to keep the 
hypothesis being tested and change some of the other theories sustaining that 
hypothesis in order to make the hypothesis work or, alternatively, they could 
choose to reject the hypothesis being tested and keep the theories that were 
sustaining the hypothesis. In either case, the idea is that this choice is 
underdetermined by evidence. Two of the main problems for feminists are that 
1) feminist values are restricted to cases in which evidence can no longer inform 
how a scientist chooses a theory and 2) it is not clear when scientists are supposed 




example, if a scientist decides to keep a hypothesis in the face of disconfirming 
evidence, how far should they go in changing the other theories in order to sustain 
that hypothesis? It is equally unclear what role, other than a political role, feminist 
values should play in these kinds of situations.  
In the case of contrastive underdetermination, Nelson appeals to the idea 
that underdetermination allows for alternative options to our going theories, in 
principle. This allows for possible changes in all of our going theories. This is 
because according to Nelson’s interpretation of underdetermination, there will 
always be alternative theories available which are able to account for the same 
empirical evidence. What Nelson doesn’t address, however, is how we are 
supposed to decide between competing theories in these cases. That is, supposing 
that we have theory 1 and theory 2, and that they are both able to account for 
the empirical evidence we have (and will even have), Nelson offers no proposal 
on how to decide between the two or what epistemological tools we should draw 
on to make this decision. 
 This is an important issue that should be addressed because we want to 
be able to have good epistemological reasons for choosing theories, not just good 
political reasons. While there are a number of problematic theories, we want to 
be able to say that they don’t work because they are flawed in some fundamental 
way; maybe the theory is rooted in a false fundamental assumption, like the case 
of women’s sexuality. Or maybe the theory has been disproven, like the 
geocentric model. In both of these examples the theories have been replaced, not 




Under Nelson’s account, it is unclear what role contextual values have in 
cases of underdetermination, other than a political one (which has historically not 
been a good strategy). My worry here (if we accept Nelson’s arguments so far) is 
that it is not clear what conceptual tools we would use (or have available) for 
choosing (and preferring) some theories over others. This raises the following 
problem: it is not clear what reasons we’d use for preferring certain contextual 
values over others in cases of underdetermination. For example, it is not clear 
what reasons we’d have for choosing theories which endorse feminist values over 
patriarchal values.  
While I agree with Nelson that we should definitely be choosing feminist 
values over patriarchal ones, I do not agree that we should appeal to 
underdetermination to make the case that science should adopt feminist values. 
This is because it is not clear that underdetermination provides us with a clear 
solution on how to settle disputes between conflicting values. This is a problem 
not only for Nelson’s proposal, but it is also a problem for other feminist proposals 
which draw on underdetermination in order to argue for the idea that science 
would benefit from adopting feminist values.  
 
1.2.2. Underdetermination and the Network Model (Potter) 
Another philosopher that appeals to underdetermination is Elizabeth Potter. In 
‘Modeling the Gender Politics in Science’ (1988), Potter’s overall project is to put 
forward a proposal that will collapse the internal/external distinction1 in our 
 
1 The internal here seems to be limited to scientific methodology, while the external seems to be 





understanding of science in order that feminist scholars can be in a better position 
to argue that feminist considerations can contribute to good science. Potter 
argues that feminist concerns have historically been understood as ‘external’ to 
science. For example, anytime that sexist assumptions have been found to have 
played a role in science, scientists and philosophers have been quick to argue that 
this happened because ‘external’ factors somehow made their way into scientific 
‘internal’ practices. This same line of reasoning, according to Potter, prevents 
feminist scholars from being able to argue that gender, class, and race factors can 
contribute to good science. This is because these factors are considered ‘external’ 
factors. Potter’s proposal is a revised version of Mary Hesse’s ‘Network Model’. 
The Network Model can be understood as ‘[…] a scientific theory as a system of 
laws which has a very complex relation to nature’ (Potter, 1988, p. 29). Potter 
draws from both Mary Hesse and Quine in order to argue that non-cognitive 
values are compatible with good science. Potter argues that if we extend Hesse’s 
Network Model, it can be useful to feminist philosophers of science. More 
precisely, she suggests that we amend the coherence conditions to include 
gender, class, and race considerations so that scientists can be justified in 
appealing to them: ‘At least in those cases in which a particular generalization in 
underdetermined by the data […]’ (Potter, 1988, p. 30).  
In this section, I will provide a brief overview of Potter’s account and work 
my way through to the discussion of underdetermination. While I agree with 
Potter that in cases in which scientific theories are *for the time being* 
underdetermined by the data, scientists should be justified in appealing to other 




needs to be said about how scientists are to go about deciding which 
considerations to include and when to include them. Furthermore, I disagree with 
the normative claim that feminist scholars should appeal to the stronger and more 
traditional understanding of underdetermination which says that scientific 
theories will *always* be underdetermined by the evidence. Finally, I argue, as I 
have been doing throughout this chapter, that appealing to underdetermination 
(in the strong sense) as a means to argue that feminist values can contribute to 
good science is a bad idea. This is because doing so comes with many undesirable 
problems and because it limits the ways in which feminist values can contribute 
to good science to cases in which theories are underdetermined by the evidence. 
   
1.2.2.1. The Network Model 
‘When the scientist establishes a law, Hesse argues, she classifies phenomena on 
the basis of resemblance among them’ (Potter, 1988, p. 29).  This is the idea that 
scientists classify according to similarity or differences found in the phenomena 
that they encounter. Potter gives the example of a red dwarf and says that the 
astronomer might encounter a star and then have to decide whether it is similar 
enough to other red dwarfs to classify it as a red dwarf or different enough not 
to. According to her, scientists are constantly faced with these kinds of decisions. 
Are a group of stars (to follow the same example), similar enough to be classified 
as red dwarfs? What characteristics define a red dwarf? How many of these 
characteristics does a star need to meet in order to be classed as a red dwarf? And 
so on. Many of these questions, according to Potter, bring up a further important 




classifying phenomena, the ones that are similar, or the ones that are dissimilar? 
This is important because once all of the data about a particular phenomenon are 
in, the scientist must make a decision. And this, according to Potter, is a case of 
the scientist ‘interpreting the data’ (Potter, 1988, p. 29). This is where 
underdetermination begins to make its way in. According to Potter,  
  
‘Data alone, observations alone, do not determine a law or generalization; 
for example, we observe that whales swim in the water and so are like fish; 
but we also observe that they are live-bearing like mammals. Are they fish 
or are they mammals?’ (Potter, 1988, p. 29). 
 
The idea here is that the observations that we derive from phenomena are not 
enough to make a generalization about them. One of the reasons that scientists 
are not able to make a generalization based on similarity, according to Potter, is 
because similarity is not transitive. That is, star2 might resemble star1 and star2 
might resemble star3, but that does not mean that star1 and star3 necessarily 
resemble each other. This creates a problem. How should the scientist classify 
star2? Should they classify it as they would classify star1 or should they classify it 
they would classify star3? According to Potter, ‘[…] any decision here is 
underdetermined by the data […]  and so […] has to be determined on other 
grounds’ (Potter, 1988, pp. 29–30). 
 One way of determining this, according to Potter, might be by appealing 
to logical coherence. This is the idea that scientists base their decision on the 




hypothesis (or generalisation) that provides the most coherence with other 
theories. The problem with this, according to Potter, is that that same hypothesis 
can also be taken as a reason to reject theories already in place in cases where 
evidence alone is not able to determine theory choice. The idea here, according 
to Potter, is that scientists cannot always appeal to logical coherence as a criterion 
to make a decision.   
 Philosophers who adopt a network model argue that scientists should 
appeal to cognitive virtues in situations in which evidence alone is not able to 
inform their decisions. ‘Scientists hold or should hold certain assumptions about 
what constitutes good systems of laws or “good theories”’ (Potter, 1988, p. 30). 
These assumptions include cognitive virtues such as ‘simplicity’ (that a good 
theory should be simple), ‘accuracy’ (that a good theory should be accurate), 
‘empirical adequacy’ (that a good theory should be empirically adequate), etc. To 
make this point, Potter appeals to Quine’s idea that ‘[…] the assumptions that 
good theories are “conservative” or are “simple” guide the scientist to make the 
decision that conserves most of what has been held true in the past , or the one 
that makes the system simpler (Quine 1978)’ (Potter, 1988, p. 30). In other words, 
when scientists are faced with a situation of underdetermination, according to 
philosophers who subscribe to the network model, they should look to cognitive 
virtues, because it is these which will guide the scientist to make a decision that 
is very much on board with what has been held true before or one that will lead 
to a simpler scientific system. Hesse refers to these cognitive virtues (simplicity, 




 Potter’s objection to the coherence conditions, as proposed by Hesse, is 
that these coherence conditions do not account for gender, class, and race 
assumptions that, according to her, also seem to inform scientific choices. Potter’s 
proposal is that we extend the Network Model so that we are able to account for 
these kinds of assumptions.  
 
‘Unless we extend the Network Model by recognizing gender, class and 
race assumptions as “coherence conditions,” the model will not be useful 
to feminists because it will not really collapse the internal/external 
distinction or other distinctions hindering a feminist understanding of 
science’ (Potter, 1988, p. 30). 
 
That is, unless androcentric, sexists, classist, and racist assumptions are accounted 
for, there will be room for continuing to think that these kinds of assumptions do 
not operate in the internal practices of science, which is exactly what Potter is 
trying to argue against. Potter’s suggestion here is that ‘[…] we crack the Network 
Model open by looking with feminist eyes at actual cases in order to discover 
coherence conditions […]’ (Potter, 1988, p. 30). 
 According to Potter, we should do this:  
 
‘At least for those cases in which a particular generalization is 
underdetermined by the data, as the generalization that matter is dead 




adopt must be based on other grounds than simple observation’ (Potter, 
1988, p. 30).     
  
The idea here is that when presented with a case of underdetermination, the 
scientist will adopt a generalization (or hypothesis) which is based on non-
observational factors. Potter’s proposal is that instead of only having the 
traditional cognitive virtues available for the scientist to appeal to, we should 
extend these in order to include assumptions that recognize gender, class, and 
race.  
 These assumptions would have a similar role to that of cognitive virtues. 
The scientist would still be able to weigh out their options and identify the 
consequences that the adoption of certain assumptions would have for the rest 
of their theory, as well as to other working theories. Furthermore, on a Network 
Model,  
 
‘[…] each generalization in the system is—at any given time, though not at 
all times—corrigible, so there is nothing theoretically to prevent us from 
discovering that even the most innocent choice is constrained ultimately 
by an androcentric or sexist assumption’ (Potter, 1988, p. 31).    
 
This flexibility means that the scientist is able to change or alter assumptions while 
still allowing some degree of the more traditional coherence conditions. A 
consequence, according to Potter, is that we can have good theories (according 





‘Thus, the model makes it clear that even good scientific theories, by all of 
the traditional criteria, can be androcentric or sexist in the sense that a 
sexist or androcentric assumption constrains the distribution of truth 
values throughout the system’ (Potter, 1988, p. 31).  
 
This, according to Potter, is supposed to leave room for altering or changing 
assumptions that are sexist or androcentric in nature. Furthermore, Potter claims 
that this theoretical move will also allow for the possibility of ‘[…] new and 
different theory constructions’ (Potter, 1988, p. 31). That is, new scientific 
theories that are born out of different assumptions. This would allow for the 
possibility of creating new theories based on feminist assumptions (because these 
would now be part of the coherence conditions); while not taking away from the 
other, more traditional cognitive virtues. Under this model, scientific theories 
would still be able to enjoy the distribution of more traditional cognitive virtues 
such as simplicity, accuracy, empirical adequacy, and so on.  
To briefly sum up, Potter proposes that if we amend the Network Model, 
it might prove useful for feminist philosophers of science. To do this, she proposes 
that we extend the coherence conditions in order that these are able to account 
for gender, class, and race. This is because, according to her, in some cases in 
which theories are underdetermined by evidence, scientists also seem to appeal 
to assumptions about gender, class, and race, except that when they do, this is 
usually considered as bad science because these kind of considerations are 




decide between conflicting generalisations, then philosophers need to account 
for the work that these assumptions are doing in the internal practices of science. 
One way of accomplishing this, according to Potter, is by extending the coherence 
conditions in order to include these kinds of assumptions. 
In ‘Modeling the Gender Politics in Science’ (1988), the kind of 
underdetermination being appealed to by Potter seems to be holistic 
underdetermination. This is the idea that no one hypothesis (generalisation) can 
be tested in isolation. This then leaves the scientists underdetermined in their 
response to a failed prediction. Situations like this leave open two possibilities, 
both underdetermined by the evidence: 1) reject the hypothesis in light of the 
disconfirming evidence or 2) adopt the hypothesis but reject some of their 
currently accepted theories.  
 
1.2.2.2. Problems with Potter’s Proposal 
I agree with Potter that assumptions about gender, class, and race should be 
accounted for in science. However, I disagree that the best way of accomplishing 
this is by appealing to underdetermination. While Potter makes a successful case 
for the idea that ‘external’ factors sometimes influence the ‘internal’ practices of 
science, she does not make a case for the idea that we should appeal to these 
external factors in cases of underdetermination. Appealing to more traditional 
cognitive virtues such as simplicity is a contentious issue in the philosophy of 
science. One of the reasons this is a contentious issue is because it is not clear 
why scientists should prefer theories that are simpler over more complex 




cognitive virtues are not widely accepted as considerations that scientists should 
appeal to. It is one thing to argue that scientists usually appeal to simplicity and 
another quite different thing to argue that scientists should be justified in 
appealing to simplicity. This applies to Potter. It is one thing to argue that 
scientists usually appeal to gender, class, and race considerations and another 
thing to argue that scientists should be justified in appealing to these 
considerations, which Potter hasn’t done.  
Second, assuming that Potter does make a case for the above, it is unclear 
how scientists should decide between competing assumptions in the absence of 
empirical evidence. It is unclear how these assumptions are supposed to aid 
specific research projects. Potter doesn’t provide any guidance on these issues.  
Another important issue is that appealing to underdetermination is 
limiting in terms of the work that feminist considerations are able to play in 
science. It is limiting because feminist concerns come into play here only after all 
empirical evidence has been exhausted. However, I think that a more successful 
proposal is one that allows feminist considerations to play a role in the 
formulations of the hypothesis, the study design, etc., when relevant to the 
research project’s aims. I will expand on this idea over the next couple of chapters, 
for now it is only important to make clear that appealing to underdetermination 
as a way to further the feminist normative claim that feminist considerations 
should play a role in science is, at best, very limiting in terms of the role they are 





1.2.3. Towards a Socially Responsible Philosophy of Science (Kourany) 
In ‘A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century’ (2003), Kourany 
proposes a new program for philosophy of science, a socially responsible 
philosophy of science. As with other sections in this chapter, what I am particularly 
interested in is the role that underdetermination plays in her account. With this 
in mind, I will give an overview of her account, with a focus on 
underdetermination.  
 According to Kourany, ‘A major reason feminists are concerned with 
science is that science can be a powerful ally in the struggle for equality for 
women’ (2003, p. 3). It can address societal injustices and rectify these with more 
accurate information. But as Kourany points out, it seems that instead, science 
has served as an active participant in the perpetuation of these injustices, which 
is another reason that feminists are concerned with science.  She offers some 
historical examples:  
 
‘In the seventeenth century, women’s brains were claimed to be too 
“cold” and “soft” to sustain rigorous thought.  In the late eighteenth 
century, the female cranial cavity was claimed to be too small to hold a 
powerful brain. In the late nineteenth century, the exercise of women’s 
brains was claimed to be damaging to women’s reproductive health—was 
claimed, in fact, to shrivel women’s ovaries. In the twentieth century, the 
lesser “lateralization” (hemispheric specialization) of women’s brains 




skills (including mathematical skills) (Schiebinger 1989)’ (Kourany, 2003, p. 
4). 
 
According to Kourany, this is problematic, not just in the context of science, but 
in the more general social context as well. This is because claims like these serve 
to perpetuate women’s inferior status in society.  
 With this, Kourany aims to make a contrast between the interests that 
most twentieth century philosophers have in science with that of feminists. 
According to Kourany, while most twentieth century philosophers have a purely 
epistemic interest in science, feminists have a social one. The reason for this is 
that science can serve as an ally, and this is beneficial for women. It is also of 
interest to feminists due to the influence that science has had on women’s 
struggle for equality (as the above examples illustrate). Feminist political 
theorists, for example, have been invested in developing an egalitarian ideal of 
human flourishing, which Kourany thinks serves as an excellent guide for a socially 
responsible philosophy of science.  
 Adopting an egalitarian ideal of human flourishing can be useful in both 
the context of discovery and in the evaluation process, according to Kourany. The 
context of discovery here has to do with decisions about what research should be 
pursued, which should be funded, which should be given priority, etc. The 
evaluation process has to do with how we evaluate scientific theories, including 
the criteria that are used to evaluate scientific theories.  
In the context of discovery, according to Kourany, an egalitarian ideal of 




Kourany suggests advocating for: ‘[…] a national science policy that prioritizes the 
funding of research of interest and benefit to women […]’ (2003, p. 7). This would 
serve as an incentive for scientists to pursue research that is beneficial for women. 
Secondly, this national science policy would ‘[…] deny funding for research that 
neglects women’s interests and needs […]’ (2003, p. 7). According to Kourany, this 
is already taking place in U.S. law with the National Institutes of Health 
Revitalization Act of 1993, for example. Thirdly, the national policy would 
prioritise ‘[…] the funding of research that promises support for egalitarian views 
and programs […]’ and ‘[…] initiatives that deprioritize the funding of research that 
threatens egalitarian views and programs […]’ (2003, p. 8). This, however, does 
not mean that Kourany would support the prohibition of such programs; she 
would just give them a lower priority.  
 One possible objection to this, according to Kourany, is that deprioritising 
such projects is incompatible with science’s aim to pursue all truth. However, 
Kourany points out that choices must be made about what research projects to 
pursue, we can’t pursue all research. This is because there are only so many 
resources available (e.g. funding). However, for those that argue that scientific 
research should be pursued on more ‘neutral’ grounds, Kourany argues that it is 
not clear that this is how research programs are pursued. She points out that most 
of our current research is financed by institutions that have a direct interest in the 
research that is being pursued. This includes institutions such as pharmaceutical 
companies, which often have a financial interest in the research. As a result, 




reasons. So, if we agree with this, then research that stems from an egalitarian 
ideal should not pose a problem. 
 The second part of Kourany’s proposal has to do with the modes of 
evaluation.  In this section, she begins by addressing the objection that the 
feminist project is antithetical to the pursuit of truth. To those that argue that 
science pursues truth and that ‘[…] the feminist project is antithetical to such a 
pursuit of truth since it offers as a mode of evaluating scientific research 
something—support for egalitarian views—that is not a criterion or indicator of 
truth’ (2003, p. 9), Kourany replies that so far no criterion has proven to be an 
indicator of truth (i.e. not simplicity, not fruitfulness, not scope, etc.). In this sense, 
she argues that the feminist project may not be as problematic as some might 
think.  
Still, there might be some that object that even if we were to accept that 
science has other aims, the feminist project still does not seem to follow any other 
scientific aim: ‘[…] the feminist project’s mode of evaluating science is antithetical 
to the pursuit of any other scientific aim as well […]’ (2003, p. 10). One example is 
Bas C. van Fraassen’s proposal that the aim of science is empirical adequacy (anti-
realist proposal). On Bas C. van Fraassen’s proposal, a belief that the scientific 
theory is empirically adequate is required for accepting a scientific theory 
(contrary to realist proposals that argue that the aim of science is truth and that 
in order to accept a theory there has to be a belief that the theory is a true story 
about what the world is actually like). Kourany argues that the objection that the 
feminist project is antithetical to the pursuit of any scientific aim is confused. She 




knowledge that fits our observations (2003). For example, the realist that claims 
that the aim of science is truth still requires that theories being put forth fit our 
observations, the same as the anti-realist such as Bas C. van Fraassen who claims 
that the aim of science is not truth but empirical adequacy. This is the idea that 
independently of the metaphysical commitments one might have for accepting a 
theory, what all of these aims have in common is that they all require that the 
knowledge fit our observations. In this sense, Kourany seems to think that the 
feminist project can be compatible with many scientific aims because the feminist 
project also requires that the scientific knowledge fit our observations.  
The next question then might be how and when egalitarian views are able 
to play a role in the feminist project. This is where underdetermination comes in. 
Kourany appeals to underdetermination to argue that there will always be a 
system of knowledge which is able to account for our observations (data). 
According to ‘the Duhem/Quine underdetermination thesis’, ‘[…] there will 
always in principle be more than one such system that can do this, and according 
to what the history of science discloses, there is frequently in practice more than 
one such system as well’ (2003, p. 10). The idea is that there will always be more 
than one theory to choose from. According to Kourany, this ties in nicely with the 
feminist project because it allows for the possibility of choosing a theory that best 
supports egalitarian goals. This is the idea that, if we have two conflicting theories, 
which are equally well-supported by all of the empirical evidence (data), then we 
should choose the theory that best supports the egalitarian ideal.  
 Kourany argues that this project should be pursued due to social reasons, 




should also pursue this project because society is affected by science, and 
ultimately because science shapes lives and consciousness, so science should 
address the needs of society (2003).One of these needs, according to Kourany, is 
justice and equality for women. In this sense, the reasons for opting for theories 
that support that egalitarian ideal are socially motivated.  
 
1.2.3.1 Problems with Kourany’s Proposal 
Underdetermination plays a key role in Kourany’s proposal of the feminist project. 
Although she argues that the feminist project can be compatible with many 
scientific aims, feminist concerns do not make their way in unless we buy into the 
idea of a strong form of contrastive underdetermination. Again, this is the idea 
that for any body of evidence (data) there will be alternative theories that will be 
able to account for this same body of evidence.  
Kourany does not explicitly appeal to ‘contrastive underdetermination’. 
Instead, she appeals to a rather strange version of the ‘Duhem/Quine 
underdetermination thesis’. I say rather strange because, as I have argued earlier 
on in this chapter, strictly speaking, there is no ‘Duhem/Quine 
underdetermination thesis’, their accounts are quite different. Additionally, 
Kourany does not justify the appeal to social and political motivations and this is 
important because neither Quine nor Duhem (the people she is appealing to) 
think that it is acceptable to appeal to extra-scientific factors in cases of 
underdetermination. Because Duhem and Quine do not think that extra-scientific 




Kourany is required to explain why scientists should be justified in appealing to 
extra-scientific factors. 
 Secondly, Kourany offers no details about the contrastive form of 
underdetermination that she is appealing to in this paper (i.e. a model that shows 
how alternative theories are generated). This is a problem because contrastive 
underdetermination is a contentious issue in the philosophy of science.  For 
example, Laudan and Leplin (1991) have argued that no such thing is possible. I 
think that this problem is relevant for the feminist project because, it is not 
immediately clear that there will a) be any alternative theories b) that any of these 
theories will be sympathetic to the egalitarian ideal which is of central importance 
to Kourany’s project.  
 I think that Kourany makes an excellent case for the idea that external 
factors such as sexist assumptions play a role in science. However, I think that the 
solution to the kinds of problems she brings up in this paper cannot be solved by 
appealing to underdetermination. For example, the generalisation from the 
seventeenth century that women’s brains were too cold and soft for rigorous 
thought was eventually considered wrong for many other reasons that had 
nothing to do with having alternative theories that were able to account for that 
same data collected by scientists. As is the case in other research areas that are 
also of interest to feminist philosophers, these scientists got many things wrong: 
study question, study design, metaphysical assumptions, etc. The data was 
collected under very problematic assumptions. The problem here are the study 
questions, the concepts being used, the metaphysical assumptions being used, 




aside) is not very helpful for feminists committed to advancing the feminist 
normative claim that science would benefit from feminist values.  
 
1.3. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter, above all else, has been to make a convincing case that 
feminist scholars should not appeal to underdetermination (whatever the 
version) in order to make the case that science would benefit from feminist 
values.  
Appealing to underdetermination setts additional obstacles for feminist 
scholars because proponents of underdetermination argue that in cases of 
underdetermination, scientists should not appeal to social and political 
considerations, which are precisely the kinds of things that feminist scholars are 
interested in appealing to.  
Leaving this issue aside, feminist scholars are often unclear about the kind 
of underdetermination they are appealing to in order to make their case. For 
example, many appeal to the ‘Duhem/Quine thesis’, when Duhem’s and Quine’s 
accounts are actually quite different from each other. In cases where we are able 
to identify the kind of underdetermination being appealed to, I found that crucial 
questions for feminist scholars remain unanswered. These questions include how 
scientists are supposed to choose between competing theories (in cases of 
contrastive underdetermination) and how they are supposed to decide what 





Importantly, appealing to underdetermination limits the role that feminist 
values can play in science.  This is because feminist values are only able to come 
into play after all empirical considerations have been exhausted. I think that this 
is undesirable because feminist values can also inform other aspects of scientific 
research including the study design, the concepts beings used, etc. I will expand 
on these ideas in the next chapter, where I will explore feminist proposals that do 


















2. Upgrading the Role of Contextual Values without Appealing to 
Underdetermination 
In the previous chapter, I argued that accounts that buy into underdetermination 
in order to argue for an epistemically justifiable role for contextual values are 
undesirable. In doing this, I considered three accounts: Lynn Hankinson Nelson 
(1990), Elizabeth Potter (1988), and Janet Kourany (2003). In this chapter, I engage 
with value literature that, unlike the previous group, does not appeal to 
underdetermination in order to make the case for an epistemically justifiable role 
for contextual values in scientific research.  I engage with two proposals: 
Kourany’s Socially Responsible Science proposal and Douglas’ Inductive Risk 
argument. I argue that while these approaches are more desirable than the 
underdetermination proposals we looked at in the previous chapter, some crucial 




In the previous chapter, we engaged with Kourany’s A Philosophy for the Twenty-
First Century (2003), where she appeals to underdetermination. The book I will be 
discussing in this section, also by Kourany, does not seem to appeal to 
underdetermination. It is unclear, however, if, in light of her new proposal, she 
now rejects underdetermination, or whether she thinks that appealing to 
underdetermination can still work alongside her new proposal.  I leave this 
difficulty aside and start by jumping straight into her new proposal: an Ideal of 




In Philosophy of Science After Feminism (2010), Kourany proposes that in 
order for her SRS ideal to succeed, it must be judged by two standards: (1) a 
moral/political standard and (2) an epistemic standard.  Here, the first standard is 
on a par with the second. This is radically different from ideals that appeal to 
underdetermination, which would have moral/political considerations come into 
play only after all other (epistemic) considerations have been exhausted. In this 
sense, what Kourany is doing is putting moral/political considerations at the same 
level as epistemic considerations (not first and not after). This is a defining feature 
of her proposal and this makes the SRS ideal a prime candidate for the non-
underdetermination group of proposals that aim to make a case for contextual 
values in science.  
As Kourany notes, one of the earliest strategies from feminist scholars 
addressing sexism and androcentrism in science in the twentieth century was to 
appeal to the value-free ideal (roughly, an ideal which insists that there is a 
distinction between ‘epistemic values’ (sometimes also called cognitive values) 
and ‘other values’ such as social, political, and ethical values, and claims that only 
the former but not the latter values should play a role in science). Many feminist 
scholars working in the twentieth century thought that the presence of sexism 
and androcentrism in science were due to bad science and that these patriarchal 
values (‘other values’) could be eliminated (or greatly reduced) by appealing to 
the value-free ideal. The thought was that if scientists followed standards that 
were more rigorous, sexist and androcentric assumptions, biases, etc. would be 




The idea was that this would benefit women socially. It would do so by 
disproving awful scientific ideas, such as the idea that women were biologically 
inferior. This supposed biological inferiority was taken to cause women’s lesser 
intelligence and this placed women at a significant social disadvantage (compared 
to men who were thought to be the superior, more intelligent being).  The hope 
was that by disproving these sexist and androcentric ideas, women would be able 
to enjoy a more equitable social space. And, one way of disproving these ideas, 
was to appeal to the value-free ideal. In this sense, the value-free ideal would help 
address moral/political considerations as well, but it would do so only as a result 
of being more epistemically rigorous. In other words, the thought was that the 
value-free ideal was capable of addressing moral/political concerns, but only 
indirectly. Moral/political considerations were to never enter the evaluative 
process, since this is what had allowed values such as sexism and androcentrism 
into the scientific context in the first place. 
 This approach, however, didn’t work out so well for a number of reasons. 
One of the most relevant and important reasons to note here (for the purposes 
of this chapter), is that in rightfully criticising sexist and androcentric science and 
calling for change, feminist scholars seemed to be shaping that very science with 
feminist values. They did this through the questions they asked, and through the 
things that they proposed should be included when designing, constructing, and 
evaluating experiments. The thought was that even if all of these questions and 
proposals led to better science, these proposals were nonetheless being informed 




One way out of this problem was to argue that their questions, criticisms, 
and proposals were objective. However, this would have been a bad strategy 
because feminists were in a special position to know that there was no such thing 
as purely objective science (in the sense of ‘the view from nowhere’). They were 
in a special position to know this because this is the story that sexist and 
androcentric science had been trying to sell them all along (that there was ‘a view 
from nowhere’).  
The alternative to this was to agree that science was in fact informed by 
values. The problem they faced with this strategy, however, was that feminist 
values are social values (‘other values’), which, according to the value-free ideal, 
have no legitimate place in science. If the strategy was to keep social values out 
by advocating for more rigorous scientific methodology, then feminist scholars 
had to explain why feminist values were acceptable but sexist and androcentric 
values were unacceptable. Again, this was hard to respond to given that feminists 
scholars appealing to the value-free ideal supported the idea that social values in 
the context of science amounted to bad science and should therefore be kept out 
of the scientific context.  As Kourany notes, some feminist scholars responded to 
this challenge by saying that feminist values merely played a motivational role, 
claimed that feminist values were operating as a methodological control for bad 
social values, while others said that the problem had to do objectivity. In the end, 
however, many feminist scholars decided that what was needed was a new 
understanding of scientific objectivity (Kourany, 2010).  
 In this regard, the value-free ideal, as a candidate, failed to meet the needs 





‘The ideal of value-free science promised to play for feminist scientists 
both an epistemic role and a political role—promised to provide both a 
way to achieve objective knowledge and (by ridding science of sexism, 
androcentrism, and other inegalitarian values) a way to achieve social 
reform’ (Kourany, 2010). 
 
What is needed, then, is an ideal capable of addressing both political and 
epistemic concerns. Kourany thinks that no clear replacement for the value-free 
ideal (which is capable of addressing both of these concerns) has emerged, up 
until now. This is where her ideal for SRS comes in. She proposes the SRS ideal as 
a replacement for the value-free ideal. In what follows, I will lay out her proposal. 
 
2.2. The Ideal of Socially Responsible Science (SRS) (Kourany) 
The SRS ideal, like the value-free ideal, is committed to ridding science of sexism 
and androcentrism. The SRS ideal, however, is committed to ‘[…] implanting 
egalitarian social values into science’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 68). This means that, 
unlike the value-free ideal, the SRS ideal is prepared to bring social values (‘other 
values’) to the forefront, alongside epistemic values (and not after, like the value-
free ideal would have it). According to the SRS approach, ‘[…] sound social values 
as well as sound epistemic values must control every aspect of the scientific 
research process from the choice of research questions to the communication and 
application of results, this to be enforced by such political means as funding 




problem that feminist scholars appealing to the value-free ideal were faced with 
when trying to figure out how to account for feminist values. With the Ideal for 
Socially Responsible Science, we have an ideal that is unafraid to endorse feminist 
values. Kourany’s account is committed to the idea that ‘[…] social values 
inevitably enter into science […]’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 68), but that ultimately, 
society has a definite say on what these social values will be (Kourany, 2010). 
These values, according to her, will be chosen according to the needs of society 
and guided by an egalitarian ideal. As far as scientific rationality goes, the SRS ideal 
is committed to the idea that it must be defined in terms of scientific success, but 
that this must, in turn, be defined in terms of both social success and empirical 
success. This means that scientific rationality must be reconceptualised in a way 
which allows it to account for what happens in the social context, which has 
traditionally been ignored by science. This, according to Kourany, will ensure that 
science: 
 
‘[…] would no longer be plagued by sexism and androcentrism (as well as 
racism and other inegalitarian values) simply because those would be the 
morally justified political conditions under which scientific research would 
be pursued’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 68). 
 
The idea here, then, is that the SRS ideal, unlike the value-free ideal, will be able 
to fulfil both the moral/political role and the epistemic role that will allow feminist 
scholars to address injustices faced by women in the social context. It will do this, 




 What Kourany is doing here is bold. It’s one of the few value accounts that 
have been unafraid of bringing contextual values to the forefront. For a long time, 
philosophers of science have wanted nothing to do with social (contextual values). 
Some of the more mainstream philosophical literature that gave contextual values 
a role, gave them a role at the margins of scientific inquiry. That is, they gave them 
a role only after all epistemic considerations had been exhausted (think of 
underdetermination, for example). This was the idea that contextual values 
should not play a role unless there was some kind of uncertainty or gap between 
the evidence and the theory. If there was uncertainty, then it was OK to appeal to 
values. But not *all* values. Some philosophers like Laudan (1990), argued that 
the only kind of values scientists should be appealing to were epistemic values 
(cognitive values). In this sense, Kourany is going against this idea and arguing that 
contextual values should be just as important as epistemic considerations in the 
context of science.  
 Her proposal, however, is not without its problems. Many things require 
clarification and that might be important to keep in mind as we dive into her 
proposal. (1) First, it is unclear if Kourany is arguing that moral/political 
considerations should play a role alongside epistemic considerations throughout 
all stages of science. If we idealise the scientific process to consist of roughly four 
stages: 1) problem selection, 2) making methodological choices (what methods 
scientists are going to employ to collect data, etc.), 3) the collection and 
characterisation of data (based on the methods that they choose), and 4) the 
interpretation of the results, it is unclear if what Kourany is arguing here is that 




considerations throughout all of these stages of the scientific process. While it 
seems uncontroversial that political/moral considerations play a role alongside 
epistemic considerations in the case of stage 1 and possibly stage 2, it’s worrying 
that political/moral considerations should play a role alongside epistemic 
considerations in stages 3 and 4. It is unclear if Kourany is arguing that these 
considerations should be on par in principle, or whether political/moral 
considerations should play a role only after all empirical considerations have been 
exhausted (in cases of uncertainty). (2) Furthermore, it is also unclear what 
relationship each of these scientific stages have to each other. For example, to 
what extent should political/moral considerations in the selection of research 
affect the chosen methodology? I will return to these questions following a 
detailed overview of Kourany’s proposal.  
 
2.2.1. A Model for Scientists to Follow 
Through an example of current research, Kourany guides us through how the SRS 
ideal might be implemented in practice. To do this, Kourany engages with the 
work of Carolyn West. Her research focuses on intimate partner violence and 
sexual assault in the United States. The aim of her research program is: 
 
‘[…] to uncover the similarities in intimate-partner violence within the 
black and white communities of the United States without negating the 
experiences of black women and simultaneously to highlight the 




the stereotype that black Americans are inherently more violent than 
other ethnic groups’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 69). 
 
As Kourany notes, in order to carry out this research aim successfully, many 
changes had to be made to the research project; including changing the focus, 
changing concepts & measurements, and integrating participants. For one, the 
definition of ‘partner violence’ was broadened in order to be able to account for 
the ‘psychological, emotional, verbal, and sexual abuse, as well as physical abuse’ 
(Kourany, 2010, p. 69). Changes were also made to the way that violence was 
measured, which, for the most part, was male focused. By male focused, Kourany 
means that what was previously taken into account was only male violent 
behaviour. This had to be changed in order to include and account for the 
experiences of women. This was done by including the context in which that 
violent behaviour took place, by taking into account the motives, and by 
accounting for the outcome that those behaviours had (2010). In addition to this, 
measurement scales were also revised in order to avoid taking white European 
American as the norm, and also to aid in avoiding a simplistic account of racial 
differences as the explanation for group differences within the black and white 
communities. This was done by looking into differences that might exists within 
groups (e.g. differences between subgroups within the black community), to help 
determine whether the differences usually attributed to race (e.g. between black 
and white communities), instead had to do with social inequalities. And finally, 
the research programme also required that the study participants be integrated 




participants ‘[…] from planning to implementing, interpreting, and disseminating 
results, in order to reduce one-sided research interpretations’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 
25-26). This approach is different from more traditional research. The research 
subjects are not only being studied, but their feedback is also being integrated in 
significant ways. After giving an overview, Kourany asks: 
 
‘[…] what are the effects of the egalitarian social values that operate within 
West’s research program? Do they compromise the justifiability of the 
knowledge the program provides? First, what are these values?’ (Kourany, 
2010, p. 70). 
 
These are all great questions, indeed. In response to the question of what these 
values are, Kourany responds by saying that they seem to be that ‘[…] “Women 
deserve to live without fear of violence from domestic partners” and [that] “Black 
women deserve the same opportunities as white women to live in such 
partnerships.”’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 70). Kourany takes these values to be 
uncontroversial, and so do I.  Secondly, Kourany takes these values to be playing 
a central role in West’s research programme. This means that values like these aid 
West’s research in avoiding the perpetuation of ‘the stereotype that black 
Americans are inherently more violent than other ethnic groups’ and instead 
motivates her team to explain differences (as far as empirically possible) in terms 
of social differences (Kourany, 2010). In other words, egalitarian values seem to 
be driving the focus away from research roads that will lead towards the 




roads that will lead towards new ways of explaining and accounting for the 
similarities and differences in intimate-partner violence within the black and 
white communities in the US.  When the focus shifts, the study design changes. 
This is, in part, why West finds herself in need of changing the concepts, 
measurements, and why she chooses to integrate the study participants into the 
research process.  In this sense, these values are indeed playing a central role in 
terms of controlling the direction of the research project. But what of the 
epistemic values? Kourany is not as clear as to what these actually are (as she is 
with the egalitarian values), but one epistemic value we might be able to highlight 
is: providing genuine knowledge of the context which West aims to reform. 
Kourany tells us that social values and epistemic values are interrelated. This 
means that West cannot expect to create social change without meeting the 
research programme’s epistemic objectives. That is, if West wants to improve 
things for women, she must successfully account for the context which she aims 
to reform, and she cannot do this without adhering to strict epistemic standards 
(although, she does not make clear what these epistemic standards are). In this 
sense, West’s research programme, according to Kourany, should be judged by 
two standards: (1) a moral/political standard and (2) an epistemic standard.  
 Kourany anticipates two objections here. The first is that the way she 
paints the picture makes it seem as though social and epistemic values cannot 
conflict in research programmes such as West’s. She anticipates her objector 
asking: ‘After all, what if the stereotype that black Americans are inherently more 
violent than other ethnic groups were true?’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 71). What the 




West’s research programme would not be able to discover this truth, but not only 
this, West’s research programme would also stand in the way of discovering such 
truth. Consequently, West would be sacrificing epistemic considerations for the 
sake of social ones.  
 Kourany replies by claiming that if the stereotype were true, West’s 
research programme would be able to uncover this knowledge. What would make 
this possible is the fact that West’s research programme is not committed to 
explaining differences between the black and white communities in terms of 
social differences no matter what, but only as far as empirically possible. This 
means that if the stereotype were true, the social differences explanation would 
not be very successful, but this doesn’t mean that West’s programme wouldn’t be 
able to contribute towards proving that the stereotype was true. It would 
contribute, it would just take a bit longer to arrive at that knowledge since the 
core of her research programme is committed to the egalitarian values described 
above. Kourany also claims that none of this would ‘contaminate’ the knowledge 
produced since what West’s research would be doing is directing research in a 
particular direction, guided by the needs of society (Kourany, 2010). 
 The second objection that Kourany anticipates is perhaps one of the most 
hotly debated in the philosophy of science literature. The objection that if the 
stereotype were true, not only would West’s programme be affected by looking 






‘[…] concepts (e.g., the concept of ‘partner violence’ itself); measurement 
scales and techniques; methods of subject selection; strategies of data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation; and even methods of publishing 
and disseminating results. It may even affect other central (p.73) aspects 
of the research process, such as consideration of the consequences of 
error and setting acceptable levels of risk (see, e.g., Douglas 2000)’ 
(Kourany, 2010, pp. 72–73). 
 
The idea is that these concepts, measurement scales, techniques, etc. are affected 
by changing the focus of the research project. As we saw earlier, West’s focus on 
egalitarian values led to changes in the study design, including broadening the 
concept of partner violence, changing the way in which violence is measured, etc. 
The charge is that the egalitarian ideal guiding West’s research programme would 
be contaminating the inner workings of science and thus slowing down the 
process towards the acquisition of truth. This is because, if it turns out that the 
similarities and differences in domestic violence within the black and white 
communities cannot be explained in terms of social differences, then West’s 
research programme would be slowing down the process towards the acquisition 
of truth (the true explanation, if there was one), or so the charge goes.  
 Kourany responds by accepting that the SRS ideal cannot be guaranteed 
to produce truth, but that this is no different from other ideals, which also cannot 
guarantee that they will produce truth. As concerns West’s research programme, 
Kourany claims that if researchers had chosen to follow a more direct way of 




cooperation from the black community, thus slowing the whole process down 
anyway. This is supposed to show that either way, the processes towards the 
acquisition of truth could be delayed. This means that the SRS ideal is not slowing 
the process down in a different way, compared to other ideals.  
 But even if we were to agree the SRS ideal does in fact slow down the 
process towards the acquisition of truth, Kourany argues that science has other 
responsibilities and goals that it must meet and that sometimes these are more 
important than the acquisition of truth and must be prioritised:  
 
‘It might be far more efficient for searching out the truth, for example, if 
scientists simply ignored the risks to human subjects or society or the 
environment posed by various lines of research and ethics committees and 
publishers and funders and the public at large allowed them to do so’  
(Kourany, 2010, p. 74). 
 
But, according to Kourany, these social values are obviously far more important 
than efficiency. The idea here is that social values sometimes take precedence 
over epistemic ones, but that this is standard practice. And that what the SRS ideal 
is doing, is no different. An example of this is animal cosmetic testing. Animal 
cosmetic testing has severely hurt and killed many animals. Perhaps, for the 
cosmetic companies involved, using animals to test their products was an efficient 
way of testing their cosmetic products, but this doesn’t mean that it wasn’t 
ethically abhorrent to society. In fact, this is why most cosmetic companies have 




 Leaving the previous worry aside, Kourany considers another objection. 
This is the claim that even if we were to accept the SRS, feminists are far from 
agreeing on what their egalitarian values amount to and how they can best be 
employed. Kourany, however, does not think that these disagreements are an 
obstacle for the SRS ideal. She thinks that although there might be disagreement 
amongst feminist scientists and feminist scholars, there is also plenty of 
agreement that they can build on. As evidence, she cites West’s underlying 
egalitarian values and adds that:  
 
‘[…] it is equally uncontroversial that women deserve to live 
without fear of rape, sexual harassment, incest, and other forms of 
violence directed at women and that women deserve equal 
educational opportunities with men, equal employment 
opportunities with men, equal opportunities with health care, and 
so on’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 76). 
 
She takes these values to be uncontroversial and shared by feminists. Kourany 
argues that this is a good start. As a result, she thinks that the real question here 
should be: to what extent is the SRS ideal applicable? And not: is the SRS ideal 
applicable? This is because she thinks that there are enough values that feminists 
agree on and can work with. To answer the extent question, Kourany is optimistic 
and points to the adoption of feminist considerations in some scientific fields. 
Some of these include primatology, cultural anthropology, and paleontology. In 




gender stereotypes and has embraced new conceptual tools which have allowed 
them to explore new research questions such as the male parenting role and the 
evolution of female sexuality (Kourany, 2010).    
   
2.2.2 Critical Analysis of the SRS 
I would like to start by saying that I am very sympathetic to Kourany’s proposal. I 
agree with her that feminist values can contribute to good science and that they 
can do so without sacrificing epistemic considerations. Kourany’s proposal is a 
good starting point from which to start thinking about how values can play a role 
in science without appealing to underdetermination. However, there are some 
crucial problems with the SRS ideal as it stands. According to the SRS ideal, ‘[…] 
sound social values as well as sound epistemic values must control every aspect 
of the scientific research process from the choice of research questions to the 
communication and application of results, this to be enforced by such political 
means as funding requirements on research.’(Kourany, 2010, p. 49). This sums up 
the SRS ideal, but also raises many questions. In this section I argue that these 
questions pose significant problems for the SRS proposal and that for this reason, 
we should reject the proposal, at least until more has been said on the issues that 
these questions raise. First, Kourany claims that both social values and epistemic 
values should control every aspect of the scientific research project. This is a 
strong claim. One that has not been backed up with sufficient detail and 
argument. Second, it is unclear what the relationship is supposed to be between 
the different scientific stages and what role values are and are not allowed to play 




It is not entirely clear what Kourany means when she says that egalitarian 
values should control every aspect of the scientific research process. From the 
example she offered (West’s study), we can infer that what Kourany means by this 
is that egalitarian values should mostly play some kind of guiding role. This guiding 
role is meant to influence the changes of concepts, measurements, etc.  However, 
this is a bit vague and different from what she claims at the onset.  
Again, if we imagine (for the sake of this discussion) that there are four key 
stages in the scientific process: 1) problem selection, 2) making methodological 
choices (what methods scientists are going to employ to collect data, etc.), 3) the 
collection and characterisation of data (based on the methods they chose), and 
finally, 4) the interpretation of the results, it is unclear how we should envision 
Kourany’s suggestion playing out in actual scientific practice. It is not clear if her 
proposal is that scientists should set up the problem (stage 1) such that this 
requires making changes to all of the other stages, in which case egalitarian values 
would mostly be playing an indirect role or if she means that egalitarian values 
should play a direct role at every stage. This distinction is important.  
In the indirect role, egalitarian values would arguably be playing a 
background role. In the direct role, egalitarian values would be playing a front and 
centre role. In the West example, egalitarian roles seem to be playing a direct role 
in problem selection (stage 1) and in making methodological choices (stage 2).  In 
stage 1, egalitarian values seem to be acting as reasons in themselves, which allow 
the scientists to make decisions about the kind of problem that they are going to 
research, and in stage 2, egalitarian values also seem to act as reasons in 




unclear if Kourany is also claiming that egalitarian values should be acting as 
reasons in themselves when it comes to the collection and characterisation of the 
data (stage 3) and in the interpretation of the results (stage 4). For example, 
should scientists be able to appeal to egalitarian values as reasons in themselves 
to reject results? Should egalitarian values be able to take precedence over 
epistemic values such as explanatory power or scope? Furthermore, it is equally 
unclear what Kourany considers epistemic values to be and (just as egalitarian 
values) what their role is throughout the scientific process. These questions raise 
important issues for the SRS ideal. This is because, in not exploring these 
questions, Kourany is unable to weigh up the possible consequences that come 
with endorsing (or rejecting) a direct role for egalitarian values throughout the 
entire scientific process and, because she does not explore these issues,  the SRS 
ideal is unable to provide answers to scientists about what it is exactly that they 
should be doing in practice.  
 Additionally, another problem is that Kourany implicitly seems to be 
committed to the idea that there is a distinction between epistemic values and 
nonepistemic values, without giving an account of the distinction. Kourany makes 
an important step in arguing that social values should be considered alongside 
epistemic considerations. However, the role of epistemic values is also a hotly 
contested topic, and Kourany is not clear about the role that epistemic values 
should be playing throughout the scientific process. If the goal is that scientists 
should be able to easily appeal to Kourany’s SRS ideal, then Kourany must be clear 
and a bit more precise about the difference and the role that epistemic values 




 The last problem that I would like to discuss before moving on to discuss 
Douglas’ account is Kourany’s lack of discussion about the complex relationship 
between the different stages of the scientific process, such as problem selection 
and methodology. Douglas discusses this problem and I will dive into this problem 
in more detail in the next section, when we get to her account. For now, I would 
just like to highlight the problem as regards Kourany’s proposal. As mentioned in 
the previous paragraphs, Kourany is not clear about what precise role values 
(egalitarian and epistemic) should be playing throughout the scientific process. 
Because of this, it is difficult to unpack the problem I want to point to that might 
arise between the different scientific stages, but here it goes. If we assume that 
Kourany is in fact arguing that egalitarian values should play a direct role in 
problem selection and methodology (stages 1 and 2), then there is an urgent 
question about how scientists are supposed to avoid selecting these two things 
(guided by egalitarian values) in a way that doesn’t predetermine the outcome of 
their research. The problem I want to highlight is that Kourany does not establish 
or discuss the limits or parameters that values should have in relation to the 
various scientific stages. It is unclear, for example, to what extent egalitarian 
values should be guiding decisions about methodology. This is a problem for the 
SRS ideal because it is unable to offer guidance on important issues like this. While 
I agree that values such as egalitarian values should have a more direct and active 
role throughout the scientific stages, I also think that there should be certain 
restrictions placed on these kind of values in order that science is still able to 




For now, I aim to highlight the vagueness of Kourany’s proposal and why I think 
the SRS is not a desirable ideal to adopt. 
 In the next section, I look at Douglas’ proposal (Inductive Risk Account) 
and see whether that account fares better than the SRS ideal.  
 
2.3. An Inductive Risk Account (Douglas) 
Heather Douglas’ Inductive Risk argument is also an excellent candidate for the 
non-underdetermination group. What Kourany did, was propose a new scientific 
ideal; the SRS ideal. Within this ideal, she also created a new role for contextual 
values. Douglas’ proposal is much more technical and narrow. She is concerned 
with uncertainty and the consequences of error, and what these mean for 
scientists. Very generally, Douglas thinks that contextual values should come in to 
aid scientists in weighing up the potential social and ethical consequences of error 
in their research as well as in guiding scientists through situations of uncertainty. 
However, in Douglas’ account, the role of contextual values is not a par with 
epistemic values, as we shall see. The role of contextual values is highly 
constrained and controlled (although, in different ways from the value-free ideal). 
I argue that Douglas’ account is a more desirable proposal, to a certain extent. I 
begin by giving an overview of her account and then move on to a critical analysis.  
Douglas argues that, contrary to the value-free ideal, there is no 
distinction between what we might call epistemic values and nonepistemic 
values. As Douglas notes, according to the value-free ideal, epistemic values are 
values that were thought to be associated with knowledge and were therefore 




were those that were thought of as values that were not related to knowledge 
and were therefore thought of as unacceptable. Which, if we recall, this was 
precisely the problem that feminist scholars were facing when appealing to the 
value-free ideal; contextual values were unacceptable under this ideal. 
Douglas appeals to several philosophers who have made a similar point, 
which is that it is often the case that epistemic values end up reflecting contextual 
values in the scientific process. The idea is that if the selection or the preferability 
of certain epistemic values end up reflecting non-epistemic values, then it is hard 
to argue that we can make a clear demarcation between epistemic and non-
epistemic values.  An example of this, as Douglas notes, can be found in scientific 
studies of gender: ‘[…] where socially desired biological determinism appears 
within scientific research in the form of simplicity […]’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 90). The 
idea is that theories like biological determinism are oftentimes not defended 
because they are simple, they are defended due to social motivations. For 
example, a biological theory of gender dimorphism has undeniable links to the 
social context (e.g., people appealing to this kind of theory in order argue that the 
natural place of women is in a heterosexual relationship looking after the home 
and a bunch of babies). What’s interesting here is that these supposed biological 
differences conveniently match socially desired gender roles (e.g. the idea that 
women are biologically wired to be more nurturing than men and that because of 
this, women are better suited for certain kinds of jobs (jobs that include caring for 
others, for example). The thought here is that traditional epistemic values such as 
simplicity often operate as a kind of cover for contextual values, when in reality 




scientists do not defend biological determinism because it is a simple theory, or 
because it is able to explain a greater number of other theories, such as gender 
dimorphism. While it may be the case that it is a simple theory and that it is able 
to explain other theories, the point here is that values such as ‘simplicity’ might 
just be an excuse to keep on choosing and defending scientific theories that are 
really being chosen on the basis of contextual values. The main idea here is that 
epistemic values might not be as easy to demarcate from non-epistemic values as 
commonly thought. Because of this, Douglas, along with others, argue that a clear 
demarcation between epistemic and non-epistemic values is not tenable (Lacey, 
1999; Longino, 1996; Rooney, 1992). And because this distinction is not tenable, 
Douglas thinks that there is a need for a new topography of values. With this, 
Douglas means to give a new account of the kinds of values available and the 
boundaries involving these values in the context of scientific inquiry.  
 As stated earlier, Douglas proposes that, contrary to what the value-free 
ideal proposed, there is not a clear demarcation between epistemic values and 
non-epistemic values. Instead, she proposes three categories for thinking about 
values: ethical, social, and cognitive. These categories, according to Douglas, are 
continuous as opposed to discrete (or strictly demarcated) categories. This is 
different from the value-free ideal that insisted on two discrete categories for 
thinking about values: epistemic values and non-epistemic values. 
 Before we get into what each of these three value categories entails, it 
might be worth pointing out a crucial feature of Douglas’ account. Under the 
value-free ideal, all acceptable values were clustered together under the label of 




internal consistency and predictive competence) are not values at all but basic 
criteria that every scientific theory should meet (we can think of this as a kind of 
upgrade). In this sense, it might be helpful to distinguish between four categories 
in Douglas’ account: basic criteria, ethical values, social values, and cognitive 
values. Cognitive values, as we shall see, will house the old epistemic values from 
the value-free ideal. I will address each one of these in turn.   
 Ethical values, according to Douglas, have to do with what is good or right. 
Douglas thinks that these kind of values ‘[…] help us weigh whether potential 
benefits are worth potential harms, whether some harms are worth no price, and 
whether some harms are more egregious than others’ (2009, p. 92). Here, Douglas 
is referring to instances in which scientists might have to think about the potential 
impact of their research.  An example of an ethical value, according to Douglas, is 
the right of a human being not to be used for experimentation without fully 
informed consent (Douglas, 2009). The idea, I take it, is that scientists should ask 
whether it would be ethically acceptable to carry out a research project in which 
human beings were being used for experimentation without their fully informed 
consent and to weigh the potential benefits and harms that such a decision might 
come with.   
 Social values, on the other hand, are values which ‘[…] arise from what a 
particular society values, such as justice, privacy, freedom, social stability, or 
innovation’ (2009, p. 92). As Douglas points out, these are related to what she 
calls ethical values and will thus sometimes overlap. For example, someone might 
want to pursue a research programme because doing so would benefit a great 




to pursue the research programme because of some underlying social value; such 
as justice: ‘For example, the social concern one might express over poverty can 
be tied to issues of justice [social concern] or to concern over the increased health 
risks [ethical concern] borne by impoverished individuals’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 92). 
Social and ethical values, however, can also be opposed to each other, where 
certain social values run contrary to certain ethical values. ‘For example, the social 
value of stability was antithetical to the ethical values underlying the push for 
desegregation and the civil rights movement’ (2009, p. 92). The social value in this 
example would be stability (to keep things the way they are) and one of the ethical 
values underlying the push for desegregation and the civil rights movement might 
be an ethical concern for the death and suffering of others (to use an example 
already provided by Douglas).  
 The last group of values are cognitive values. Douglas takes this group of 
values to be distinct from what we may traditionally understand as epistemic 
values (values that contribute towards the attainment of truth). Douglas explains: 
‘Rather, I mean those aspects of scientific work that help one think through the 
evidential and inferential aspects of one’s theories and data. Taking the label 
“cognitive” seriously, cognitive values embody the goal of assisting scientists with 
their cognition in science’ (2009, p. 93). She takes cognitive values to be: 
simplicity, explanatory power, scope, consistency, predictive precision, and 
fruitfulness. These are the values that were once considered epistemic values 
under the old value-free ideal, values that were considered to be directly related 
to knowledge and therefore acceptable in the context of scientific inquiry. 




cognitive values. In her proposal, Douglas renames epistemic values to ‘basic 
criteria’. According to her, basic criteria have more to do with truth. That is, basic 
criteria are appealed to in a journey towards the acquisition of truth, where 
cognitive values aid in creating better science in a way that secures new 
possibilities of research.  
 Following this line of thought, Douglas limits the basic criteria to two: 
internal consistency and predictive competence. A scientific theory is internally 
consistent if it does not have any contradictions within it. Having an internally 
inconsistent theory leads to contradiction and these contradictions can lead to 
unreliable conclusions; which are undesirable in a scientific theory (Douglas, 
2009). Predictive competence has to do with the extent to which scientific 
theories are equipped to make predictions. These predictions do not have to be 
one-hundred percent precise, but rather, they have to have a good 
approximation. If a theory fails to make predictions, this is a clear indicator that 
something is wrong with the theory. Predictive competence, however, is different 
from predictive precision. Predictive precision is as its name suggests: making 
precise predictions. In the case of predictive competence, it is not required that 
the theory in question is perfectly precise in its predictions, only that the theory 
makes approximately correct predictions (Douglas, 2009). According to Douglas, 
internal consistency and predictive competence are basic criteria that every 
scientific theory should meet. If they fail to meet these basic criteria, this signals 
that there is something seriously wrong with the theory. These two criteria make 
up the basic criteria category (distinct from ethical, social, and cognitive 




 Basic criteria are, according to Douglas, ‘[…] about the ultimate goal of 
research, which is true (or at least reliable) knowledge’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 93). 
That is, basic criteria should help in deciding whether a statement is true or false. 
Douglas appeals to Laudan’s (2004) earlier work, where he argues that many 
epistemic values actually have little to do with reaching this goal. For example, a 
value such as explanatory power (which is usually thought of as an epistemic 
value), does not have a ‘necessary connection’ to truth (Douglas, 2009). 
Explanatory power cannot tell us if a statement is true or false.  If statement 1 can 
explain more than statement 2, this does not mean that statement 1 is true. There 
is no necessary connection between explanatory power and truth. If we follow 
this line of thought, according to Douglas, we end up with very few epistemic 
values (what she renames ‘basic criteria’) that actually aid in the attainment of 
truth, two actually, which are internal consistency and predictive competence.  
 According to Douglas, basic criteria (i.e. internal consistency and 
predictive competence) ‘[…] operate in a negative way, excluding claims or 
theories that do not embody them, rather than as values, which are aspects of 
science for which to strive, but which need not be fully present in all cases’ 
(Douglas, 2009, p. 94). The idea here is that basic criteria are doing different types 
of work. Basic criteria seem to 1) aid in the attainment of truth (or at least reliable 
knowledge) and 2) work as a kind of arbiter between acceptable and unacceptable 
scientific theories. While values seem to 1) be things to strive towards (but which 
won’t necessarily lead us to the attainment of truth or reliable knowledge) and 2) 




This move makes Douglas’ account somewhat similar to the value-free 
ideal. The value-free ideal insisted on drawing a clear distinction between 
epistemic values (what Douglas calls basic criteria) and non-epistemic values. 
Epistemic values were knowledge-conducive and non-epistemic values were not. 
In Douglas’ account, basic criteria are, in a sense, the new epistemic values, 
although with a new role. Internal consistency and predictive competency are the 
knowledge-conducing criteria (that all theories must have) and values (cognitive, 
social, and ethical values) are not knowledge-conducive and will therefore play a 
more restricted role in her account.  
To recap, under Douglas’ account we have: basic criteria (this category is 
made up of two old epistemic values: internal consistency and predictive 
competence) and values which include the ethical, social, and cognitive value 
categories. All scientific theories are required to be internally consistent and 
predictively competent but not all scientific theories are required to embody 
ethical, social, and cognitive values. This means that internal consistency and 
predictive competence have been rerouted out of Douglas’ values discussion. The 
focus now shifts from this demarcation to the role that ethical, social, and 
cognitive values should have in science. 
2.3.1. Role of the Ethical, Social, and Cognitive Values 
In thinking about the role of the ethical, social, and cognitive values, Douglas 
claims that these values can play a direct or indirect role in science. In the direct 
role, ‘[…] values can act as reasons in themselves to accept a claim, providing 
direct motivation for the adoption of a theory’ (2009, p., 96). In the indirect role, 




helping to decide what should count as sufficient evidence for the claim’ (2009, p. 
96). In this indirect role, as uncertainty goes down, so does the use or power of 
values and, as uncertainty goes up, so does the use and power of values. This 
means that if there is no uncertainty, there is no indirect role for values. In 
thinking about direct and indirect roles, Douglas argues that direct values, if used 
inappropriately, can threaten the integrity of science. Indirect values pose no such 
threat to the integrity of science (because of their built-in restrictions). 
 
2.3.1.1. Direct Role   
When thinking about a direct role for values, all values are considered (ethical, 
social, and cognitive). It might be helpful to think of these values as ‘available 
options’ for this role. But where can these values play a role? According to 
Douglas, these roles are limited to the very early stages of scientific research. 
Namely, when deciding what scientific projects to pursue and when deciding what 
methodology to use. This means that, under Douglas’ account, it is appropriate to 
appeal to ethical, social, and cognitive values when trying to decide whether or 
not to pursue a research project. One might, for example, be in favour of 
supporting or pursuing a particular research project because of one’s deeply held 
social values. Presumably, this also means that one might be legitimately allowed 
to oppose pursuing a certain line of research because doing so would go against 
one’s deeply held social values (Douglas doesn’t discuss this).  In addition to 
utilising values to help make a decision about what research projects to pursue, 
Douglas argues that values can also help make decisions about what research 




of research projects governments and other funding institutions should fund. 
Douglas claims that ‘We choose to fund areas of research about which we care to 
know more’ (2009, P. 99). And she follows this up with an example: ‘The 
government may fund a project studying the possibility of increased photovoltaic 
cell efficiency because the grant administrators consider any increase in efficiency 
to be important to the country’s future energy security and economic 
development’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 99). This, I think, is a very important stage in the 
scientific process that is currently discussed very little in the philosophical 
literature, but one that requires a much more detailed discussion including the 
process that research proposals need to go through in order to even be 
considered for funding. It is not obvious that there is a clear and neat relationship 
between what a society values, for example, and what research actually gets 
funded. There are many studies which have shown that the relationship and the 
factors involved might be a bit more complicated (Coulter et al., 2014) I will come 
back to this in the next chapter. 
 The second way in which values are able to play a legitimate direct role, 
according to Douglas, is when it comes to deciding what methodology to use. 
Douglas points out that during the selection of methodology there might be 
questions about the ethical acceptability of such methodology. For example, cases 
in which the methodology exposes human subjects to harm. Douglas doesn’t 
mention non-human subjects, but it is easy to see how this can be extended to 
non-human subjects as well. Animal testing in cosmetic products is a fitting 
example. Many cosmetic companies test their cosmetic products on animals, 




Under Douglas’ account, values would be able to play a legitimate role in choosing 
the method to be (or not be) used. The values in this case would act as reasons 
for choosing (or presumably rejecting) a particular method. According to Douglas, 
‘[...] a more ethical methodology, a socially desired research program, a 
cognitively interesting project, will be selected because of the value placed on 
those options’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 100). 
 These are the two ways in which values are able to play a direct role: 
deciding which research programmes to pursue and what methodology to use. 
However, Douglas warns against the danger in using these two to predetermine 
the outcome of a study (something which Kourany does not): ‘One cannot use 
values to direct the selection of a problem and a formulation of the methodology 
that in combination predetermines (or substantially restricts) the outcome of a 
study’ (Douglas, 2009, p., 100). Predetermining the outcome of a study goes 
against the core value of science, which for Douglas is producing reliable 
knowledge. When a scientist selects a problem and methodology to predetermine 
the outcome of a study, they are in danger of producing unreliable knowledge 
because this approach does not allow for the possibility that the evidence may 
contradict the predetermined outcome (2009).  This is an important point. 
Douglas gives the example of hormonal influences on behaviour in children. 
According to her, ‘It is already known that (a) there are hormonal differences in 
children, and (b) there are behavioural differences in children. A study that simply 
measures these two differences to find a correlation would be inadequate for 
several reasons’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 100). The first reason, according to Douglas, is 




also change hormone levels (just as hormones can influence behaviour). A second 
reason, according to Douglas, is that this does not take into account other factors 
that also influence behaviour, such as social expectations. Not taking these factors 
into account reinforces the assumption that hormones somehow determine 
behaviour (Douglas, 2009). It does this by excluding, by design, other possible 
explanations.  
 Just as Douglas acknowledges that utilising problem selection and 
methodology together in a way in which predetermines the outcome of a study is 
a problem, she also acknowledges that ‘[…] there are no sure-fire ways to 
guarantee that we are not subtly presuming the very thing we wish to test’ 
(Douglas, 2009, p. 101). She continues: ‘The best we can do is to acknowledge that 
values should not direct our choices in the early stages of science in such a 
pernicious way’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 101). She goes on to acknowledge that there is 
a lot more work needed in this area of research to spell out, in greater detail, the 
relationship between problem selection and methodology. But that for now, what 
she does want to make clear, is that the direct role for values that she is proposing 
in the early stages of science should not be understood as one which allows those 
involved to undermine the value of science (to produce reliable knowledge). 
 
2.3.1.2. Indirect Role  
As far as the indirect role for values in science, Douglas argues that ‘The indirect 
role for values in science concerns the sufficiency of evidence, the weighing of 
uncertainty, and the consequences of error [...]’ (2009, p. 103). This means that in 




the available evidence, in cases of uncertainty, and in cases where the 
consequences of error must be considered. In this case, as in the case of the early 
stages of science, all values are considered (social, ethical, and cognitive).   
According to Douglas, there are different stages of the scientific process at 
which a scientist might need to make decisions about what empirical claims to 
make. These stages are, roughly 1) when making methodological choices, 2) in the 
collection and characterisation of data, and 3) in the interpretation of the final 
results. Perhaps one thing to note here is the difference between her proposal 
and the value-free ideal. What Douglas is proposing is that all values are able to 
play a legitimate indirect role at these stages of the scientific process. Under the 
value-free ideal, only cognitive (epistemic) values were allowed to play a role, 
although, contrary to Douglas’ account, they were allowed to play a more direct 
role. The reason values are only able to play an indirect role under Douglas’ 
account is because evidence is front and centre in these stages and values only 
come in to help deal with cases of uncertainty and the consequences of error. This 
means that as uncertainty decreases, so does the role of values. That is, if there is 
no uncertainty, then there is no need for values.  
When making methodological choices, Douglas argues that there is an 
indirect role available for values. This role involves appealing to values in order to 
weigh up the available options. Douglas gives the example of setting the level of 
statistical significance. As Douglas explains, setting the level of statistical 
significance is setting a standard for the amount of evidence that is needed before 
a claim is taken to be ‘significant’. This means that there is a choice to be made 




Deciding where to set the level of statistical significance has consequences 
for the balance between false positives and false negatives. As Douglas explains, 
if a scientist lowers the level of statistical significance, they will end up with more 
false positives. If they decide to raise the level of statistical significance, they will 
end up with more false negatives. Finding a balance between the two is a tricky 
job that is oftentimes not possible. This is because sometimes finding a balance 
requires resources that are simply not available at the time of the test. One might, 
for example, require more study participants, but due to time constraints or 
budget constraints, that might not be possible. So, as Douglas points out, choices 
must be made based on what the scientists do have at that moment.  
Scientists must weigh up their options: should they accept more false 
positives or more false negatives? Douglas argues that this is exactly where values 
should come in: to help weigh up the costs of these options. This involves taking 
into account the social and ethical costs. In other words, when scientists are not 
able to design a more accurate test which will allow them to balance out the false 
positives and the false negatives, then they should appeal to ethical, social, and 
cognitive values. Douglas discusses the example of an epidemiological study that 
studies the effects of an air pollutant on a population. In this example, the 
consequences of false positives would mean that the air pollutant in question 
would be considered a health hazard, when it is not. According to Douglas, this 
alarm would lead to unnecessary and costly regulations that would not benefit 
anyone. Furthermore, the belief that the air pollutant in question is hazardous 
might also have a negative impact of future research. On the other hand, the 




considered safe, when it is not. According to Douglas, this could lead to people 
being harmed by the pollutant. In the scientific context, this also means that 
scientists would be likely to accept the result and not follow up the research any 
further (Douglas, 2009). This is where values come in to do some work. ‘The social 
and ethical costs are the costs of the alarm and the regulation on the one hand, 
and the human health damage and resulting effects on society on the other. The 
cognitive costs include the mistaken beliefs among scientists that shape their 
future research’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 105). According to Douglas, some weighing 
(she doesn’t provide a method for doing this) of these values must take place, as 
these values are relevant to setting the level of statistical significance.  
The same general idea applies during the collection and characterisation 
of data stage. This includes using values to decide whether or not to include 
experimental runs. It also includes using values to weigh up uncertainties to do 
with data characterisation. Douglas notes that oftentimes it is not entirely clear 
whether scientists should include all experimental runs or not. There seems to be 
a degree of uncertainty and this is where values should aid; in helping to make 
these kinds of decisions. Douglas gives the example of Nobel Laureate Robert 
Millikan and his Oil Drop Experiment, which was used to measure the charge of 
an electron. In this case, when Millikan was running the experiments, there were 
some experimental runs that did not duplicate the results that other experimental 
runs confirmed. Because of this, Millikan had to decide which experimental runs 
to keep and which to disregard (Douglas, 2009). Characterising data is also far 
from always being crystal clear and oftentimes involves dealing with borderline 




what they are looking at. For example, if scientists are looking at a rat liver slide 
and this appears abnormal, they might have to make a judgment about whether 
what they are looking at is cancerous, and if it is, make a decision about what kind 
of cancer it is (Douglas, 2009). In these cases, Douglas argues that scientists must 
take into account the consequences of error that their decisions might have; and 
values have a very important role in making a judgement call in situations like this.  
 The next stage is interpreting results. This involves the choice of accepting 
or rejecting a theory based on the available evidence. Douglas notes that: ‘Often, 
the set of evidence leaves room for interpretation; there are competing theories 
and views, and thus some uncertainty in the choice’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 106). 
Consider the case of scientists studying a rare disease and its links to genetics. If 
their pool of study participants was low due to the resources that were available 
to them at the time, should they accept or reject their results? Douglas argues 
that in situations like this, scientists should consider the consequences of error 
that their choices might have. Douglas notes that these consequences will be 
different, depending on the research project. But she argues that values are 
needed to weigh up the consequences of error. 
 Douglas points out that ‘Such actions entail social consequences, many of 
which are ethically important to us’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 106). For this reason, social 
and ethical values are needed to weigh up the possible consequences of error. 
The important detail to highlight here though, is that as uncertainty decreases 
regarding the interpretation of evidence, so does the role of values. So values are 




no uncertainty, then values do not have a legitimate role to play, according to 
Douglas. 
 A similar rule applies to scientific theories that embody cognitive values 
such as simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, and precision. According to Douglas, these 
values should not serve as reasons in themselves to accept scientific theories 
because these values do not necessarily aid in the search for truth. Instead, 
according to Douglas, ‘[…] the presence of cognitive values aids scientists in 
thinking with a theory that exemplifies cognitive values’ (Douglas, 2009, p. 107). 
This means that scientific theories that embody cognitive values such as 
simplicity, aid scientists in working with the theory more easily, in so far as there 
is uncertainty regarding the available evidence (for example, it might be easier to 
work with a simple theory). But, should the uncertainty decrease, so should the 
reliance on cognitive values. In this sense, cognitive values are able to play a 
legitimate indirect role in so far as there is uncertainty regarding the available 
evidence.  
 
2.3.2. Critical Analysis of the Inductive Risk Account 
I take Douglas’ proposal to be an important departure from the value-free ideal. 
In addition to the very early stages of problem and method selection, Douglas’ 
proposal makes room for the idea that contextual values can play a legitimate role 
throughout all stages of the scientific process. It also gives feminist philosophers 
of science a value account option that doesn’t require appealing to 
underdetermination in order to say that contextual values can play a legitimate 




have to appeal and be committed to underdetermination in order to appeal to 
social and ethical values. They only have to have the evidence be 
underdetermined by the theory at that moment. This means that there only has 
to be uncertainty at the time of the decision-making-process. This is different 
from committing to an underdetermination thesis which holds that in principle, 
evidence is underdetermined by theory choice.  
Contrary to the SRS ideal, Douglas offers a lot more detail about what kind 
of values she has in mind, the distinctions between these values, and the role that 
these values should play throughout the scientific process. Douglas proposes a 
reshuffling of values where what we end up with is a distinction between basic 
criteria and values. The two basic criteria that all scientific theories must meet are 
internal consistency and predictive competence. The rest are values and these 
include social, ethical, and cognitive values, where, depending on the scientific 
stage, they will play different roles. They will play either a direct role or an indirect 
role, depending on the stage.  
I think these distinctions are important because they allow us to ensure 
that science is able to keep on producing reliable knowledge. I agree with Douglas 
that we should set some kind of standard about the minimal requirements that a 
scientific theory should meet (internal consistency and predictive competence). 
Kourany, on the other hand, is not clear on this point and this raises a problem for 
her proposal. Epistemic/cognitive values have traditionally been considered to set 
this standard. Depending on what philosopher we ask, we will come across 
different arguments about why certain epistemic/cognitive values are more 




any epistemic/cognitive values contribute to truth and I am not going to argue 
that she should. What I do want to argue is that we don’t have to buy into the 
realist argument that science aims for truth in order to make a case that scientific 
theories should, at the very minimum, be internally consistent and have predictive 
competence. Having internally consistent theories decreases the possibility that 
the theory will be false, thus allowing science to keep on producing reliable 
knowledge. Predictive competence, as Douglas argues, ensures that we are able 
to rule out scientific theories whose predictions fail. It would be a serious worry 
to want to keep on holding on to a theory that fails at predicting every single time. 
In this sense, I agree with Douglas that internal consistency and predictive 
competence should play the role of basic criteria that all scientific theories should 
meet. 
Furthermore, Douglas argues that social, ethical, and cognitive values can 
either play a direct or indirect role, depending on the scientific stage. Kourany is 
not clear on what the distinction is between these values and what role or to what 
extent they should be playing a role throughout the scientific process. For this 
reason, I think that her account raises more questions than solutions. Douglas 
begins by describing a direct role for these values in the first two stages of the 
scientific process: problem selection and methodology selection.  
Douglas argues that social, ethical, and cognitive values can play a direct 
role when it comes to deciding which research to fund. According to her, ‘We 
choose to fund areas of research about which we care to know more’ (Douglas, 
2009, p. 99). For example, if governments, who oftentimes fund scientific 




research programmes. Douglas doesn’t spend a whole lot of time on spelling out 
the details of how this will work or how this might look in actual practice other 
than assuming a relationship between funders and the research that gets funded 
where some kind of discussion or weighing up  of values takes place. I don’t think 
this relationship is as neat as Douglas seems to suggest and for this reason I think 
that it is worth spending some time reviewing how funding actually gets allocated, 
to then be in a better position to propose what role values will play in this initial 
stage. In the next chapter, I develop a case study that looks into genetic 
explanations of sexual orientation and the role values seem to play when it comes 
to funding LGBTQI+ related research. I argue, along the same line that Kourany 
argued in ‘A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century’ (2003), that what 
we need are laws in place which require scientists to include minority groups in 
their research as a funding requirement. Additionally, we also need legislation 
that makes sure that research topics that are beneficial to minority groups get the 
funding they need. 
Douglas also argues that social, ethical, and cognitive values can play a role 
in the selection of the methodology. On this point, however, Douglas only 
discusses the role that values should play in choosing an ethical methodology. 
That is, in the role that values should play so that scientists don’t end up with 
ethically problematic methods. To illustrate this point earlier, I gave the example 
of cosmetic companies and the methods they choose for testing their products. 
Some, for example, test on animals. This has led to a lot of unnecessary animal 
suffering and animal deaths. On Douglas’ suggestion, this is where values are 




point. However, what I think is missing, and especially important for feminists, is 
exploring the additional role that values have as far as the choice of concepts that 
are embedded in methodology. She does not discuss this. However, this is where 
I think feminist values might be able to do some of the most beneficial work. I will 
argue in future chapters that the choice of concepts will determined by the goals 
that one has. This is a big claim that I will spell out in greater detail throughout 
the last three chapters. For now, it is only important to point out that Douglas 
does not address this point. 
When it comes to the last three stages of the scientific process (values can 
play a direct and indirect role in making methodological choices), Douglas argues 
that social, ethical, and cognitive values should only play an indirect role, and I 
agree. I am on board with the proposal that these values should only be appealed 
to in these stages in cases of uncertainty (except when it comes to choosing 
methodology, where values can also play a direct role). I think that this restriction 
also plays a good role in ensuring that science produces reliable knowledge. For 
example, this restriction prevents scientists from appealing to contextual values 
when there is no uncertainty about the characterisation of data but still allows 
scientists to appeal to these values if there is uncertainty about the 
characterisation of data.   
 
2.4. Conclusions 
I propose that Kourany’s proposal (SRS ideal) is not a workable ideal for feminist 
scholars because of the many problems it faces. There is no discussion about what 




supposed to play throughout the scientific stages. There are just very general 
claims that say that the SRS ideal is committed to ‘[…] implanting egalitarian social 
values into science’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 68) and that ‘[…] sound social values as well 
as sound epistemic values must control every aspect of the scientific research 
process[…]’ (Kourany, 2010, p. 49). However, it is not clear exactly how scientists 
are supposed to cash out these values. It is also worrying that Kourany does not 
propose basic criteria that all scientific theories must meet. This is important 
because while it is important that we be able to find a role for feminist values in 
science, it is also important that the knowledge being produced by scientists be 
reliable knowledge. However, we can’t ensure that unless we set up limits about 
the role that values can and cannot play throughout the scientific stages.  
 Douglas’ proposal provides us with distinctions between values and a 
more detailed guide about the role that these values are able to play throughout 
the scientific stages. In doing this, she proposes that we upgrade internal 
consistency and predictive competence to basic criteria that all scientific theories 
must meet in order to ensure that science is able to produce reliable knowledge. 
In this sense, Douglas’ proposal is a more complete account. However, I think that 
in order for this account to be useful to feminist scholars, more needs to be said 
about the direct role that values are able to play in the problem selection and in 
the methodology selection stages. This is because I think that one of the most 
important roles that feminist values can play in science is precisely during these 
two stages. I think that more needs to be said about the role that values can play 
in terms of funding because, contrary to what Douglas argues, I do not think there 




funded. It’s a little messier than that and I think we should ensure that values are 
playing a more active role than what Douglas proposes. Furthermore, when it 
comes to selecting methodology, Douglas does not discuss the role that concepts 
play at this stage of the scientific process. However, I think that this is another 
area where feminist values could play a crucial role. 
 In order to explore these issues, I engage with a specific area of research 
in genetics: sexual orientation. In the next chapter, I introduce this literature and 
explore the role that values are playing throughout all of the scientific stages of 
this research area. I argue that one of the most important role for values lies in 
the choice of concepts and that this choice will be determined by the goals that 















3. Genes, Sexual Orientation, and Values: A Case for Queer Feminist Values 
The plan for this chapter is to explore, through a case study, the direct role 
contextual values play in two scientific stages: problem and methodology 
selection. I argue that one of the most important roles that feminist values can 
play in science is during these two stages. In the last chapter, we looked at 
Douglas’ proposal for the role that values could play in these two scientific stages. 
Douglas’ discussion of values included social, ethical, and cognitive values. In the 
first half of this chapter, I argue for a more active role for values than Douglas 
proposes in the first stage (problem selection). Following Kourany (2003), I argue 
that we should push for legislation that ensures that minority groups2 are included 
in scientific research and that we should push for legislation that ensures that 
research topics that are beneficial to minority groups get the funding they need. 
In the second half of this chapter, I argue that one of the most important roles 
that values can play in the methodology selection stage lies in the choice of 
concepts3 and that this choice will be determined by the goals that one has. 
Douglas does not discuss this. My suspicion is that unless philosophers of science 
or scientists are actively thinking about politically charged concepts and the work 
that these are doing in the methodology selection stage, this will not be a topic 
that will be on their mind as one that needs to be discussed.  
 In order to carry out this work, I engage with research in genetics that aims 
to give an explanation of sexual orientation. I take scientific research that looks 
into sexual orientation to be a fitting example where the concepts used in its 
 
2 Members of groups, who, compared to dominant groups, experience several disadvantages. 
3 I am not attempting to argue for nor introduce a metaphysical distinction between concepts 




methodological approaches are politically charged. I argue that, what I call queer 
feminist values should play a front and centre role in this area of research. I use 
the term ‘queer’ as an umbrella term that captures minority sexual orientations, 
an umbrella term for the LGBTQI+4 community. My intention with placing the 
term ‘queer’ in front of ‘feminist values’ has to do with placing queer perspectives 
at the forefront of this research project.  
Following on from this, there might be a question about what feminist 
values are. Feminist values vary. There is not one set of values that all feminist 
philosophers agree on. However, one thing that feminist philosophers might 
agree on is opposition to values associated with misogyny and patriarchy, this 
includes values such as sexism and discrimination. It is in this sense that I use 
‘queer feminist values’ in this chapter. I do not aim to give an exhaustive list of 
feminist values, this would exceed the aims of this chapter.     
It is equally important to note that most of the scientific work in this area 
of research was developed in a western context. As a result, so too are the 
assumptions about what a sexual orientation is. For this reason, my analysis in this 
chapter is limited to western understandings of sexual orientation. Including, for 
example, the relationship that the sexual orientation concept has with other 
concepts such as sex and gender. I do not engage with sexual orientation 
understandings outside of this western context because doing so would exceed 
the aims of this chapter and of this dissertation. However, in mapping out a new 
potential area for values, my hope is that this will then open up more space to talk 
 




about how different understandings of sexual orientation might challenge genetic 
understandings of sexual orientation.  
 
3.1. An Introduction to Scientific Research that Studies Sexual Orientation 
Scientific research that looks into the origins of sexual orientation in the western 
context has been around since the mid 1800’s. A key figure in the development of 
such research is Karl Heinrich Ulrich (Heinrich Ulrichs, 1994). In Ulrich’s The Riddle 
of the “Man-Manly” Love, we begin to see the development of a theory of 
sexuality that had a great impact on the development of concepts such as 
heterosexual and homosexual, as we know them today (1994). One of the earliest 
recordings of the heterosexual and homosexual concepts was in 1869, by Károly 
Mária Kertbeny (Feray et al., 1990). In the context of the U.S., one of the earliest 
recordings in print was by Dr. James G. Kiernan in 1892 and again in that same 
year by Dr. Krafft-Ebing (Katz, 2007). It is then that discussion about what kind of 
thing homosexuality and heterosexuality are begins. With this claim, I do not aim 
to suggest that heterosexuals and homosexuals did not exist prior to this time. I 
aim to frame our current discussion and give an account of where some of the 
concepts that are currently used in the genetics literature originate. Following the 
next few years after these concepts first showed up, their meaning started 
changing. When Kiernan and Krafft-Ebing were writing, the norm was not 
heterosexuality. The norm was reproductive sex, full stop. In fact, Kiernan’s 
concept of heterosexuality described a person who was attracted to both women 
and men (similar to our current bisexuality concept, in this sense) and was 




aim for procreation (Katz, 2007). Homosexuality was also considered abnormal 
because it was thought that homosexuals ‘deviated’ from their own gender norm 
(Katz, 2007). In Krafft-Ebing’s work, however, ‘heterosexuality’ described an 
erotic feeling toward members of the opposite-sex and homosexuality described 
an erotic feeling toward the same-sex. According to authors like Katz, Krafft-
Ebing’s work offered a new way of conceptualising sexuality. That is, it was a 
stepping stone from thinking about sexuality in terms of procreation to thinking 
about sexuality in terms of pleasure. It was only gradually that doctors started to 
accept heterosexuality as the new normal, and everything deviating from this, 
including homosexuality, as abnormal (Katz, 2007). 
 
3.1.1. Homosexuality as a Mental Illness     
About 60 years after these concepts first started to appear in print, and 
heterosexuality started to become the norm, homosexuality was classified as a 
mental disorder. In the U.S., homosexuality was considered a mental disorder by 
the American Psychiatric Association up until 1973 (this was less than 50 years 
ago) (1973). However, it wasn’t fully removed from the (DSM) Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in all of its forms until 1987. This means 
that from 1952 to 1987, homosexuality lived in the DSM in some form or another. 
The history of homosexuality in this publication is a bit troubling. From 1952 to 
1987, there were five publications of the DSM and homosexuality appeared in all 
five of them in one form or another.  
The concept of homosexuality was first included in DSM-I back in 1952 




publication, homosexuality was included again as a sexual deviation. In 1973, in 
the third DSM publication, homosexuality was ‘removed’ and replaced by sexual 
orientation disturbance. I put quotation marks around the word removed because 
the only thing that changed was that homosexuality by itself was no longer 
considered a mental disorder. However, under the new sexual orientation 
disturbance category, homosexuality was still able to qualify as a treatable 
condition when accompanied by the right psychological state. Part of the sexual 
orientation disturbance definition read as follows:  
 
‘This category is for individuals whose sexual interests are directed 
primarily towards people of the same sex and who are either disturbed by, 
in conflict with, or wish to change their sexual orientation’ (1973, p. 44). 
 
In 1980, in the fourth DSM publication, homosexuality was included under 
psychosexual disorders as ego-dystonic homosexuality. This included:  
 
‘[…] a desire to acquire or increase heterosexual arousal, so that 
heterosexual relationships can be initiated or maintained, and a sustained 
pattern of overt homosexual arousal that the individual explicitly states 
has been unwanted and a persistent source of distress’ (1980, p. 281)  
 
This definition is similar to that of the 1973 publication. It implies that 
homosexuality is a treatable condition (when combined with a desire for 




reference to homosexuality was removed. However, a reference to 
homosexuality was still implied under Sexual Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, 
which included: ‘persistent and marked distress about one’s sexual orientation’ 
(1987, p. 296). I say that homosexuality is implied because homosexual people are 
more likely than heterosexual people to experience distress about their sexual 
orientation due to societal pressures. This means that homosexual people are 
more likely to be diagnosed under this category. 1994 marked the first year that 
homosexuality did not figure (implicitly or explicitly) in the DSM.   
The DSM is an important and highly influential handbook both in the U.S. 
and in other parts of the world, but it is not the only influential handbook. The ICD 
(International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems), 
which is published by WHO (World Health Organization), is also a highly influential 
publication (and considered by the APA as a companion to DSM). Homosexuality, 
in the latest ICD 2016 publication, is still classed as an ego-dystonic disorder (ICD-
10 Version: 2016, 2016). This is extremely harmful for the LGBTQI+ community 
worldwide. This pathologisation, in many ways, has contributed to violent 
treatments aimed at ‘curing people of homosexuality’ and converting them to 
heterosexuality (think electroshock therapy, castration, psychologically harmful 
therapy sessions, etc.) (Dickinson, Cook, Playle, & Hallett, 2012), (King, Smith, & 
Bartlett, Treatments of homosexuality in Britain since the 1950s—an oral history: 
the experience of professionals, 2004), and (King, Smith, & Bartlett, 2004). This 
pathologisation contributed to the idea that homosexuality is a deviation from 





3.1.2. Homosexuality as a Criminal Act 
In addition to homosexuality being considered a mental disorder during this time 
period, homosexuality was also criminalised. In fact, it continues to be in many 
parts of the world. The U.K. started to take the first step to decriminalise 
homosexuality in 1967 with the Sexual Offences Act. The U.S. started in 1962 (in 
the state of Illinois). This was 50 years ago in the first case and 55 years in the 
second. Just as with the case of homosexuality being considered a mental 
disorder, it was not that long ago that these countries started to decriminalise 
homosexuality. It is important to mention that homosexuality is still criminalised 
in other parts of the world. In some countries like Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 
Iran, Somalia, and in Nigeria, homosexuality is punishable by death (Mendos, 
2019a, pp. 15–16). In other countries, homosexuality is punishable by prison. 
Some countries like *Uganda, Zambia, Barbados, Guyana, Bangladesh, and Qatar 
have a life sentence (Mendos, 2019b, pp. 198–202). This criminalisation has and 
continues to contribute to the view that homosexuality is a deviation from the 
norm. This is the idea that heterosexuality is the norm and that any other sexual 
orientation is a deviation. Furthermore, that this deviation should be punished. 
 
3.1.3. The Influence of the Pathologisation and Criminalisation of Homosexuality 
on Inquiries Regarding the Biological Origins of Homosexuality  
I propose that the social context, beginning with the development of the concept 
in the late 1800’s, and the history of the pathologisation and criminalisation of 
homosexuality has influenced the type of questions that get asked and funded in 




stage of the scientific process: problem selection (this includes making decisions 
about what research to pursue and what research to fund). This first stage has to 
do with the practices that determine how the scientific community decides what 
projects are worth researching and which ones are not, how scientific projects get 
funded, and who they get funded by.  
 
3.2. How Contextual Values Influence the Problem Selection Stage  
3.2.1. Making Decisions about What Research Projects to Pursue – Part 1 
Many geneticists who have taken part in the research that looks into the genetic 
underpinnings of homosexuality claim that this research project is purely an 
intellectual endeavour that will contribute towards having a fuller understanding 
of human sexuality. It is, however, difficult to buy into this story given 1) the 
history of the concept and the pathologisation and criminalisation of 
homosexuality and 2) given that there is no comparable research on the genetic 
underpinnings of heterosexuality. This is worrisome for the LGBTQI+ community. 
Although I am sympathetic to the idea that genetic research that looks into sexual 
orientation might be able to give us a greater understanding of human sexuality, 
I think that ultimately, values should come in at this stage to weigh up the benefits 
and costs of this research to the LGBTQI+ community. Which, given the historical 
context, is the most vulnerable group in this situation. For this reason, I think that 
priority must be given the LGBTQI+ voices. I will not attempt to do the weighing 
up here, but as Douglas says, some weighing up must take place!  
What I will do is offer a glimpse of the public reaction, including the 




headlines. The purpose of this is to outline some of the worries put forward by 
some LGBTQI+ organisations and individuals that should be taken into account, 
and to highlight the difference in public opinion as regards this topic of research. 
 To carry out this task, I will focus on the following study: ‘A Linkage 
Between DNA markers on the X Chromosomes and Male Sexual Orientation’, a 
study published in 1993 by Dean H. Hamer, Stella Hu, Victoria L. Magnuson, Nan 
Hu, and Angela M. L. Pattatucci. The goal of this study was to determine whether 
cis male sexual orientation was genetically determined or not. They concluded: 
‘Our data indicate a statistically significant correlation between the inheritance of 
genetic markers on chromosomal region Xq28 and sexual orientation in a selected 
group of homosexual males’ (1993, p. 321). After the study was published, it 
produced great controversy, both in scientific circles and in the public in general. 
Most of the controversy, however, focused heavily on the ethical implications that 
these results might have, and not on the study itself. 
 That is, while the study focused on whether or not there was a significant 
correlation between genes and male sexual orientation, the media, including 
LGBTQI+ advocacy groups, and anyone else who cared to have an opinion, 
focused on the future. They focused on the implications that this study might have 
if it were proven true in the future. One controversial news headline read: 
‘Abortion hope after ‘gay genes’ findings’ (Lewis, 1993). In the article, the author 
questioned whether ‘Isolation of the genes means it could soon be possible to 
predict whether a baby will be gay and give the mother the option of an abortion’ 
(Lewis, 1993). Some newspapers even cited the efforts of an MP: ‘A Commons 




and signed by 30 MPs calls for a gene charter because of fears that mothers could 
try to have ‘homosexual’ foetuses aborted’ (Hope, 1993).  
The LGBTQI+ community was divided on the issue, as the news outlets 
reported. A spokesperson for the Campaign for Homosexual Equality was quoted 
by the Daily Mirror as saying: ‘“Once you start offering the facility to choose babies 
of a certain hair colour, skin colour, sexual orientation, etc, [sic] you are on a very 
slippery moral slope. “Gay people have as much right to be born as anyone else.”’ 
(Swain, 1993). Some, like the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force said that it was 
‘“mixed in response to the findings… NGLTF supports scientific research into the 
complexities of human sexuality but is concerned with possible uses of such 
research”’(Rensberger, 1993, p. A1).  Some, like Darrell Yates Rist, a co-founder of 
the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation said: ‘“Intellectually, what do we 
gain by finding out there’s a homosexual gene? Nothing, except an attempt to 
identify those people who have it and then open them up to all sorts of 
experimentation to change them”’ (Angier, 1993a, p. A1). While other LGBTQI+ 
advocacy groups thought that the study would amount to greater equality: 
‘Gregory King of the Human Rights Campaign Fund, the largest LGBTQ civil rights 
organization in the US, said: “When people learn that homosexuality is not a 
choice, they will be more willing to treat us as equal members in society.”’ 
(Hawkes, 1993a, p. 3). 
Some legal experts agreed. Richard Green, an MD and JD, then at the 
University of California at Los Angeles, was quoted as saying that ‘“If sexual 




discriminate against gays and lesbians, including sodomy laws, housing and 
employment discrimination laws, all would fall.”’ (Angier, 1993b, p. 24).  
Lord Jakobovits, on the other hand, thought that using this research to 
further the rights of the LGBTQI+ community was a bad idea: ‘Homosexuality is a 
grave departure from the natural norm which we are charged to overcome like 
any other affliction, genetic or not. […] I hope ethically sensitive professional and 
lay people alike will join in defeating this further attempt to erode our 
transcendent moral values’ (Hawkes, 1993b, p. 3).   
What I want to highlight with all of this news coverage (which took place 
in the days following the publication of the study on 16 July 1993) are the worries 
put forward about the potential ethical consequences that this research could 
have and that opinion on this matter was divided. Importantly, there was also an 
optimistic appeal to the idea that if this study can prove that people are born gay, 
then certain rights and liberties will follow for the LGBTQI+ community. 
 Given not only the history of the pathologisation and criminalisation of 
homosexuality, but also the current political climate for the LGBTQI+ community, 
it is important to take into consideration the worries raised by the LGBTQI+ 
community and think about the gains and costs of this research. For those that 
buy into the idea that we should pursue this research because if it can prove that 
people are born gay, then rights and liberties will follow, it is important to 
highlight a few things. Many on the ultra-right disagree with the idea that if people 
are born gay then we should afford them certain rights and liberties. The ultra-
right does not think that a genetic link to homosexuality should or will impact the 




people think that if there is such a link, that we should use this information for 
eugenic anti-homosexuality purposes.  
 These worries, however, have not stopped the optimism. After the study 
was published, Hamer (one of the lead scientists on the project) was actively 
involved in promoting his and other scientific findings in order to further the rights 
and liberties of the LGBTQI+ community. Hamer showed up to Hawaii’s testimony 
hearings for SB1 (same-sex marriage) in 2013 where he offered his testimony as 
a private citizen, in support of same sex-marriage. In the testimony hearings he 
said that ‘Sexual orientation is a deeply ingrained innate trait with strong genetic 
& biological roots’ (D. Hamer, 2013). He intended to influence the committee’s 
deliberations on same-sex marriage. Since then, he has continued to push this 
narrative forward. In 2014, for example, Hamer wrote that  
 
‘Understanding the biological roots of sexual behavior goes beyond pure 
science, helping to shape attitudes, laws, and, ultimately, the ability of 
people to live free and open lives. It thus behooves scientists who conduct 
such research to be thoughtful participants in how their data are 
presented and play out in the public forum. This is why I continue to 
believe, as I stated in Science more than 20 years ago, that “scientists, 
educators, policy-makers, and the public should work together to ensure 
that such research is used to benefit all members of society.”’ (Hamer, 





Hamer no longer works in the laboratory. He has since turned to filmmaking 
(Qwaves). But his study ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome 
and Male Sexual Orientation’ has since been taken up by other scientists. 
While I am less sympathetic to the idea that we should pursue this line of 
research because doing so would help further the rights and liberties afforded to 
the LGBTQI+ community, I am not entirely opposed to it. While it seems to be a 
bad argument to make, it also seems to have great influence over how people 
view the LGBTQI+ community.  
For example, some studies have found that people who think that 
homosexuality is something which somebody is born with tend to view 
homosexuality more favourably and people who think that homosexuality is 
something which is a choice, tend to view homosexuality more negatively. The 
Pew Research Center found that the ‘Belief that homosexuality is immutable is 
strongly associated with positive opinions about gays and lesbians – even more 
strongly than education, personal acquaintance with a homosexual, or general 
ideological beliefs’ (2003, p. 8). This is interesting, and matches up quite nicely 
with other data.  
In the U.S., for example, where the majority of people think that people 
are born gay, the LGBTQI+ community tends to enjoy more civil rights and liberties 
(my claim here is not one of causation, but merely one of correlation. I aim to 
show that there might be interesting connections worth looking into here).  In the 
U.S., where LGBTQI+ folks are entitled to such things as marriage recognition, 
some adoptions rights (these vary from state to state), and some (although 




country in which a majority of its citizens think that homosexuality is an in-born 
trait. According to the most recent Gallup poll, 50% of people in the U.S. think that 
people are born gay or lesbian, while 30% say that people are gay or lesbian due 
to upbringing and environment (Saad, 2018). If we compare these numbers in the 
U.S. just a few years ago ( to for example, 1977), we find that in times where the 
LGBTQI+ community did not enjoy rights such as marriage, adoption, etc., the 
majority of people thought that being gay or lesbian was a choice (Saad, 2018). As 
far as I am aware, similar kinds of data are not available for other countries. Some 
countries, such as the UK, have carried out surveys with similar kinds of questions, 
but only recently. In the U.K., a country in which LGBTQI+ members are also 
entitled to such things as marriage recognition, adoption rights, and protection 
against (some) hate crimes (to name a few rights); 49% of people think that people 
are born gay or lesbian, 31% of people think that being gay or lesbian is a choice, 
3% of people think that being gay or lesbian is the result of upbringing, and 17% 
don’t know, according to a 2017 survey (Smith, 2017).  
Studies like these, especially the ones carried out in the U.S., where there 
is available data since 1977, seem to suggest that public opinion might figure as 
an important factor when it comes to the distribution of rights and liberties to the 
LGBTQI+ community (again, my claim here is merely one of correlation). In this 
sense, perhaps there is an argument to be made for the idea that we should 
pursue this line of research because doing so would help further the rights and 
liberties afforded to the LGBTQI+ community. As I mentioned earlier, I am not 




there is discussion of the gains and costs that such research would have for the 
LGBTQI+ community.  
The next stage, after deciding whether a scientific research project is 
worth pursuing, is for the scientists themselves to think about the kind of research 
projects that they may want to pursue. That is, assuming that we think that the 
benefits of this research project are greater than the risks for the LGBTQI+ 
community, the next step is to look at the context in which scientists would be 
‘deciding’ whether to pursue this kind of research. 
 
3.2.2. Making Decisions about What Research Projects to Pursue – Part 2 
As mentioned earlier, one of the assumptions guiding this area of research is the 
idea that by studying sexual orientation, we will be able to have a deeper 
understanding of human sexuality. However, the research questions that are 
getting asked and pursued in genetics as regards sexual orientation, tell a different 
story. These questions can be categorised into the following four different but 
overlapping and related areas: 1) questions about the mechanisms of 
homosexuality, 2) questions about the mechanisms of male homosexuality, 3) 
questions about the mechanisms of homosexuality understood under the lens of 
a binary-gender model, and 4) questions about the mechanisms of cisgender5 
homosexuality. A defining theme in all four areas is homosexuality. Another 
important feature is that male homosexuality stands out as the only area that 
prioritizes a specific sexual orientation. This is reflected in the available scientific 
 





studies: there is very little scientific literature in genetics about women and zero 
literature about non-binary or agender people. In this sense, the research is 
heavily focused on cisgender men, with a slight focus on cisgender women. This 
means that all non-binary genders (or people who might reject gender categories) 
are not included in this area of research. The focus, however, is even more limited, 
this is because the research only focuses on cis men and cis women. This means 
that trans men and trans women are not included as part of this research.  In other 
words, this area of research is only looking into the underlying mechanisms of 
homosexuality in cis men with a small focus on the underlying mechanisms of 
homosexuality in cis women.  
If scientists are trying to answer a general question about the underlying 
mechanisms of sexual orientation, then they are failing to do so by employing this 
narrow focus on cis men.   
This narrow focus is also very telling of the historical context of this area 
of research and of our current social context. Historically, research areas in 
biology have been heavily focused on men. When women do figure, it’s mostly to 
note their supposed inferiority as compared to men and to highlight their 
assumed reproductive role (Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Schiebinger, 1989). In this 
sense, it is no surprise that LGBTQIA+ research also follows suit in terms of their 





3.2.2.1. An Example: NIH (National Institutes of Health) Funding 
According to a recent study, from 1989 to 2011 the NIH6 funded 625 studies 
related to LGBT health, but only 13.5% studied sexual minority women compared 
to 86.1% that studied sexual minority men (Coulter, Kenst, Bowen, & Scout, 2014). 
This means that things are not very different when it comes to LGBTQIA+ 
research. The study also found that out of the 625 studies, only 6.8% studied 
transgender populations (2014). This area of research seems to be very 
overwhelmingly focused on cis men. 
The numbers mentioned above are a general overview, but we can narrow 
those by content area. According to the same study, out of the 628 studies, only 
39 were about genetics (2014, p. e108). If we exclude studies related to HIV/AIDS 
and other sexual health issues, the number falls down to 9 studies (2014, p. e108). 
This is in the span of 22 years and out of 127, 798 studies funded on any topic 
(2014, p. e106).  
It just takes a glance at these numbers to notice two things: 1) LGBTQI+ 
research has not been a high priority for the NIH and 2) genetic related research 
about the LGBTQI+ population has been even less of a priority. But why is this? 
According to the authors, the political environment can have an effect on LGBT 
health research. They cite the case of the current U.S. Senator for Pennsylvania, 
Patrick Toomey. In 2003 he ‘[…] proposed an amendment to the NIH 
appropriations bill to rescind the funding of 5 research studies that concerned 
LGBT populations’ (2014, p. e110). The Senator went on record saying:   
 





‘[…] who thinks this stuff up? And, worse, who decides to actually fund 
these sorts of things?  Well, unfortunately, the NIH has done so. These are 
the exceptions, and not the rule. This is not a general criticism of the NIH. 
But the point is these are not applications that are worthy of taxpayer 
funds’ (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE, 2003, p. H6574).  
 
Ultimately, the proposed amendment failed but his proposal still had significant 
consequences. One of these was that the NIH found itself in a situation in which 
they had to justify around 198 NIH projects to a group of Republican Congress 
members. The NIH found itself in this situation because, after the 2003 proposed 
amendment failed, the then NIH director Elias A. Zerhouni, was asked to justify 
the original 5 studies in Toomey’s proposed amendment plus an additional 5 
research projects to a joint committee. The next day, Zerhouni was forwarded a 
list not of the 10 research projects, but a list of around 198 research projects. 
Zerhouni was forwarded the wrong list. Members of the joint committee later 
apologized for this error and asked Zerhouni to ignore the list, and only review 
the 10 original research projects, but Zerhouni went ahead and justified each of 
the research projects on the list: a list which the Traditional Values Coalition later 
took credit for. The Traditional Values Coalition is considered a hate group by the 
Southern Poverty Law Centre. This had a huge impact on the scientific community. 
Some scientists began to change words that might be considered controversial 




According to Coulter et al., this shows ‘[…] how political landscapes have 
institutionalized LGBT discrimination and influenced scientific research’ (2014, p. 
e111). I agree. This is a good example in which the social context, in this case the 
political context, is influencing scientific research. More precisely, this is an 
example in which political values are influencing which research projects get 
funded and pursued and which don’t. This is a case in which the social context is 
influencing decisions about what research projects to pursue and fund, in a rather 
pernicious way.  
The Traditional Values Coalition is an American hate group (SPLW, n.d.). 
They pride themselves in upholding what they take to be traditional Christian 
values and have been known to lobby in defence of such values in the past. They 
oppose homosexuality, amongst many other things. According to them: 
‘“Americans should understand that their attitudes about homosexuality have 
been deliberately and deceitfully changed by a masterful propaganda/marketing 
campaign that rivals that of Adolph [sic] Hitler’ […] (SPLW, n.d.). Furthermore: 
 
‘“The hate crimes language passed in the House is a threat to free speech, 
freedom of religion, and association. Homosexuality is a behavior, not a 
fixed identity. It is similar to smoking or drug use, not an immutable 
characteristic like race or ethnicity. There are no ‘former’ Blacks, but there 
are ex-homosexuals. The existence of ex-homosexuals is clear evidence 
that homosexuality is behavior-based, not an unchangeable characteristic. 




—Rev. Louis Sheldon, “Prohomosexual Hate Crime Legislation is Back!,” 
Traditional Values Coalition Report, 2005’ (SPLW, n.d.) 
 
This organisation is extremely homophobic, transphobic, islamophobic, and sexist 
(to name a few of their organization’s values). According to a news article by 
Science, the studies on the hit list included studies related to HIV/AIDS prevention, 
risky behaviour, pregnancy prevention, mental health, among others (Kaiser, 
2003). According to the same news article, ‘A few notations hint at the listmaker’s 
disapproval—for example, the observation: “endorses sexual behavior and 
condom use among teens.” A project to prevent HIV among Russian drug users 
carries the note: “Gives credence to intravenous drug activity.” ’ (Kaiser, 2003, p. 
758). The takeaway here is that the Traditional Values Coalition were certainly 
attempting to influence research agendas in science.  
When a senator is questioning your research topic and says of it that ‘[…] 
these are not applications that are worthy of taxpayer funds’(CONGRESSIONAL 
RECORD — HOUSE, 2003, p. H6574), there is reason to worry. Even more so when 
one realises that an organisation like the Traditional Values Coalition was involved 
in selecting which research topics need to be further justified. A study which 
looked into scientists’ responses to this political controversy, found that 
 
‘Half (51%), for example, said that they removed potential ‘‘red flag’’ 
words from titles and abstracts of their subsequent NIH grant submissions. 




sex; homosexual; homophobia; AIDS; bare backing; bathhouses; sex 
workers; needle-exchange; and harm-reduction’  (pg. 1575). 
 
This was one way in which scientists responded to the controversy. A second way 
in which scientists responded was by reframing studies: ‘For some (7%), studies 
were reframed in ways thought to be less politically sensitive, perhaps by avoiding 
research on marginalized or stigmatized populations’ (pg. 1575) Another 17% of 
scientists ‘[…] dropped studies or chose not to renew studies that they (or their 
administrators) believed to be politically nonviable’ (pg. 1575). Two out of the 82 
PIs (principal investigators) that participated in the study said that they left their 
research positions ‘[…] in which they had to raise their own salaries by securing 
grant money for the security of research jobs with guaranteed salaries’ (pg. 1576). 
One PI claimed to have ‘[…] left academic research altogether, declaring that ‘‘This 
[controversy] ended my research career’’ (S)’ (pg.1576). 
 This is an example in which contextual values seem to have played a role 
in the problem selection stage of the scientific context. More specifically, this is 
an example in which contextual values seem to be playing a role in the future of 
LGBTQI+ related research. There are many other groups that share the Traditional 
Values Coalition’s values and many of them have lobbied against research which 
they think goes against their values. These groups include groups like Alliance 
Defending Freedom and Focus on the Family, which are not only openly anti-
LGBT; they are also very influential anti-LGBT organizations within the current 




 The Toomey case is an example in which we can see the influence of anti-
LGBTQI+ contextual values (such as homophobia) affecting the funding and the 
type of questions that get pursued. This case highlights the impact that these 
values had on LGBTQI+ research very generally. My focus in this chapter is mostly 
on genetic research, which as we can see, amounts to a very tiny percent of the 
research that was funded by NIH. First, if it is true that the aim of genetic sexual 
orientation research is to learn more about human sexuality, then this research 
project shouldn’t be billed as an ‘LGBTQI+ research project’. It should be billed as 
a research project that affects people of all sexual orientations, including 
heterosexual people. But alas, this is not how it is currently being billed, and for 
this reason I will focus my discussion on how this research topic is actually getting 
billed. This will also give me the opportunity to address some of the other research 
projects that were funded by the NIH and that I think are beneficial to the LGBTQI+ 
community, and therefore important to keep on funding. 
 Currently, genetic research that looks into sexual orientation is being billed 
as an LGBTQI+ research project and being questioned by the U.S. government and 
groups such as the Traditional Values Coalition on that basis. It is being treated as 
any other research project that is seen to be beneficial to the LGBQI+ community. 
This includes research into sexual health, mental health and substance issues 
within the LGBTQI+ community. 
 As you might remember, in the previous chapter, we reviewed Douglas’ 
proposal for the role that values should have when deciding what scientific 
projects to pursue and which scientific projects to fund. According to her, one 




of one’s deeply held social values and values should be able to play a role when 
deciding what research project to pursue at this stage. Additionally, she argues 
that values should also play a role in helping governments and other funding 
institutions decide who to fund. I think that things are far more complicated in the 
actual world for this proposal to be able to work, especially when it comes to 
politically charged topics like the ones I’ve discussed.  
While topics such as photovoltaic cell efficiency (example discussed by 
Douglas) might be able to be discussed in the ideal scenario that she proposes, 
LGBTQI+ research projects don’t stand a chance. This is due to the current 
homophobic and transphobic climate that we live in. We live in a world where 
people in power (including the current U.S. administration) are trying to dismantle 
what little rights the LGBTQI+ community have won over the course of history. 
We live in a world where ‘[…] The Trump Administration offered to cut HIV and 
AIDS research funding under the National Institutes of Health (NIH)[…], they ‘[…] 
proposed slashes to programs and departments critical to the LGBTQ community, 
including Medicaid, Planned Parenthood, and the Center for Disease Control’s HIV 
and AIDS programs[..] (GLAAD, n.d.). Furthermore, ‘The Department of Health and 
Human Services erase[d][…] all mentions of the LGBTQ community and their 
health needs in its strategic plan for the fiscal year 2018-2022’ (GLAAD, n.d.). This 
isn’t just limited to the U.S., ‘Reporting reveals that President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief gave a sizable grant to the anti-LGBTQ group Focus on the Family 
Africa on Sept. 18, 2017’ (GLAAD, n.d.). 
The list of the number of attacks to the LGBTQI+ community by the Trump 




n.d.). I bring up these examples to help set the tone for what LGBTQI+ people are 
currently faced with. The current U.S. administration is not likely to want to 
discuss whether they should fund research that would benefit the LGBTQI+ 
community. This is because they are too busy striping away the small amount of 
protections and services that the LGBTQI+ community has fought for and won up 
until now. 
 Furthermore, as we saw above in the Toomey scandal (and given the 
current circumstances), scientists are less likely to apply for grants to do research 
that might benefit the LGBTQI+ community. This is because precedents like the 
one set with the Toomey case are likely to discourage them. This is in addition to 
the current political climate against the LGBTQI+ community set by the Trump 
administration.  
 Given these circumstances and this appalling social context in which the 
LGBTQI+ community is forced to live in, I argue (following on from Kourany (2003), 
that we should push for legislation that would encourage scientists to pursue 
research that would interest and be of benefit to the LGBTQI+ community. This 
includes making sure that LGBTQI+ people are included in that research. Kourany 
gives the example of the 1993 National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, 
which ‘[…] mandated the inclusion of women and minorities in U.S. medical 
research, and made funding contingent on that inclusion’ (Kourany, 2003, p. 8). I 
would favour this kind of direct approach when it comes to making decisions 
about what research projects to pursue and what kind of research projects to 





3.3. How Contextual Values Influence Methodological Choices 
In this section, I explore a new direct role that values could play on the second 
stage of the scientific process: methodology selection. In the previous chapter, we 
looked at Douglas’ proposal. Her proposal had to do with the direct role that 
values could play when it came to assessing questions about the ethical 
acceptability of methodology. I argue that one of the most important roles for 
values that might be of interest to feminist philosophers lies in the choice of 
concepts embedded in the methodology and that these concepts will be 
determined by the goals that one has. In order to do this, I begin with an 
introduction to genetic research that looks into the underpinnings of sexual 
orientation. I then take up Hamer et al.’s study in order to illustrate my argument. 
In this section, I also assume that this is a research project worth researching.  
 
3.3.1. Introduction to Genetic Studies 
Behavioural genetic studies are usually divided into three areas: family studies, 
twin studies, and adoption studies. Family studies are used to determine whether 
a trait runs in families. This is done by comparing families of probands (subjects 
being studied) with families of controls. The idea is that if a trait runs in a family, 
there will be a clustering of the trait in families of probands compared to families 
of controls. Twin studies compare monozygotic twins and dizygotic twins. 
Monozygotic twins are 100% genetically identical while dizygotic twins are around 
50% genetically identical. The assumptions are that both sets of twins share a 
prenatal and postnatal environment, and so, if monozygotic twins are more 




influence. Adoption studies compare a child who has been given up for adoption 
and their biological parents with a child who has been given up for adoption and 
their adoptive parents. This is meant to give the researcher an insight into both 
the genetic and environmental influences on the child.  
These studies, family, twin, and adoption studies, are the studies that take 
place before looking into a genetic mechanism of a specific trait. If there is 
sufficient evidence that genetic factors seem to be influencing a trait, then the 
next step is usually molecular genetic studies. These are the studies that I will be 
focusing on. Molecular genetics is a branch of genetics which studies the chemical 
nature of genes and the ways in which genes affect traits. The two most widely 
used studies are linkage studies and association studies. 
 
3.3.2. Genetic Study: Hamer et al.’s 1993 Study  
I would like to begin my analysis with Hamer’s 1993 study: A Linkage Between 
DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation. I would like to 
begin here for many reasons. First, this study has given rise to similar studies that 
have attempted to replicate its findings. As such, much of what I say here will 
apply to the other studies as well.  
Hamer et al., begin their study by noting that homosexuality presents an 
opportunity to explore the underlying mechanisms of human sexual development 
and differentiation (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993). However 
general this claim might seem, it is important to remember that they are only 




Hamer et al.’s study draws from previous work in behavioural genetics; 
work which has attempted to determine whether homosexuality is heritable. 
These studies suggest that homosexuality is heritable ( (Richard C. Pillard & James 
D. Weinrich, 1986), (Bailey & Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 
1991), (Bailey JM, 1993), (Bailey, Pillard, Neale, & Agyei, 1993)). Some of these 
studies also suggest that gay men are more likely to have more gay brothers than 
gay sisters and that the opposite seems to be true for lesbians; that they are more 
likely to have more gay sisters than they are to have gay brothers. This work has 
suggested to scientists like Hamer that the underlying mechanisms for sexual 
orientation might be different in women and men. This is some of the background 
knowledge from which Hamer’s study is drawing. 
Once scientists have reason to believe that a trait is heritable, one of the 
next steps is to try to figure out the mechanism through which these traits get 
passed on. This is where Hamer et al.’s work comes in.  
Hamer’s study uses pedigree analysis7 and linkage analysis8 to figure out 
whether or not male sexual orientation is genetically influenced. Hamer’s 
interpretation of the results seems to vary in strength throughout the article. For 
now, I will stick to the more modest version. This version suggests that one form 
of male sexual orientation is genetically influenced.  
In order to carry out this research project, Hamer and his team designed a 
study and recruited participants. The participants included self-acknowledged 
homosexual men as well as some of their relatives. This included 76 indexed 
 
7 A pedigree analysis is a family tree that allows scientists to map phenotypes. 




subjects as well as some of their families, 38 pairs of homosexual brothers for the 
sib-pair (siblings) pedigree study as well as some of their relatives, and two 
additional families were added to the linkage study (more details given below).  
The participants were mostly white: 92% were white non-Hispanic, 4% 
were African American, 3% were Hispanic9, and 1% were Asian, with an average 
age of 36 ± 9 (mean ±SD: mean and standard deviation). 
The sexual orientation of the probands, for the most part, was assessed by 
the Kinsey scale. The Kinsey scale is a one-dimensional bipolar model. The Kinsey 
scale consists of a scale that ranges from 0 for exclusive heterosexuality to a 6 for 
exclusive homosexuality. Most of the study participants recruited by Hamer and 
his team were asked to rate themselves on four scales: self-identification, 
attraction, fantasy, and behaviour. This means that the study participants had to 
rate themselves on a 0 to 6 scale on all four of these scales. For example, if a study 
participant self-identified as extremely heterosexual, then they would rate 
themselves a 6, and so on for the other three categories. The participants were 
divided into two different classes: self-acknowledged homosexual men and their 
relatives.  
These were the results: for the self-identification scale >90% of 
homosexual male subjects rated themselves as a Kinsey 5 or a 6 and >90% of their 
nonhomosexual10 male relatives rated themselves as a 0 or a 1. The sexual 
 
9 This is a problematic colonialist term. For more on this subject, please see Latino vs. Hispanic, 
The Politics of Ethnic Names, by Linda Martín Alcoff (2005). 
10 This is a term used by Hamer et al. in their study. I am using it when engaging with their work 
for consistency. In their work, the term ‘nonhomosexual’ seems to refer to people who mostly 
score ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’ on the scale. One way to think about the scale, which ranges from 0 to 5, 
is with ‘0’ described as definitively heterosexual, ‘1’ mostly heterosexual, ‘2’ somewhat 





attraction and fantasy scales were a bit similar: ≥95% of the participants rated 
themselves as either less than a 2 or more than a 4. The behaviour scale was a bit 
different:  in this scale, the response of homosexual and nonhomosexual 
participants overlapped (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993). Hamer 
explained these results in terms of adolescent and early adult experiences 
(Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993). And because of this, they decided 
that ‘[…] it was appropriate to treat sexual orientation as a dimorphic rather than 
as a continuously variable trait’ (1993, p. 322) This means that Hamer and his team 
decided to ignore the overlap in the Kinsey behaviour scale and instead, focus on 
the more straightforward differences in the other 3 Kinsey scales (self-
identification, attraction, and fantasy scales). 
After recruiting study participants and assessing their sexual orientation, 
Hamer and his team conducted a pedigree analysis. As mentioned earlier, a 
pedigree analysis is a family tree that allows scientists to map phenotypes. These 
diagrams allow scientists to analyse the mode of inheritance (they oftentimes 
operate like a working hypothesis).  
In order to carry out this part of the study, Hamer and his team collected 
family data from 114 homosexual male probands. These participants were then 
asked to rate their male relatives (fathers, sons, brothers, uncles, and cousins) on 
the Kinsey scale. Here, it is important to note that the authors are not counting 
bisexuality as a form of homosexuality, instead bisexuality was categorised as 
nonhomosexual. I will come back to this in my analysis. But for now, it is important 




relatives as homosexual or nonhomosexual. The reliability of their answers was 
tested by interviewing the 99 relatives. The results matched up: 
 
All (69/69) of the relatives identified as definitely homosexual verified the 
initial assessment, as did most (27/30) of the relatives considered to be 
nonhomosexual; the only possible discrepancies were one individual who 
considered himself to be asexual and two subjects who declined to answer 
all of the interview questions. (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 
1993, p. 322) 
 
This means that individuals were either categorised as homosexual or 
nonhomosexual. 
 The next step, after categorising participants, was to establish the 
population prevalence of male homosexuality. According to the authors, the 
popularly accepted figures are 4 to 10 percent. But they went with 2 percent 
which was based on a different study that they carried out. According to Hamer 
and his team, they went with this lower number in order to account for their study 
design, which includes a more narrow definition of male homosexuality (Hamer, 
Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993).  
 I won’t go through all of the results, but you can see from the table below 
that the analysis for the random probands population shows that the highest rate 
of male homosexuality is in brothers and maternally related relatives (1993). The 
problem with these figures, though, according to Hamer and his team, were that 




simple Mendelian trait and 2) there were some families in which some lesbians or 
paternally related homosexual men were present. Hamer and his team thought 
that ‘This could be explained if some instances of homosexuality were male-
limited and maternally inherited whereas others were either sporadic, not-sex 
limited, or not maternally transmitted’ (1993, p. 322). To put this in very simple 
terms, Hamer decided to narrow down the concept of male homosexuality to 
instances where the mode of inheritance was male-specific (a mode of 
inheritance that was not shared by females, for example). This means that their 
understanding of homosexuality is very limited and is not able to account for male 
homosexuality that does not fit into this narrow understanding.   
In order to test for this male-specific mode of inheritance idea, they 
deigned a new study, in which they recruited 38 families which had to meet the 
following requisites: they had to have two homosexual brothers each, one lesbian 
relative at the most, and homosexual brothers must not have a homosexual father 
or homosexual sons (to decrease the chances of paternal transmission). You can 
see the results in the table below, under the Sib-pairs probands heading. This 
study returned favourable results and supported their hypothesis that the 
selection of families with these characteristics would only increase the rate of 
male homosexuality in maternally derived relatives. The paternally derived 
relatives, as compared to the random proband study, remained unchanged or 
decreased in number. These results pointed to a maternal transmission of male 






(Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993, p. 322) 
 
 The new insight that Hamer and his team offer with these pedigree 
studies combined with another unpublished study11 that included lesbian cis 
women and their relatives is that gay men are more likely than gay women to have 
maternally-related gay uncles and gay nephews. This is a significant observation 
because the sib-pairs share genetic information with their uncles and nephews 
and, assuming that the uncles and nephews live separately, they do not share the 
same environment. This suggests that male homosexuality, at least as defined by 
Hamer and his team, might be a heritable trait that can be explained genetically. 
According to Hamer and his team, one possible explanation might be that 
male homosexuality is transmitted through the X chromosome (sex-linked 
inheritance). The idea behind this is that males usually receive the X chromosome 
through their mother and the Y chromosome through their father. With this in 
 




mind, if the trait is maternally transmitted, then one possibility is that it is 
transmitted through the X chromosome.  
One way to test this is to carry out linkage analysis, which is what Hamer 
and his team did next. Linkage analyses are usually the next step in trying to 
identify the general region of the gene or genes that might be responsible for the 
trait that scientists are interested in locating. One thing that these studies are not 
going to do, however, is give scientists the location of an exact gene (s). They are 
going to give them an approximation of the region. It is important to remember 
that the human genome has an estimate of around 20,000 to 30,000 genes. And 
the X chromosome has an estimate of around 900 genes. But numbers of genes 
aside, linkage analyses are not designed to detect a specific gene; they are 
designed to locate a region that might house these genes (so to speak). 
The underlying idea for the linkage analysis was that if the X chromosome 
contains a gene that is responsible for male homosexuality, then the genetically 
related gay men in the study should share X chromosome markers close to that 
area (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993). That is, they were proposing 
to look for genetic markers that were identical across all and only gay men. The 
participants in this analysis included the 38 participants from the sib-pair 
population and 2 from the random population, in addition to other relatives. This 
yielded a total of 40 participants. 
The DNA of all participants was collected and typed for 22 markers on the 
X chromosome. The results were positive and suggested that there might be 
linkage between male homosexual orientation and the Xq28 region (see the last 




(Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993). This is a significant score. Usually, 
LOD scores over three are considered to show close linkage.  
 
(Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993, p. 323) 
 
Hamer and his team took the results as ‘[…] evidence that one form of 
male homosexuality is preferentially transmitted through the maternal side and 
is genetically linked to chromosomal region Xq28’ (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & 
Pattatucci, 1993, p. 325).  
 
3.3.3. Role of Values in Hamer et al.’s Methodology 
In this section, I argue that one of the most important roles for values in science 
lies in the choice of concepts that is embedded in the methodology. Douglas, as 
we saw in the last chapter, discussed the role that values could have in assessing 




interested in assessing here. I am interested in assessing the concepts that Hamer 
et al.’s study relies on to carry out their research.  
 
3.3.3.1. The Pool of Study Participants 
The first point that I would like to make has little to do with the role that concepts 
play in the methodology. However, it is important to address this point because it 
is still related to the method Hamer et al. used and plays a big role in the 
conclusions that scientists are able to draw. Additionally, I think that this point 
will be helpful in thinking about future research. This point has to do with the 
participants from whom they collected data. 
In Hamer et al.’s study. 92% of the participants were white non-Hispanic, 
4% were African American, 3% were Hispanic, and 1% were Asian. This means that 
the overwhelming majority of the participants in the study were white (92%). This 
is not an isolated case in the sciences (Dresser, 1992). In fact, instances like this 
highlight a much bigger structural problem. The problem being that white men 
are usually taken to be the neutral representation of human kind in scientific 
studies. This is exemplified in studies like this, where the majority of participants 
are white, but what we end up with is a generalisation that is meant to apply to 
men of all backgrounds.  
In addition to the pool of participants being very white, it is also very cis12. 
If we take Hamer and his team to be seriously committed to the idea that their 
 
12 This study took place in 1993. While I acknowledge that it takes time for new concepts to 
make their way into the scientific literature and while I also want to make room for the fact that 
concepts can evolve, I also think that it is important to highlight instances in which trans, 
genderqueer, and non-binary folks (for example) are left out. With this, I do not mean to single 




research represents ‘[…] an opportunity to explore the mechanisms underlying 
human sexual development and differentiation’ (D. H. Hamer et al., 1993, p. 321), 
then it is important that their pool of participants (as well as their sexual 
orientation concept – more on this in the next section) be able to reflect this. 
There are trans men who are homosexual and they should most definitely be 
included in research which aims study male homosexuality. Deciding what other 
participants to include will depend on what these scientists take their concept of 
sexual orientation to refer to. I now move on to spell this out in greater detail. 
 
3.3.3.2. The Relationship between Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender  
Hamer et al. do not address what their understanding of sexual orientation refers 
to. Sexual orientation is usually understood to refer to some kind of attraction, 
desire, or fantasy towards a person[s] at least partly on the basis of that person’s 
sex and or gender. Hamer et al. do not distinguish between sex and gender and 
neither do they specify whether their understanding of sexual orientation refers 
to some kind of attraction, desire, or fantasy towards a person[s] (1) at least partly 
on the basis of that person’s sex, (2) at least partly on the basis of that person’s 
gender, or (3) at least partly on the basis of that person’s sex and gender. Here we 
have the first instance in which values can shape concepts. 
 Depending on Hamer et al.’s values, which I think should be ones of 
inclusivity and of recognising LGBTQI+ experiences, one thing they should 
 
genderqueer, and non-binary people are often not included. Recognising this is one of the first 




consider is opting for a concept of sexual orientation whose relationship to sex 
and or gender is one that reflects the experiences of the LGBTQI+ community.  
 Not being clear about what the relationship between these concepts 
(sexual orientation, sex, and gender) is creates unnecessary confusion and leaves 
the researchers without the conceptual tools that they need in order to be able 
to clearly state what exactly it is that they are researching. Furthermore, if the aim 
of genetic researchers like Hamer is to understand homosexuality and not just cis 
homosexuality, then what they need is an account of sex and gender that allows 
them to account for the experiences of trans, genderqueer, and non-binary 
people. They also need a concept of sexual orientation that is able to account for 
both sex and or gender. I won’t spend time developing this idea in detail here 
because in the next chapter I propose a new way of understanding sexual 
orientation when carrying out genetic research, and I fully develop this idea there. 
For now, it is only important to make clear that there is room for values to shape 
our concepts at this stage.  
 
3.3.3.3. Sexual Orientation Concepts and the Kinsey Model 
With the sex and gender relationship to sexual orientation out of the way, the 
next thing I want to talk about is the concept of sexual orientation itself. What I 
mean here is, independently of what the concept of sexual orientation refers to, 
what does sexual orientation describe? Does that concept describe attraction? 
Behaviour? Sexual fantasies? This is another place where I think values could play 





 Hamer et al. are not entirely clear about what they understand sexual 
orientation to be. However, based on the sexual orientation assessment they use, 
we can draw some conclusions. In order to assess sexual orientation, Hamer and 
his team appeal to the Kinsey scales: 
‘Sexual orientation was assessed by the Kinsey scales, which range from 0 
for exclusive heterosexuality to 6 for exclusive homosexuality (13). 
Subjects rated themselves on four aspects of their sexuality: self-
identification, attraction, fantasy, and behavior’ (D. H. Hamer et al., 1993, 
p. 321). 
 
The Kinsey model is a one-dimensional bipolar model. This model buys into a 
binary account of gender (two genders only: women and men) and says that a 
person’s sexual orientation falls somewhere along a one-dimensional scale, which 
has two polar opposites: exclusive homosexuality on one end and exclusive 
heterosexuality on the other end.  
First, this means that the only genders that this model is able to 
acknowledge and account for are two: women and men. This means that all other 
genders that fall outside of this binary, including people who reject gender 
categories altogether, are not built into the model and the model is therefore 
unable account for their experiences.  
This model reflects the societal arrangements and structure of the genders 
that western society (in which this model was developed) deems as real and 
legitimate. Some trans, genderqueer, and non-binary people, for example, have 




and in all aspects of life. They have had to fight against the idea that there are 
only two genders. In having to do this, they have faced an enormous amount of 
discrimination. The idea that there are only two genders is deeply rooted in 
misogyny and sexism and is reflective of western society. In this sense, the usage 
of the Kinsey model is reflective of implicit values such as sexism and cissexism, 
which are reflective of the social context in which the Kinsey model and the study 
were developed.  
Again, if Hamer and his team (including other geneticists working on the 
topic) are interested in carrying out research on sexual orientation, not just cis 
sexual orientation, then the Kinsey model is not desirable because it reinforces 
the idea that only two genders exist. The Kinsey model does this by excluding the 
experiences of many people within the LGBTQI+ community who do not subscribe 
to a binary account of gender. This problem gives researchers an opportunity to 
opt for a more egalitarian model that is representative of our rich gender diversity 
(I develop this idea in the next chapter. For now, it is only important that we 
recognize the potential for values to influence the geneticist’s choice of concepts). 
Additionally, the Kinsey model seems to suggest that sexual orientation 
works by matter of degrees. This is the view that a person can be moderately 
attracted to women, while others can be exclusively attracted to women. In this 
sense, Kinsey’s account, it would seem, is able to account for different kinds of 
sexual orientations, not just exclusive homosexuality and exclusive 
heterosexuality (unlike the binary account which says that there are only two 




In The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual 
Orientation (2001), Stein raises two further problems for the Kinsey model that 
might be relevant here: the first problem is that this account ‘lumps’ together 
people who have different kinds of sexual desires, including bisexuals. Consider 
these cases:  
 
‘a. Individuals who are strongly attracted to people of the same sex and 
strongly attracted to people of the other sex.  
b. Individuals who are moderately attracted to people of the same sex and 
moderately attracted to people of the other sex.  
c. Individuals who are weakly attracted to people of the same sex and 
weakly attracted to people of the other sex.’ (Stein, 2001, pp. 53-54) 
 
These three cases all seem to be different, yet they would all be classed as a 3 on 
the Kinsey scale. This is a problem for Hamer and his team as well as for any future 
genetic researchers who want to carryout research on the topic of sexual 
orientation. This is perhaps less of a direct problem for Hamer and his team 
because they are not researching bisexuality. However, they still have to ascribe 
a sexual orientation to all of their study participants and this might include 
bisexual people. For geneticist who are interested in researching bisexuality, this 
is a problem because if they appeal to the Kinsey model, they will not have the 
conceptual tools that they need to properly carryout their research and account 




 A second problem that Stein raises is that the Kinsey model assumes that 
sexual orientation has only one dimension. That is, the model assumes that a 
person’s attraction to men varies inversely with the degree of attraction to 
women (Stein, 2001). But this might not be necessarily true. That is, someone who 
is strongly attracted to women will not necessarily be weakly attracted to men. 
Someone can be strongly attracted to women and also be strongly attracted to 
men. The problem here is that the Kinsey model is not able to account for cases 
like this.  
 In continuing to think about the concept of sexual orientation, Hamer and 
his team treat male homosexuality as a dimorphic rather than a continuous trait. 
According to them, ‘Only the sexual behavior scale gave a small overlap between 
the two groups largely because of adolescent and early adult experiences. 
Therefore, for our study, it was appropriate to treat sexual orientation as a 
dimorphic rather than as a continuously variable trait’ (1993, pp. 321-322). This 
means that study participants were classified either as homosexuals or  
nonhomosexuals.  
The behaviour scale was one of the four scales that the study participants 
had to rate themselves on. The idea was that their sexual orientation would be 
assessed based on how they rated themselves on these scales. However, if we 
recall, one of the features of the Kinsey scales is that it is a bipolar model that 
assesses sexual orientation in matter of degrees. According to this model, an 
individual can be exclusively heterosexual or exclusively homosexual, but these 
are not the only options available. Under this model, an individual can also be 




example. In this sense, Hamer et al. opted out from this understanding and 
instead opted in for a dimorphic understanding of sexual orientation. They 
adopted the idea that there were only two sexual orientations: homosexuality or 
nonhomosexuality. Bisexual study participants, under this understanding of 
sexual orientation were considered as nonhomosexual (heterosexual). This 
dimorphic understanding of sexual orientation is problematic for two reasons. 
The first is that it is unable to account for the sexual orientations of those who do 
not identify as homosexual or heterosexual. Second, this understanding of sexual 
orientation is problematic because it fails the bisexual community. You cannot 
just lump in bisexual people with heterosexual people (or nonhomosexuals as 
Hamer et al. refer to this group), this is not how bisexuality works. Bisexuality is a 
sexual orientation in its own right. Geneticists need an understanding of sexual 
orientation that is able to adequately account for all sexual orientations, not just 
homosexuality and heterosexuality. This presents yet another opportunity for 
values to shape our concept of sexual orientation.  
In addition to this, there is one more problem that I would like to draw 
attention to before I wrap up this section. This is Hamer et al. use of behaviour as 
an indicator of someone’s sexual orientation. Although Hamer et al. collect 
information on sexual behaviour as an indicator of a person’s sexual orientation, 
they later dismiss this information because it was inconsistent in terms of what 
the study participant’s reported in the other scales used to assess their sexual 
orientation. If we look back at the results for the other scales used by Hamer et 
al., namely the self-identification scale, the attraction scale, and the fantasy scale, 




terms of their response. It was only the behaviour scale that seemed to create 
some overlap between both groups. Hamer and his team tell us that this overlap 
might be due to adolescent and early adult experience and for this reason they 
decide to not take it into account. 
I am not sure why Hamer et al. decided to collect information about the 
study participant’s sexual behaviour in the first place, but I want to suggest that 
sexual behaviour should not be included in genetic understandings of sexual 
orientation, not because these don’t neatly line up with a person’s attraction, self-
identification, or sexual fantasies (as Hamer et al. suggest). I argue that geneticists 
should not try to account for sexual behaviour because sexual behaviour is heavily 
dependent on a person’s social and political context and might therefore not be 
able to accurately represent a person’s sexual orientation. For example, it is 
perfectly conceivable that a gay man who lives in a country where homosexuality 
is criminalised can have sexual desires etc. about men while, due to personal 
safety issues, choosing not to engage in any sexual behaviour. Again, I think that 
our concept of sexual orientation will be shaped by the aims the one has. If this 
aim is to carryout genetic research, then sexual behaviour should not be included 
as an indicator of a person’s sexual orientation.  
 
3.4. Conclusions 
One of the things that feminist philosophers have been concerned with are ways 
in which science affects women’s lives. One of the things that they have 
highlighted is that there is not a whole lot of research that focuses on women and 




Genetic explanations of sexual orientation are by no means an exception. This is 
an area that continues to be focused not only on men, but on cis men. 
If we agree with some of the scientists and grant that 1) genetic research 
that looks into the underpinnings of sexual orientation is worth pursuing because 
proving that sexual orientation has a genetic basis will help change attitudes and 
laws and 2) that this research project is worth pursuing because it will provide us 
with some kind of general knowledge about the underlying mechanisms of sexual 
orientation in human beings, then the kind of questions that geneticists are 
pursuing and the kind of concepts that they are using has to change. This is 
because if this is their aim, they are failing to meet this aim. Cis white men do not 
represent all human beings. Scientists know very little about women’s sexuality 
and relatively nothing about other gender minorities, including people who reject 
gender categories altogether. There is a lot of diversity out there and this area of 
research has failed to not only capture this diversity, it has also failed to even 
attempt to do so. This is because the questions that are getting asked and pursued 
and the concepts that are being used have focused and continue to focus on cis 
men.  
I propose that two of the most impactful roles that values can play in 
science is through the direct role that values can play when making decisions 
about what research projects to pursue and fund and when making 
methodological choices, including the scientist’s choice of concepts. A proposal 
like this is especially important when it comes to dealing with politically charged 
research such as sexual orientation. In the first stage (when making decisions 




This includes taking the time to weigh up the consequences for the LGBTQI+ 
community.  In the case that we decide that a research project is beneficial and 
of interest to the LGBTQI+ community, I propose that we push for legislation 
which encourages scientists to pursue this kind of research and which makes sure 
that the LGBTQI+ community is represented in this research. In the second stage 
(making methodological choices), I propose that the concepts used be determined 
by the goals that one has. To demonstrate this, in the following two chapters I 
develop two different concepts of sexual orientation that are needed to address 
two different goals. The first is carrying out genetic research and the second is 















4. The Gay Gene(s)? Rethinking the Concept of Sexual Orientation in the 
Context of Science 
In 2013, Hamer claimed that ‘[…] genes are the single most important factor in 
determining a person’s sexual orientation and outweigh all known shared 
environmental factors’ (D. Hamer, 2013). In this chapter, I argue that we are far 
from being able to accept or reject a claim like this. A quick look at past and 
current genetic studies of sexual orientation will reveal problematic metaphysical 
assumptions that need to be addressed before we are in a position to accept or 
reject a claim like the one put forth by Hamer. Different scientists seem to 
understand sexual orientation differently. Some understand sexual orientation 
through a mix of sexual orientation markers such as self-identification, attraction, 
fantasy, and sexual behaviour, while others understand sexual orientation 
through just one sexual orientation marker, such as sexual behaviour. This 
inconsistency means that scientists might be measuring and talking about 
different things when talking about sexual orientation. If this is right, then a claim 
like Hamer’s is problematic because, as will see by critically engaging with the 
genetics literature, we do not have the conceptual tools or the data to assess a 
claim like this.  
 Having a clear idea about what concepts things in the world belong to 
helps us explain and predict future events associated with these concepts. This is 
because things that belong to say, concept X, track specific patterns and 
properties that are specific to that concept and that, to a certain extent, 




If we want a concept of sexual orientation that will have more predictive 
and explanatory power, we need, at the very minimum, a concept of sexual 
orientation that tells us what properties or markers are the most helpful in 
understanding sexual orientation. In this chapter, I argue that scientists should 
adopt a sexual orientation view that prioritises internal sexual orientation 
markers such as desire, fantasies, and attraction (I am not committed to any one 
of these markers. My point is that the sexual orientation markers should be inner 
states or processes) 13 and that they should move away from sexual orientation 
views that prioritise sexual behaviour. I also argue that a genetic account of sexual 
orientation should take into account both the sex and gender of the person one 
is ascribing sexual orientation to and the sex[es] and gender[s] this person desires, 
fantasises, and is attracted to.   
I begin by providing a quick note on the relationship between sex, gender, 
and sexual orientation. I then move on to review some common ways of 
understanding sexual orientation in the genetics literature. I argue that these 
accounts have a very limited amount of predictive and explanatory power. 
Following this, I outline what an account of sexual orientation that has more 
predictive and explanatory power might look like. I argue that this account will be 
one that focuses on internal markers such as desire, fantasies, and attraction.   
 
 




4.1. Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation 
In this section, I argue that it is unclear how scientists carrying out genetic studies 
of sexual orientation understand sex and gender and what role they think this has 
when understanding sexual orientation. Following on from Dembroff, I argue that 
we should understand these two concepts as distinct, independent, and at least 
partially socially constructed concepts. I also argue that our concept of sexual 
orientation should take into account the sex and gender of the person one is 
ascribing sexual orientation to and the sex[es] and gender[s] that person has 
desires, fantasies, and attractions about. 
Scientists, scholars, and the average layperson take ‘sexual orientation’ to 
refer to some kind of attraction, desire, or fantasy towards a person[s] at least 
partly on the basis of that person’s  sex and or gender. In the scientific literature 
that pertains to sexual orientation, scientists do not distinguish between sex and 
gender and oftentimes use these terms interchangeably. For example, it is not 
uncommon for scientists to switch back and forth in studies between the gender 
concept of woman to the sex concept of female. For example, in Hamer et al. 
1995, the study begins by claiming that ‘Most men are sexually attracted to 
females whereas most women are attracted to males’ (1995, p. 248). There is no 
explicit view about what these concepts of sex and gender are like or what makes 
up each of these concepts. 
 There are, however, many scientific studies outside of the discipline of 
genetics on the topic of sexual orientation that assume that there are two sexes 
(female and male) and that there are fundamental differences between these two 




between the male and female brain that can help explain sexual orientation. A 
good example of this is LeVay’s study of the hypothalamus (LeVay, 1991). His is a 
neuroanatomical study. According to him, sexual orientation in men might have 
some interesting relationship with the INAH3 region of the brain. LeVay buys into 
the idea that the INAH3 region of the brain is different in male and female brains. 
Building on this, he claims that this region of the brain in homosexual males is 
similar to that of heterosexual females and that this is part of what might be able 
to explain ‘sexual feelings or behaviour’ towards members of a particular sex[es]. 
In this study, it is quite clear that LeVay thinks that there are average differences 
between males and females in the brain. This is not quite as explicit in genetic 
studies. The closest genetic studies have come to making an endorsement of this 
kind comes in the form of geneticists claiming that their findings might be able to 
help explain some of the studies that do make these kind of claims. For example, 
geneticists might find that an X region of a chromosome that they take to 
influence sexual orientation might have interesting connections with non-genetic 
studies. The story typically goes something like this: lower-level biological 
phenomena such as genes produce certain molecules that then influence (or 
determine, depending on how strong the claim is) higher-level phenomena. They 
then take a story like this to confirm and provide an explanation for studies such 
as LeVay’s. Examples like this show that there might be some implicit 
endorsements by geneticists that there are two sexes and that there are specific 
differences between these two sexes.  
 Another way in which geneticists implicitly endorse or assume sex 




Hamer et al.’s study. Their study design relies on the assumption that sex is to 
some extent determined by a person’s sex chromosomes. People typically have 
23 pairs of chromosomes. The first 22 pairs are called autosomes and the last pair 
are called sex chromosomes because, in contrast to the autosomes, the sex 
chromosomes are assumed to play an important role in sex determination. People 
with XY are assumed male and people with XX are assumed female. There is a 
prevalent cultural and scientific belief that the X chromosome is the ‘female 
chromosome’ and that the Y chromosome is the ‘male chromosome’. When in 
fact, evidence suggests otherwise. For example, recent  research has shown that 
the WNT4 gene on chromosome 1 is thought to play a key role in ovarian 
development (Richardson, 2013, pp. 6 & 136). Also, genes DMRT1 on 
chromosome 9 and FOXL2 on chromosome 3, are thought to play a key role in 
ovarian and testes differentiation (Richardson, 2013, pp. 136 & 204). So it’s not 
just the XX and XY that contribute towards ovarian and testes development and 
differentiation. Research like this suggests  that sex is not so neatly divided along 
the XX and XY dichotomy, like previously thought. Hamer et al. implicitly assume 
the model that says that sex is divided along these lines. I am of course attempting 
to tease out this information from their study because they do not make any 
explicit claims regarding this subject. However, we are able to gather a few things 
from their study. The first is that their male participants are ones with XY 
chromosomes. This information is evident when reviewing their linkage analysis 
results. I am not attributing any specific theory of sex or gender to Hamer et al. I 
do, however, think that there are some implicit assumptions about sex being 




are assuming that sex is determined by a person’s chromosomal sex and if so, 
what that chromosomal sex determines and how that is relevant to sexual 
orientation. 
 There is a lot of unclarity surrounding these issues in the context of genetic 
studies. However, if geneticists are interested in putting forth a plausible account 
of sexual orientation, then clarity is needed regarding what they take sex and 
gender to be and what role they think these concepts have in relation to sexual 
orientation. If, for example, geneticists think that sex determines gender and that 
there are only two sexes (male and female) and two genders (women and men), 
then there will be no room to account for some trans, genderqueer, and non-
binary people. For example, while there might be room to account for cis women 
who are exclusively attracted to other women (lesbian women), there would be 
no room to account for a genderqueer person who is exclusively attracted to 
women independently of their sex. 
 If the aim of these genetic studies is to further understand human 
sexuality, and not just cis human sexuality, then what we need is an account of 
sex and gender which allows us to account for the experiences of trans, 
genderqueer, and non-binary people that might not be able to be accounted for 
under a restrictive binary view like the one just discussed. 
 Following on from Dembroff (2016), I think that scientists should 
understand sex and gender as 1) independent concepts where one concept 
doesn’t determine the other and 2) as socially constructed concepts.  
Dembroff argues that the concept of sex tracks biological features and that 




these concepts are at least partially socially constructed and independent of one 
another (one doesn’t determine the other). I think this is a good way of 
understanding these concepts because it provides us with the conceptual tools to 
be able to account for the sexual orientation of trans, genderqueer, and non-
binary people.  For this reason, I think that both of these concepts should be taken 
into account when understanding sexual orientation. To illustrate this idea 
consider these two common ways of understanding what ‘sexual orientation’ 
refers to:  
 
1) Sexual orientation refers to a person’s sexual desire, attraction, etc. to 
another person at least partly on the basis of that person’s sex. 
2) Sexual orientation refers to a person’s sexual desire, attraction, etc. to 
another person at least partly on the basis of that person’s gender. 
 
Both of these options operate on a one-dimension model. They either account for 
sex or gender, but not both. I argue that a genetic account of sexual orientation 
should account for both sex and gender. This would look something like this: 
 
3) Sexual orientation refers to a person’s sexual desire, attraction, etc. to 
another person at least partly on the basis of that person’s sex and/or 
gender. 
 
Under this proposal, we would end up with a two-dimensional model of sexual 




gender, and these two combined would be part of what would lead us to a 
person’s sexual orientation. For example, if a person X sexually desires, is 
attracted to, and fantasies about females (sex) and women (gender) only, then 
we would ascribe them the sexual orientation of lesbian. 
 Importantly, Dembroff argues that we should understand sexual 
orientation in a way that only considers the sex and/or gender of the person a 
person X is attracted to14. I disagree. I think that when understanding sexual 
orientation, we should also take into account person X’s sex and or gender.  
Dembroff’s motivation for not taking into account the sex and/or gender 
of the person we are ascribing a sexual orientation to is a political and social one. 
According to Dembroff, the move to leave out the sex and/or gender of the person 
we are ascribing a sexual orientation to ‘Reduces or eliminates the presumption 
that cisheterosexuality is the normatively standard sexual orientation and all 
queer sexual orientations are normatively deviant[…]’(Dembroff, 2016, p. 5). This 
reduction or elimination happens because by not including the sex and/or gender 
of the person we are ascribing sexual orientation to, we end up with a radically 
new sexual orientation taxonomy that does not include sexual orientation 
concepts such as heterosexual. For example, according to Dembroff’s proposal, 
all men who are attracted to women and all women who are attracted to women 
would share the same sexual orientation, in virtue of being attracted to the same 
 
14 Dembroff uses the term ‘attraction’ as a shorthand for dispositions to engage in sexual 
behaviour (2016, p. 7). I use ‘attraction’ when referring to Dembroff’s proposal in the way they 
understand it in order to be consistent with how they use the term. However, this should not be 
confused by how I use the term in this chapter when I am not discussing Dembroff’s work, which 
is as a kind of internal manifestation that might or might not have anything to do with sexual 




sex and/or gender. This means that all lesbians and heterosexual men would share 
the same sexual orientation and the sexual orientation concepts of lesbian and 
heterosexual would disappear. 
The problem for geneticists is that this is not how most people currently 
understand their own sexual orientation. Studying sexual orientation requires 
that geneticist use sexual orientation concepts that are in actual use (such as the 
concepts of lesbian and heterosexual) and not sexual orientation concepts that 
are not known to people and that are not in use. Crucially, I do not see Dembroff’s 
proposal taking off in the future. This is because for many people, their own sex 
and/or gender plays an important role in how they understand their own sexual 
orientation (Bettcher, 2014). Because of this, I think that it is important that our 
concept of sexual orientation be able to account for the sex and/or gender of the 
person one is assigning a sexual orientation to.  
It is important that we have a clear idea about what our concept of sexual 
orientation refers to because this will affect our sexual orientation taxonomy and 
the kinds of people we will be able to account for. While I argue that our concept 
of sexual orientation should be based on both sex and gender and that we should 
take into account the sex and/or gender of both the person we are assigning a 
sexual orientation to and the sex and/or gender that person sexually desires, is 
attracted to, etc., I remain neutral on a number of issues. For one, I remain neutral 
on how many sexes or genders there are and I also remain neutral on whether 
these concepts of sex and gender are discrete or continuous. Addressing these 





4.2. Sexual Orientation Views in the Genetics Literature 
Leaving the sex, gender, and sexual orientation relationship to a side, I  would now 
like to work through a few common ways of understanding sexual orientation in 
the genetics literature and show that there is no agreed upon way to understand 
sexual orientation amongst geneticists.  
 
4.2.1 A Linkage between DNA Markers on the X chromosome and Male Sexual 
Orientation 
Hamer and at al. 1993 study, ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X 
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation’, is a good place to begin (D. H. Hamer 
et al., 1993). In their study,  
 
‘Sexual orientation was assessed by the Kinsey scales, which range from 0 
for exclusive heterosexuality to 6 for exclusive homosexuality (13). 
Subjects rated themselves on four aspects of their sexuality: self-
identification, attraction, fantasy, and behavior’ (D. H. Hamer et al., 1993, 
p. 321).  
 
This group of scientists appealed to a variety of markers typically associated with 
sexual orientation. Under their view, a person’s sexual orientation is a 





4.2.2 Male Homosexuality: Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at Xq28 
Consider a second study, where sexual orientation was understood through a mix 
of four different markers: self-identification, corroboration from a secondary 
source, stereotypes, and a gay interviewer. In ‘Male Homosexuality: Absence of 
Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at Xq28’, Rice and colleagues put out an advert 
in two gay news magazines. They were in search of families that had at least two 
gay brothers. The individuals that responded to the advert ‘volunteered 
information about the sexual orientation of individuals in their families, including 
siblings, parents, uncles, aunts, and first cousins, although all members of the 
extended family were not directly interviewed’ (Rice et al., 1999, p. 666). This was 
the first time they assessed sexual orientation. We can identify this first 
assessment as self-identification. Later, when it came time for the molecular 
analysis, they assessed sexual orientation for a second time. The participants who 
took part in the molecular analysis included the index subjects15 and their gay 
brothers. According to Rice et al. in ‘Male Homosexuality: Absence of Linkage to 
Microsatellite Markers at Xq28’: 
 
‘Sexual orientation was confirmed for all subjects16 at the time of blood 
sampling by the direct questioning of a gay interviewer. The index subject 
read gay magazines and volunteered that he was gay, and this observation 
 
15 Initially, 182 individuals responded to the advertisement for the study. The people who 
responded to these advertisements are the ‘index subjects’. The other participants in the study, 
including the brothers that participated in the molecular analysis, were recruited through the 
index subjects.  




was corroborated by interviewing the gay brother’17 (Rice et al., 1999, p. 
666).  
 
Quite a few things require unpacking from this passage. First, it is 
important to highlight the appeal to gay magazines and self-identification as 
markers of the study participants’ sexual orientation. Rice et al. inform us early on 
in their paper that the adverts for this study were published in two gay magazines, 
and this is made quite clear. However, this is not what is going on in this passage. 
Rice et al. seem to be appealing to the fact that the index subject read gay 
magazines and self-identified as gay men as sexual orientation markers. That is, 
this was taken as information that helped confirm the sexual orientation of the 
index subjects.  
If this is right, then many issues need to be raised. The first is that it is not 
clear that there is any correlation between reading gay magazines and being gay. 
It is perfectly conceivable that heterosexual people read gay magazines. It is also 
perfectly conceivable that not all gay people read gay magazines. Because of this, 
it is not clear that reading gay magazines can shed any light on a person’s sexual 
orientation.  
Leaving this difficulty aside, it is odd that Rice et al. only appeal to reading 
gay magazines as some kind of marker for their index subject’s sexual orientation, 
but not for all of their participants, including the index subject’s gay brothers who 
 
17 The advertisements for this study were published in gay news magazines. It is unclear if the 
fact that index subjects responded to this advertisement was taken as the only evidence to 
establish that the index subjects read gay magazines. It is also unclear if the brothers of the index 




are also participating in the molecular analysis. In other words, if these scientists 
consider that reading gay magazines is an important marker or indicator of 
someone’s sexual orientation, then it is not clear why they didn’t ask the index 
subject’s gay brothers if they also read gay magazines. 
Furthermore, Rice et al. report that the index subject’s sexual orientation 
was corroborated by interviewing the index subjects’ gay brothers and, in a sense, 
the gay brothers seem to have also corroborated the information provided by the 
index subjects that they themselves are gay by taking part in the study. According 
to Rice et al., sexual orientation also has to do with how others, other than the 
person in question, understand their sexual orientation. That is, there seems to 
be something important about another person’s assessment of one’s own sexual 
orientation. It would have been interesting to see what Rice et al. would have 
done if the answers provided by the study participants didn’t neatly line up. That 
is, if some of the brothers came back and said that their brother (an index subject) 
was not gay but bisexual, for example. This would have been a good indicator of 
how much weight another person’s assessment of one’s own sexual orientation 
has over other sexual orientation markers used by Rice et al.  
Then we have the gay interviewer whose job it was to confirm all of the 
participants’ (index subjects’ and their gay brothers’) sexual orientation. It is not 
clear what questions were asked by the gay interviewer or why it was important 
or relevant that the interviewer was gay. It is not clear if the gay interviewer was 
supposed to help the participants feel more comfortable due to the nature of the 
study or if Rice et al. were assuming that gay people have some kind of gaydar 




Drawing strictly from Rice et al.’s study, the relevance of ‘the gay interviewer’ in 
assessing sexual orientation is unclear. What is clear is that the gay interviewer 
was part of assessing the study participant’s sexual orientation and therefore part 
of Rice et al.’s understanding of sexual orientation. To sum up, Rice et al. seem to 
understand sexual orientation through a mix of self-identification, corroboration 
from secondary sources, stereotypes, and a gay interviewer.  
 So far I have listed only two examples from the literature on sexual 
orientation: Hamer et al.’s ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X 
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation’ (1993) and Rice et al.’s ‘Male 
Homosexuality: Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at Xq28’(1999). 
However, even just looking at these two examples it is easy to see that these 
scientists sometimes are referring to different things when talking about sexual 
orientation. We can see that while Hamer et al.’s study understands sexual 
orientation on the basis of a combination of markers such as self-identification, 
behaviour, attraction, desires, and fantasies, Rice et al.’s study understands sexual 
orientation on the basis of self-identification, corroboration from secondary 
sources, stereotypes, and a gay interviewer. If both studies conclude that sexual 
orientation is, to a certain extent, influenced by genes and they both understand 
sexual orientation differently, they are going to end up with different and possibly 
conflicting results. The only factor that might remain stable across these two 
studies is that they will both be able to capture a group of people that self-identify 
with a particular sexual orientation. However, unless scientists are ready to 
subscribe to a self-identification view of sexual orientation (which I will later argue 





4.2.3. Genome-Wide Association Study of Male Sexual Orientation 
Consider another study. According to ‘Genome-Wide Association Study of Male 
Sexual Orientation’(2017) by Sanders and colleagues, they ‘[…] classified men as 
homosexual based on both their self-reported sexual identity and sexual feelings 
(Kinsey 5-6)’ (Sanders et al., 2017, p. 3). Note how this is different from the 
previous two studies (except for self-identification marker). According to this 
study, sexual orientation has to do with only two markers: self-identification and 
sexual feelings.  
 
4.2.4. Large-scale GWAS Reveals Insights into the Genetic Architecture of Same-
Sex Sexual Behaviour 
Lastly, consider a study that is, at the time of writing this chapter, claimed to be 
the largest genome-wide analysis of sexual orientation. The title of the study is 
‘Large-scale GWAS reveals insights into the genetic architecture of same-sex 
sexual behaviour’, by Ganna et al. (2019). According to Ganna and colleagues, 
‘Twin and family studies have shown that sexual orientation is in part genetically 
influenced (~40% narrow-sense heritability), but previous efforts to identify the 
specific genes involved have been unsuccessful due to a lack of power’ (2018). 
This is where Ganna and colleague’s study comes in. According to them, they had 




power that affected previous studies. The problem with their study, however, is 
that sexual orientation is mostly18 understood in terms of sexual behaviour: 
 
‘Our primary phenotype of interest is a binary, self-reported measure of 
whether respondents had ever had sex with someone of the same sex 
(here termed “nonheterosexuals”) or had not (here termed 
“heterosexuals”) (Box 1)’ (Ganna, Verweij, Nivard, Maier, Wedow, Busch, 
Abdellaoui, Guo, Sathirapongsasuti, 23andMe Research Team, et al., 2019, 
p. 1) 
 
 This is a problem because Ganna et al. are using different sexual orientation 
markers from the ones used in previous studies to which their study is referring, 
and which they wish to confirm. Sanders and colleagues, for example, did not 
even examine sexual behaviour in their study. Sanders et al.’s study seems to 
understand sexual orientation through self-identification and sexual feelings, 
while Ganna et al.’s study mostly understands sexual orientation through sexual 
behaviour. This is a problem because if it turns out that they are talking about 
different things, then the results from Ganna and colleagues might not be 
confirming the idea that sexual orientation is genetically influenced in the same 
 
18 Ganna et al. discuss other sexual orientation markers in their study such as sexual identity, 
sexual attraction, sexual experience, sexual fantasies, gender and emotional connection, gender 
and socialization, and gender and time spent/comfort. However, these markers were only used 
to assess the sexual orientation of 23andMe study participants (the smallest set of participants), 
but not used to assess the sexual orientation of all study participants in their study including 
their UK Biobank participants. This creates a lot of difficulties for their study, which I will address 




way that Sanders and colleagues are claiming that sexual orientation is genetically 
influenced, for example. 
 
4.2.4.1. A Quick Discussion of Ganna et al.’s Study   
Before continuing to discuss these studies, I would like to make a quick detour to 
discuss Ganna et al.’s understanding of sexual orientation in a bit more detail. The 
reason for this is that this study is a bit more complicated than the other three 
studies I’ve discussed. While Ganna et al. mainly understand sexual orientation in 
terms of sexual behaviour, it is also true that they use six additional sexual 
orientation markers in their study. My aim in these next few paragraphs is to 
highlight just how problematic these other six sexual orientation markers are. 
There are too many problems with the ways in which Ganna et al. collected and 
assessed this data for it to be useful for their study.  
For one, their two main groups of study participants were not asked the 
same kind of questions that were used to assess their sexual orientation. The first 
main group of participants came from UK Biobank and this was their largest group 
at 408,995 study participants. The second main group came from 23andMe and 
was made up of 68,527 study participants. The UK Biobank study participants 
were asked only about their sexual behaviour (and were asked different sexual 
behaviour questions compared to the second group). The 23andMe group of 
study participants were asked seven questions (including a question about sexual 
behaviour) to assess their sexual orientation. The questions for the 23andMe 
group were questions about their sexual identity, sexual attraction, sexual 




socialisation, and their gender and time spent/comfort (2019, pp. 6–7). It is 
problematic that these groups were asked different questions because Ganna et 
al. use both of these groups as one large set of data, as if both of these groups 
have had their sexual orientation assessed in the same way, when in fact, they 
have not. For example, the UK Biobank study participants were asked: ‘Have you 
ever had sexual intercourse with someone of the same-sex?’ (2019, p. 4). After 
answering this question, the study participants answered two further questions 
that determined whether they were exclusively homosexual or heterosexual: 
‘‘About how many sexual partners have you had in your lifetime?’ and ‘How many 
sexual partners of the same sex have you had in your lifetime?’’ (2019, p. 4). In 
order to be considered an ‘exclusive homosexual’, the study participants had to 
answer yes to the first question. Additionally, the number of same-sex partners 
had to be equal or greater than the total number of sexual partners reported:  
 
‘Participants that responded affirmative to this question and for which 
their total number of same-sex sexual partners was equal or greater to 
their total number of sexual partners were considered exclusively 
homosexual, whereas those who never had sex with a same-sex partner 
were considered heterosexual. Participants that reported to have never 
had a sexual relationship and those with both same-sex and opposite-sex 
sexual partners were set to missing’ (2019, pp. 4–5).  
 
Those study participants that never had a same-sex partner were labelled 




differently. Even though the participants were asked ‘With whom have you 
actually had sex?’ and then had seven options form which to choose (1) other sex 
only, 2) other sex mostly, 3) other sex somewhat more, 4) both sexes equally, 5) 
same sex somewhat more, 6) same sex mostly, and 7) same sex only’), Ganna et 
al. reassessed this information ‘[…] with participants who answered 0 (other sex 
only) being considered as heterosexuals and those who answered 1 (other sex 
mostly) to 6 (same-sex only) as non-heterosexuals’ (2019, p. 7). This means that 
in the case of 23andMe study participants, it only took 1 same-sex sexual 
encountered to count as a ‘homosexual’, while the UK Biobank study participants 
required that the number of their same-sex partners be equal or greater to their 
total amount of their sexual partners. This is problematic because Ganna et al. 
then use the data collected form 23andMe and from UK Biobank as one set of 
data. However, had they used one set of criteria across the board, their results 
would have been different. For example, if they applied the ‘one same-sex sexual 
encounter’ rule to the UK Biobank study participants, they would have ended up 
with a lot more people that were ‘homosexual’, according to their criteria (this 
couldn’t be done the other way around because 23andMe study participants did 
not report a total number of sexual partners or same-sex partners).  
Second, the study participants from 23andMe were asked completely 
different questions about their self-identification by 23andMe compared to how 
Ganna et al. understand and report this information. 23andMe asked the study 
participants ‘How do you label, identify, or think of yourself?’ (2019, p. 42). The 
study participants then had seven options from which to choose as their answer: 




bisexual, 5) homosexual somewhat more, 6) homosexual mostly, 7) homosexual 
only (2019, p. 42). A scale like this is problematic because some of these concepts 
are not popular self-identifications of sexual orientation outside of surveys like 
this. It is unclear what ‘heterosexual somewhat’ is supposed to refer to here and 
it is also quite uncommon for someone outside of these studies to self-identity as 
‘heterosexual somewhat’. It is unclear what the difference or relationship 
between ‘heterosexual somewhat’ and ‘bisexual’ is supposed to be, for example, 
or between ‘homosexual somewhat more’, ‘bisexual’, and ‘homosexual mostly’. 
As interesting as this problem is, this is not the main problem I want to highlight. 
The main problem I want to highlight is that Ganna et al. ignore the information 
about self-identification. Ganna et al. classified anyone who had ever engaged in 
same-sex behaviour in some of their tests as a ‘nonheterosexual’ and anyone who 
had never engaged in same-sex behaviour but only in opposite-sex behaviour as 
a ‘heterosexual’. This is problematic because self-identification then gets reduced 
to a problematic classification of the study participant’s sexual behaviour. As I 
have argued in previous paragraphs, it is problematic to reduce a person’s sexual 
orientation to their sexual behaviour because sexual behaviour is heavily 
dependent on a person’s social and political context. It is unreasonable to classify 
anyone who has ever engaged in same-sex sexual activity as a ‘nonheterosexual’, 
especially if this involves ignoring their self-identification as heterosexual. It is 
perfectly conceivable that someone had a same-sex sexual encounter and still be 
heterosexual. This same-sex sexual encounter can be accounted for in many ways. 




experimenting in their early adulthood. An account that ignores self-identification 
in this way is not able to account for these kinds of complexities.  
Additionally, ‘nonheterosexual’ is not a popular sexual orientation concept 
used outside of these studies. While Ganna et al. worry that a term like this might 
be offensive (it is), their actual problem (which they do not address) is that sexual 
orientation concepts like ‘nonheterosexual’ are not sexual orientation concepts 
used in the real world. If they want to study sexual orientation, then they need to 
use sexual orientation concepts used in the actual social context in which their 
study participants find themselves.  
Furthermore, the self-identification information collected by 23andMe is 
used to test for phenotypic and genetic correlations between this and the other 
six markers (sexual attraction, sexual experience, sexual fantasies, gender and 
emotional connection, gender and socialisation, and gender and time 
spent/comfort). Although there appears to be a high correlation between sexual 
experience and sexual identity (self-identification) by looking at the graphs 
provided by Ganna et al. (figure S7), it is unclear how self-identification was 
assessed for this test. It is unclear if Ganna et al. applied the same one-person 
rule, where all it takes is for a study participant to report one same-sex sexual 
encounter to be classed as a ‘nonheterosexual’ or whether they actually 
honoured the seven-point scale: (1) heterosexual only, 2) heterosexual mostly, 3) 
heterosexual somewhat, 4) bisexual, 5) homosexual somewhat more, 6) 
homosexual mostly, 7) homosexual only). In the supplementary material, Ganna 
et al. report that for the 23andMe data set ‘The sexual experience question (item 




dichotomous variable from UK Biobank) and analyzed as the main phenotype, 
with participants who answered 0 (other sex only) being considered as 
heterosexuals and those who answered 1 (other sex mostly) to 6 (same-sex only) 
as non-heterosexuals’ (2019, p. 7). If this one person method was applied, then 
this is extremely problematic because this is then no longer a reflection of how 
the study participants actually self-identified and if they used the seven-point 
system, this is also a problem for two different reasons. The first is that these 
seven self-identification options are different compared to the data used in the 
rest of the tests carried out within the study, where Ganna et al. label their study 
participants as ‘nonheterosexuals’ and ‘heterosexuals’. This means that even 
within their own study, Ganna et al. appear to be talking about different kinds of 
things; this seven-point scale and the one-rule method are not the same kind of 
thing. The second problem is one that I keep repeating and that is that it is unclear 
just how much these seven self-identification options actually reflect how people 
in the real world self-identify. This point is important to highlight again because 
the claim by Ganna et al. in the above-mentioned test is that there is a phonotypic 
and genetic correlation between how people self-identify and their sexual 
behaviour. This is also problematic given that Ganna et al. take their results to 
confirm previous genetic studies such as Hamer et al.’s, for example. The glaring 
problem is that other geneticists such as Hamer do not account for self-
identification using this seven-point scale. They use concepts such as gay, lesbian, 
and heterosexual.  
The last problem I would like to draw our attention to is to Ganna et al.’s 




manuscript, we use the terms “female” and “male” rather than “woman” and 
“man.” This is because our analyses and results relate to biologically defined sex, 
not to gender’ (2019, p. 2). However, it is unclear what this actually means. That 
is, it is unclear what, according to them, makes up biological sex. It is clear that 
they only considered two sexes: female and male, but it is unclear what 
determines these sexes. It is unclear if it is chromosomes, genitalia, etc. Second, 
it is unclear how this actually relates to their understanding of sexual orientation. 
Additionally, although they claim to only be focusing on sex and appear to be 
making some kind of distinction between sex (biological) and gender (social), 
some of their study participants were asked questions about gender. This 
information was then used to check for phenotypic and genetic correlations with 
the rest of the sexual orientation markers (2019, p. 36). Consider these three 
23andMe questions (out of the seven questions they were asked): Gender and 
Emotional Connection: Whom do you feel more drawn to or close to 
emotionally?. Gender and Socialization: Which gender do you socialize with?, and 
Gender and Time Spent/Comfort: In which community do you like to spend your 
time? In which do you feel most comfortable? (2019, pp. 6–7). Arguably, these 
discrepancies do not affect their main phenotype which is sexual behaviour, but 
it is one more example that shows the inconsistencies between how the data was 
collected by 23andMe and how this data was actually interpreted and used by 





4.3. Self-Identification & Inconsistent Uses of Sexual Orientation Markers 
So far, I have listed four studies and have shown that they all seem to understand 
sexual orientation differently and some, very problematically. First on the list was 
Hamer et al.’s study ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and 
Male Sexual Orientation’(1993). According to Hamer and his team, sexual 
orientation can be understood through a mix of four markers: self-identification, 
attraction, fantasy, and behaviour. The second study on the list was Rice et al.’s 
‘Male Homosexuality: Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at 
Xq28’(1999). According to Rice and team, sexual orientation can be understood 
through a mix of self-identification, corroboration from secondary sources, 
stereotypes, and a gay interviewer. The third study was Sanders et al.’s ‘Genome-
Wide Association Study of Male Sexual Orientation’(2017). According to them, 
sexual orientation can be understood through two markers: self-identification 
and sexual feelings. And lastly, the fourth study was Ganna et al.’s ‘Large-scale 
GWAS reveals insights into the genetic architecture of same-sex sexual 
behaviour’(2019). According to Ganna and colleagues, sexual orientation can be 
understood mostly through sexual behaviour. 
 There is no ‘one’ marker of sexual orientation that these four studies all 
use in identifying sexual orientation. There is, however, one marker that three of 
these studies use. That marker is self-identification, but this marker aside, the 
authors of these studies use different markers to identify sexual orientation. In 
this section, I argue that it is undesirable for scientists to adopt the self-




orientation markers in genetic studies is a problem. I start by addressing the self-
identification view. 
 The self-identification view of sexual orientation is the view that sexual 
orientation ‘[…] is based on one’s sense of what his or her own sexual orientation 
is’ (Stein, 2001, p. 44). This is the view that if person X really believes that they 
have q sexual orientation, then that is their sexual orientation. This seems like a 
pretty straightforward way to understand sexual orientation and in fact, many 
areas of research successfully employ this understanding to their studies. For 
example, if we want to find out if there are any wage gaps between say, lesbian 
women and heterosexual women, then it makes sense that when collecting 
information from study participants, that we collect sexual orientation 
information based on how the study participants self-identify.  
For example, in ‘Sexual Orientation, Labour Earnings, and Household 
Income in Canada’(2018), information about the study participants’ sexual 
orientation was collected through a self-report by the study participants 
(Dilmaghani, 2018). Studies like Dilmaghani’s do not aim to find an underlying 
mechanism that is responsible for what makes someone gay or heterosexual. 
They aim to find out whether there are any income differences between groups 
of people that already self-identify with a particular sexual orientation. In 
contrast, genetic studies aim to find an underlying mechanism that is responsible 
for sexual orientation. The difference in research aims helps explain why the self-
identification view of sexual orientation view might be useful for economical and 
statistical studies like Dilmaghani’s study, but not useful for genetic studies. To 




Political lesbianism, just as the name suggests, is a political movement that 
aims to challenge male supremacy by prioritising women. For some women, part 
of this prioritisation includes exclusively engaging romantically and/or sexually 
with other women. In this sense, political lesbianism is a political identity that has 
been taken up in a *political sense* by (previously) self-described heterosexual, 
bisexual, and lesbian women. In contrast, there are self-described lesbians that 
were lesbians long before committing to a political lesbian identity whom took 
the concept of lesbian to describe their sexual desires, attraction, fantasies, etc., 
regardless of their political commitments.  
Coming back to the Canadian Household Income study, it makes sense that 
political lesbians should be understood as lesbian women because it does not 
matter whether or not they ‘really’ are lesbians or not. It matters that socially, 
they are subject to the same kind of injustices as lesbian women. For example, if 
two political lesbians are in a relationship and that relationship is read as a lesbian 
relationship, then they will be subject to the same kind of wage discrimination 
that other lesbian women face. For this reason, it is important that they be 
considered lesbians in studies such as the Canadian Household Income study. In 
contrast to economic and statistical studies like the Canadian Household Income 
study, genetic studies aim to find an underlying mechanism for sexual orientation 
that is unrelated to political identity19. These geneticists will not want to include 
people who identify as lesbians for political reasons. This is because it seems that 
what geneticists aim to uncover is something deeper about sexual orientation. I 
 
19 In a different chapter, I argue that we need a different sexual orientation concept to address 




argue that this ‘something deeper’ (if there is such a thing) will have to do with a 
person’s internal states such as sexual desire, attraction, fantasy, etc. towards a 
person, at least partly on the basis of that person’s sex and/or gender. For this 
reason, I do not think that a self-identification view is enough to carry out the job 
in the context of genetic studies. Geneticists need something else in addition to a 
person’s self-identification that will aid them in identifying an underlying 
mechanism for sexual orientation (if it turns out that there is one). Later in this 
chapter, I argue that that something is a person’s self-report of their sexual desire, 
attraction, and fantasy. That is, I argue that geneticists should focus not only on 
self-identification, but also on sexual desire, attraction, and fantasy. However, 
before moving on to this part of the chapter, I would like to say something about 
why I think it is problematic that geneticists are currently using a variety of 
inconsistent sexual orientation markers. 
It is problematic that geneticists are currently using an inconsistent variety 
of sexual orientation markers in the genetics literature of sexual orientation 
because this could lead to different and potentially conflicting results within the 
genetic sexual orientation literature. Recall that Ganna and colleagues 
understood sexual orientation mostly in terms of sexual behaviour and that they 
took their study to confirm much of the genetic research of sexual orientation that 
has been previously carried out, although in much smaller numbers. I argue that 
it is highly improbable that Ganna et al.’s study confirms the results of previous 
genetic studies. This is because other studies seem to be talking about different, 
although arguably similar kinds of things. Consider the study carried out by 




identified on the basis of two sexual orientation markers: sexual identity and 
sexual feelings. These markers are different from the sexual behaviour marker 
that Ganna and his colleagues seem to be focusing on. To illustrate this point, 
consider the case of Sam. Sam is a gay man who has only recently come out and 
has only ever sexually engaged with women. If Sam was a study participant in 
Sanders et al.’s study he would be identified as a gay man (because of his self-Id). 
However, if Sam was a study participant in Ganna et al.’s study, Sam would 
potentially be identified as a heterosexual man (due to his sexual history). I argue 
that the reason that Sam is able to end up with a different sexual orientation in 
each of these studies is because these geneticists are not talking about the same 
thing when talking about sexual orientation. This is problematic because 
geneticists like Ganna et al. then assume that they *are* talking about the same 
thing and then take their results to confirm previous results, when these results 
do no such thing.  
This has the consequence that the predictive and explanatory power of 
these studies is then reduced to whatever it is that they are measuring individually 
and in that specific context. This is in contrast to what they aim and take 
themselves to be doing, which is providing a larger-scale predictive and 
explanatory power of sexual orientation across the discipline. For example, while 
Ganna et al.’s study might be able draw some interesting conclusions from their 
data on sexual behaviour, any predictions or explanations resulting from these 
conclusions would only apply to the cultural context in which they collected their 
data or to a similar context. This is because behaviour is very much dependent on 




and explain sexual behaviour patterns (but not sexual orientation) based on the 
data that they produced and only in relation to that specific context. For example, 
their study participants were from the UK, the U.S., and Sweden. My thought here 
is that their results would only apply to these contexts and perhaps to other 
similar contexts. This is because sexual behaviour is heavily dependent on a 
person’s social and political context. The UK, the U.S., and Sweden are all 
countries that afford the LGBTQI+ community with greater rights and liberties 
than say, places like Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Yemen, where homosexuality is 
criminalised, and in some places punishable by death. It is not difficult to imagine 
that LGBTQI+ people that live in places where homosexuality is punishable by 
death might not engage in the sexual behaviour that best reflects their sexual 
orientation. In fact, it is quite likely that many of these LGBTQI+ people are 
engaging in sexual behaviour that does not reflect their actual sexual orientation. 
This is just one example of how sexual behaviour can change from context to 
context, due not to a person’s sexual orientation, but due to that person’s social 
and political context.  
 
4.4. The Problem with Behaviour Views of Sexual Orientation     
In this section, I argue that behaviour is the least reliable indicator of sexual 
orientation. If scientists are right and there is some kind of genetic basis, then this 
will most likely be explained in terms of some kind of mechanism[s]. If it turns out 
that there is a mechanism[s], then behaviour will just end up being some kind of 




people will act on these desires and fantasies and as a result engage in sexual 
behaviour, but others will not).  
In the previous section, I argued that it is problematic that geneticists are 
using a variety of inconsistent markers to identify sexual orientation in their 
studies. I argued that this was a problem because many of these scientists were 
taking themselves to be talking about the same concept when talking about sexual 
orientation, when in fact in many cases they were talking about different things. 
To illustrate this idea I discussed the case of Sam, a person who had recently come 
out as a gay man and who had only ever engaged in sexual behaviour with women. 
I argued that Sam would be accounted for as a gay man in Sanders et al.’s (2017) 
study but that at the same time he would most likely be considered a heterosexual 
man under Ganna et al.’s (2019) study. I talked about how this was problematic 
and wrapped up that section by pointing to some reasons as to why 
understanding sexual orientation in terms of sexual behaviour might be unhelpful 
for geneticists. In the next few paragraphs, I argue that geneticists should move 
away from behaviourist understandings of sexual orientation altogether. 
In its most radical version, behaviourism is the thesis that behaviour can 
be explained without reference to inner activity or processes. In the context of 
the sexual orientation literature, this means that sexual orientation can be 
understood and accounted for in terms sexual behaviour, without any reference 
to inner activity or processes. This means that a person X’s sexual orientation will 
be whatever their sexual behaviour amounts to (Stein, 2001). For example, if a 
woman has only ever had sex with women, then she would be classified as a 




There is, however, something strange about adopting this kind of view, or 
versions of this kind of view, when the aim of genetic studies is to find some kind 
of genetic influence. This is because most genetic studies are looking for some 
kind of sexual orientation mechanism concerned with the inner activity and 
processes of sexual orientation. This mechanism[s] (if it turns out that there is 
one) will be one that shows the complex biological low-level ways in which sexual 
orientation is genetically influenced. Strictly speaking, it is not clear what sexual 
behaviour has to do with this mechanism. Sexual behaviour is a very unreliable 
marker of sexual orientation, if not the most unreliable of all. This is because there 
are many other variables (aside from the possible genetic underlying mechanism) 
that might play a role in whether or not someone chooses to engage in sexual 
behaviour. For example, someone might live in social context in which 
homosexuality is criminalised and might therefore choose not to engage in sexual 
behaviour. It might also be the case that someone has chosen to remain celibate, 
despite having sexual desires, fantasies, etc. about people on the basis of their sex 
and or gender. Another possibility is that one might choose to engage in sexual 
behaviour because one is a sex worker. The possibilities are endless. 
Some geneticists might object to this line of reasoning and argue that 
despite these problems, a behaviourist understanding of sexual orientation can 
still be saved. The thought might be that this can be accomplished if we exclude 
all of the problematic cases where a person’s sexual behaviour does not reflect 
their actual sexual orientation and we only include cases where sexual behaviour 
is reflective of a person’s sexual orientation. Although this might seem like an 




In the philosophical literature, many philosophers have moved away from 
talking about ‘actual’ behaviour to talking about ‘potential’ behaviour that might 
manifest under ‘certain conditions’. The thought is that moving away from talking 
about actual behaviour to potential behaviour that might manifest under a 
particular set of conditions gets rid of the problem of including a person’s sexual 
behaviour that might not be reflective of the person’s sexual orientation. This way 
of understanding sexual orientation is usually cashed out in terms of 
dispositions20. Dispositions are meant to give account of how a thing, substance, 
or person might behave under a particular set of conditions. For example, under 
a particular set of conditions a glass might break, water might boil, or a person 
might behave generously. With sexual orientation, the idea is that given a 
particular set of conditions, a person might engage in sexual behaviour and that 
this sexual behaviour would then be reflective of this person’s actual sexual 
orientation. It seems to me, however, that this is the wrong way to go for 
geneticists. 
Dispositions (sometimes also understood as possibilities, potentialities, 
abilities, capacities, etc. depending on what philosopher you ask) are understood 
in relation to possible worlds. Possible worlds are different from the actual world. 
For example, in the actual world FIFA (The Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association) pays women’s teams significantly less21 than men’s teams who take 
part in the world cup. In a different world, if we didn’t live in a patriarchy, the 
 
20 In what follows, I engage with possible-world semantics because this is the mainstream 
approach in the sexual orientation literature.  
21 In the last women’s world cup (2019), the winning team received a total amount of £3.2 




women’s team would receive equal pay. In this example, the condition for the 
women’s team to receive equal pay in our possible world is that there be no 
patriarchy. A possible world, then, can be understood as a place in which possible 
events might take place, given a certain set of conditions. For sexual orientation, 
this means that what is taken into account under a dispositional view is not the 
actual behaviour that takes place in the actual world, but the behaviour that could 
take place in a possible world, under a certain set of conditions. 
Currently, geneticists that understand sexual orientation in terms of sexual 
behaviour only consider behaviour that has taken place in the actual world and as 
such, they ask their study participants about their actual sexual behaviour. For 
example, in the UK Biobank data set used in Ganna et al.’s study, participants were 
asked questions such as: ‘‘Have you ever had sexual intercourse with someone of 
the same-sex?’[…], ‘About how many sexual partners have you had in your 
lifetime?’, and ‘How many sexual partners of the same sex have you had in your 
lifetime?’’ (Ganna, Verweij, Nivard, Maier, Wedow, Busch, Abdellaoui, Guo, 
Sathirapongsasuti, Team, et al., 2019, p. 4). These questions were about the actual 
sexual behaviour that study participants have had in this actual world. This way of 
understanding sexual orientation is problematic because it fails to take into 
account the many ways in which this sexual behaviour might not be reflective of 
the study participant’s actual sexual orientation. For example, someone might 
have experimented during their early adult years, worked as a sex worker (part or 
all of their life), lived in a social and political context that meant they couldn’t 
engage in the sexual behaviour that best reflects their actual sexual orientation, 




Alternatively, if geneticists were to adopt a dispositional view, they would 
be asking their study participants not what actual behaviour they have engaged 
in in this actual world, but what behaviour they might possibly engage in in a 
possible world, given a certain set of conditions. For example, if geneticists 
wanted to capture what sexual behaviour a person that currently lives in a context 
where homosexuality is punishable by death would engage in if they lived in a 
possible world where homosexuality was not criminalised, then one of the 
conditions they might add would be a condition that reflects this. For example, 
this condition might say something like ‘that there is sexual freedom in this 
possible world’. However, someone might object and say that this condition is not 
enough because in addition to needing sexual freedom, a person would also need 
a context in which there is a variety of sexual partners available. Therefore, 
geneticists might decide to include this as a condition as well, and so on. They 
could keep on adding more conditions, until they feel like they’ve arrived at a 
dispositional account that captures a satisfactory understanding of sexual 
orientation. 
In theory, dispositional views of sexual orientation might seem like a good 
idea, but in scientific practice, geneticists face the problem of having to find a way 
to (imaginatively) transport their study participants to possible worlds to see what 
possible sexual behaviours they might engage in so that they can then record this 
information for their genetic studies. However, it is unclear how geneticists can 
achieve this. 
A dispositional view would require study participants to be able to 




which can be problematic. Take for example a person who has grown up in social 
and political context where homosexuality is criminalised. Let’s call this person 
Joe. Joe has same-sex sexual desires, but is convinced that engaging in same-sex 
sexual behaviour is wrong in this and in any possible world. Asking Joe to imagine 
what behaviour they would engage in in a possible world where they would be 
able to freely express their sexual desires would not be very helpful for geneticists. 
This is because Joe already believes that same-sex sexual behaviour would be 
wrong in any possible world. Joe’s case is not an extreme case. A person does not 
have to live in a place where homosexuality is criminalised in order to believe that 
same-sex sexual behaviour is wrong. A person could have grown up in a place 
where homosexuality is not criminalised (like the U.S. or the UK) and still believe 
that same-sex sexual behaviour is wrong. The problem for geneticists is that they 
have to trust that their study participants would be able to imagine possible 
worlds that are quite different from the actual worlds their study participants 
actually live in.  
 
4.5. Towards a New Genetic Understanding Sexual Orientation  
Instead of appealing to behaviour (including plain behaviourist views or fancier 
dispositions-to-behaviour views) to understand sexual orientation, I propose that 
geneticists should appeal to inner states or processes such as sexual desire, 
attraction, and/or fantasies. I do not aim to propose a specific account of sexual 
desire, attraction, and/or fantasy in this chapter. Nor do I propose that it is these 
states and only these states that geneticists should take into account. Rather, 




away from problematic behavioural accounts to ones that are concerned with 
inner states or processes. This is because I think that these will be more reliable 
markers of sexual orientation and will therefore be more helpful in trying to find 
an underlying mechanism[s] of sexual orientation (if it turns out that there is one). 
Esa Díaz-León offers an interesting alternative to how we should 
understand sexual orientation. According to Díaz-León, we should understand 
sexual orientation in terms of sexual preferences. A sexual preference, according 
to Díaz-León, is a ‘[…] disposition to have sexual desires of certain kinds, given 
certain manifesting conditions’(Díaz-León, forthcoming, p. 14). There are a few 
things to note here. The first is that her proposal appeals to dispositions, which I 
find unhelpful when thinking about sexual orientation for all of the reasons I have 
already discussed in the previous paragraphs about dispositions. For the reasons 
I discuss in those paragraphs, I do not think it is a good idea to appeal to 
dispositions even when appealing to complex mental states such as sexual 
desires. Díaz-León’s proposal is one that argues that we should understand sexual 
orientation in terms of dispositions to desire.  My proposal would be to keep her 
focus on desires, but drop her focus on dispositions. I think that geneticists should 
move towards understandings of sexual orientation that concern inner states or 
processes, such as sexual desire. Díaz-León’s desire view is just one example of 
how this view might look. 
According to Díaz-León, ‘[…] sexual desire is a mental state that is 
somehow connected with some experiences such as sexual arousal (which is 




it)’(Díaz-León, forthcoming, p. 16). This is the idea that sexual arousal need not 
necessarily result in physiological sates but can also result in psychological states.  
Díaz-León argues for a hybrid view of sexual desires. According to her, ‘[…] 
A sexual desire (for men and/or women, or people of certain sex and/or gender) 
involves the combination of a propositional attitude (of the form “S bears the 
relation of desiring towards proposition p”) plus a disposition to be sexually 
aroused by, or sexually attracted to, men and/or women.’ (Díaz-León, 
forthcoming, p. 17). In this sense, her view of sexual orientation combines 
complex mental states that involve a propositional attitude that require that a 
person be disposed to be sexually aroused (might be physiologically but also just 
psychologically) about certain kinds of people (or as she also leaves open as a 
possibility: caused by certain kinds of people). 
In this chapter, I will not go into the technical details of this view because 
this is not my aim. My aim is to give an example of how a desire view might be 
look and what kind of understanding of sexual orientation geneticists should start 
to move towards. I think that Díaz-León’s view is an interesting one. There are, 
however, many issues that one might want to challenge. This includes whether 
sexual desire requires a propositional attitude, whether preferences are 
dispositional mental states, whether sexual orientation are sexual preferences, 
etc. For the purposes of this chapter, I remain neutral on most of these questions. 
The only issue I have a stake in, for the purposes of this chapter, is on the issue of 
dispositions. I do not think that a dispositional view would be helpful to 
geneticists. I have argued that it is not clear how geneticists would go about when 




Instead, I propose that whatever desire view geneticists adopt, it should 
be one without dispositions. Some philosophers, including Díaz-León will object 
and argue that without dispositions, a desire view will be subject to a lot of the 
same problems associated with a behaviourist view of sexual orientation because 
desires, just like behaviour, are influenced by other mental states as well as by a 
person’s social and political context. For example, it could be the case that a 
person’s homophobic social and political context will influence that person’s 
sexual desire to the extent that they repress their sexual desires. I think this is a 
worry, but to a lesser extent than it is for a behaviourist view. 
Like Stein (2001), I think that this objection actually offers a great 
explanation as to why it sometimes takes LGBTQI+ people such a long time to 
come out to themselves or to come to terms with their sexual orientation. The 
difference between behaviour and desire to me, however, is that once people 
come out with a particular sexual orientation, they are much more likely to hold 
on to these sexual desires as a reflection of their actual sexual orientation than 
they are with their sexual behaviour. For example, a gay man living in a country 
where homosexuality is punishable by death might still hold his sexual desire 
towards other men as a reflection of his actual sexual orientation even though he 
might not be able to engage in sexual behaviour that reflects his sexual 
orientation with other men. Because of this, I think that the way forward for 
geneticists is to move towards some kind of desire view. 
Earlier in the chapter, I argued that self-identification alone was not 
enough to understand sexual orientation. This was because self-identification can 




were actually after seemed to be something deeper than political reasons and 
that this something deeper were inner states and processes. I argued that the 
problem with self-identification was that it was not good on its own because it 
was not able to capture this ‘something deeper’. However, when inner states and 
processes such as desires are combined and taken into account, this is no longer 
a problem. This is because self-identification is no longer only a reflection of a 
person’s political commitments, it is also a reflection of that something deeper. If 
we think that that something deeper is desires, then self-identification would in 
part, be a reflection of those desires. In practice, this means that study 
participants in genetic studies would self-report their desires (according to the 
view that geneticists adopt) as well as their self-identification, and these two 
things would need to line up.  
               
4.6. Conclusions 
To circle back to the quote that I started this chapter with, I do not think there is 
empirical evidence available to support (or reject) Hamer’s claim that ‘[…] genes 
are the single most important factor in determining a person’s sexual orientation 
and outweigh all known shared environmental factors’ (D. Hamer, 2013). Even 
though there are a few genetic studies of sexual orientation published on this 
topic, I have argued that these studies are far from being able to support or reject 
a claim like Hamer’s because of the different and oftentimes problematic 
understandings of sexual orientation that these studies adopt.  
 I proposed that geneticists should adopt an inner state like understanding 




sexual orientation. I remained neutral on a number of issues throughout this 
chapter. These issues require greater attention and discussion. I have not been 
able to do that here, nor was this my aim. My aim in this chapter was to offer a 
convincing argument for geneticists to start using uniform understandings of 
sexual orientation across all genetic studies of sexual orientation and to offer an 
argument to convince geneticists that the best way forward for them in terms of 
understanding sexual orientation is to adopt a view concerned with inner states 



















5. An Ameliorative Approach to Thinking about Sexual Orientation  
You cannot be a lesbian if you have had heterosexual relationships or you cannot 
be a lesbian if you have children. This is part of what the UK’s Home Secretary 
barrister said to Aderonke Apata, a Nigerian lesbian and gay-rights activist seeking 
asylum in the UK on the basis of sexual orientation (Allegretti, 2015). There is also 
a risk of not being able to count as a Lesbian and thus deported if you are not 
familiar with Oscar Wilde, do not go to gay clubs, or do not attend Pride (Bennett, 
2014). These real-life cases reflect troubling assumptions on which the UK’s Home 
Office ascribes sexual orientation.  
Cases like this show that thinking about what sexual orientation is 
important for addressing social injustices faced by the LGBTQI+ community. As 
others have pointed out, there is currently a lot of confusion around sexual 
orientation (Dembroff, 2016; Stein, 2001). There are questions about whether 
one is born with a particular sexual orientation or whether one chooses it, what 
constitutes a sexual orientation, how one should ascribe sexual orientation, etc. 
What’s more, governments, LGBTQI+ advocacy groups, scientists, and the average 
layperson, all seem to have different and conflicting answers to these questions.  
As a result, there is a lot of philosophical work that needs to be carried out in 
order to help clarify and address these issues. However, it is important that this 
work be carried out with care. It’s important that we have a clear idea about who 
we have in mind when we address these issues and how we think these proposals 
might impact these groups of people. 
In this chapter, I put forward a new way of thinking about sexual 




orientation relies heavily one’s social and political context and consists of three 
main sexual orientation markers: self-identification, behaviour and internal 
manifestations. I engage with four metaphysical accounts of sexual orientation 
and argue that if we centre the concerns of some of the most marginalised groups 
in the LGBTQI+ community, these accounts fail at being able to address social 
injustice issues that arise due to discriminatory practices and attitudes on the 
basis of sexual orientation. 
My aim in this chapter is to think about the metaphysics of sexual 
orientation with the goal of advancing LGBTQI+ rights, especially for people of 
colour, immigrants, trans, and genderqueer people. In this sense, this chapter is 
not an abstract metaphysical exercise. It is important to think about this issue in 
order to address social injustices. In particular, I focus on members of the LGBTQI+ 
community who seek asylum because they have had to flee or need to flee their 
home country due to severe violence and persecution, and who face persecution, 
harassment, and violence on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, what 
happens when someone from the LGBTQI+ community applies for asylum on the 
basis of sexual orientation? How is sexual orientation being understood by people 
making the decision to grant or deny asylum? And more importantly, how should 
sexual orientation be understood in these contexts to help better protect the 
LGBTQI+ community, especially its most disadvantaged members? 
 I begin by providing some context. I then move on to discuss four 
metaphysical accounts of sexual orientation: self-identification, behaviourism, 
ideal dispositionalism, and bidimensional dispositionalism. Drawing from 




centre the concerns of some of the most marginalised groups in the LGBTQI+ 
community, these four sexual orientation accounts fail at being able to address 
these concerns. To help in addressing these concerns, I put forward a new way of 
thinking about sexual orientation: a political cluster concept approach22. I argue 
that we should allow for the possibility of taking into account the social and 
political context and that we should extend the number of sexual orientation 
markers to include self-identification, behaviour, and internal manifestations such 
as desires and fantasies. 
 
5.1. Context   
The 1951 Refugee Convention outlines what a refugee is, their rights, and the legal 
obligations of ratifying countries to protect refugees. Sexual orientation has 
oftentimes been protected under the Convention through what is outlined in 
Article 1A(2) as protection for a particular social group:  
 
‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
 
22 I am specifically putting forward an account for the purposes specified in this chapter.  For 
other purposes, such as scientific ones, a different account will be needed (see chapter 4). I take 
this account and scientific accounts to do be doing different work. The aim of this account is to 
be better equipped to address social injustices faced by the most marginalised members of the 
LGBTQI+ community. Scientific accounts have other aims. One might be, for example, to learn 
more about human sexuality. I do not think these two are incompatible. One can have an 
account of sexual orientation that aims to address social injustices while having another account 




nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.’ (United Nations, 1951, p. 14) 
 
Because there is no explicit mention of sexual orientation, it is up to the countries 
who ratified the 1951 Convention to account for sexual orientation as they best 
see fit (if they consider members of a sexual orientation to constitute a particular 
social group that needs protection in the first place). Because there is no 
‘universal’ or agreed upon way of understanding sexual orientation, different 
countries understand sexual orientation differently. Furthermore, because most 
countries do not publish information on asylum applications, it is really hard to 
give a full report on the accounts they are currently using to assess sexual 
orientation. However, through information that has been made available (e.g. 
state reports, media reports, legal decisions, personal reports, LGBTQI+ advocacy 
groups, and leaked documents), we know that different countries assess sexual 
orientation differently.  
One way of understanding sexual orientation has been through sexual 
behaviour. For example, in the UK, a confidential Home Office document that was 
leaked in 2014 showed a disturbing focus on sexual acts as a way to assess an 
asylum seeker’s sexual orientation (Taylor & Townsend, 2014). Some of the 
questions asked, according to the leaked document, focused on specific sexual 
acts and the asylum seekers’ physiological responses to these (Taylor & 




A second way of understanding sexual orientation has been through 
sexual arousal examinations such as penile plethysmography and vaginal 
photoplethysmography, which are highly invasive and unreliable indicators of 
sexual orientation. Such examinations have taken place in the Czech Republic (The 
BBC News, 2010).  
To give a third example, sexual orientation has also been understood 
through stereotypes. In 2018, it was reported that Austrian authorities rejected 
an asylum application on the basis of sexual orientation because according them, 
the applicant did not walk, behave, or dress in a way that indicated that the 
applicant was homosexual (The Economist, 2018).  
While the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in 2014 that EU 
countries (including the ones just mentioned) cannot use tests like penile 
plethysmography and vaginal photoplethysmography to assess sexual 
orientation, they did not entirely rule out the use of stereotypes or the use of 
information provided by asylum seekers about their sexual practices (A, B, C v 
Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2014).23  
 
5.2. Sex and Gender 
Before moving on to discuss the four metaphysical accounts of sexual orientation, 
it is important to draw attention to the often-confusing relationship between sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation. For one, the concepts of sex and gender are 
important when engaging with the metaphysics of sexual orientation because 
 




they determine, to a certain extent, what the concept of sexual orientation refers 
to.  
On some understandings, sexual orientation refers to a person’s 
attraction, desire, etc. to people with a particular sex[es]. For example, under the 
UK’s Equality Act (Equality Act 2010, 2010) sexual orientation has to do with a 
person’s sex:  
‘(1) Sexual orientation means a person’s sexual orientation towards— 
(a) persons of the same sex, 
(b) persons of the opposite sex, or 
  (c) persons of either sex’ (Equality Act 2010, pt. 2, Ch.1, 12) 
 
On other understandings, sexual orientation refers to a person’s attraction, 
desire, etc. to people with a particular gender[s]. For example, according to the 
International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), sexual orientation ‘Refers to 
each person’s capacity for profound affection, emotional and sexual attraction to, 
and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the 
same gender or more than one gender’ (ILGA-Europe, n.d.). And to further 
complicate things, on some understandings of sexual orientation, sex and gender 
don’t seem to figure at all. For example, Stonewall, an LGBTQ rights charity in the 
UK, defines sexual orientation as ‘A person’s romantic and/or sexual attraction to 
another person’ (Stonewall, n.d.).    
A further problem is that, when sex and gender do figure, it is not clear 




these categories is (if any). This is important because our understanding of these 
two issues will have a big impact on our resulting sexual orientation taxonomy.  
The first three metaphysical accounts which I will be discussing (self-
identification, the behavioural view, and the dispositional view), are all set up by 
Stein with the aim of not committing to any of the ongoing debates in the 
metaphysics of sex and gender24. In order to do this, Stein adopts ‘sex/gender’ as 
a placeholder for ‘sex’ or ‘gender’. For example, instead of saying something like: 
sexual orientation refers to a person’s attraction, desire, etc. to people with a 
particular ‘sex[s]’, under Stein’s proposal we would say: sexual orientation refers 
to a person’s attraction, desire, etc. to people with a particular ‘sex/gender’.  
I think that a placeholder like ‘sex/gender’ is not very helpful because it 
does not help us narrow down an account of sexual orientation that will be most 
useful for addressing social injustices faced by some of the most marginalised 
groups in the LGBTQI+ community.  Following on from Dembroff, I will argue that 
both sex and gender should be included and that these categories should be 
understood as socially constructed and independent of each other. I remain 
neutral on the question of how many sexes or genders there are and whether 
these are discrete or continuous categories.  
 
 
24 Stein is only committed to ‘sex’ referring to biological features and ‘gender’ to cultural ones. 
He remains neutral on what determines sex or what determines gender, how many sexes or 




5.3. Metaphysical Accounts of Sexual Orientation 
I now turn to four existing metaphysical accounts of sexual orientation: self-
identification, behaviourism, ideal dispositionalism, and bidimensional 
dispositionalism.   
 
5.3.1. Self-Identification View 
One way of understanding sexual orientation is in terms of self-identification. 
According to Stein, this is the view that if a person X says that they have a ‘q’ 
sexual orientation, then that is their sexual orientation. (Stein, 2001, pp. 44–45). 
This view is widely used in, for example, economic studies and statistical surveys 
and reports.25  
Stein argues that the self-identification view is problematic because it 
does not allow for the possibility of self-deception (Stein, 2001). That is, it is 
possible that someone might identify with a sexual orientation that does not 
match the one they actually have. The thought is that perhaps someone has 
repressed their desires so deeply, that they now believe they have a different 
sexual orientation to the one they actually have. I agree with Stein that this is a 
problem for the self-identification view. This view does not allow for the 
possibility that someone’s self-identification and attraction, desire, etc. can come 
apart and be in opposition to each other. This is important if we want to be able 
to account for the experiences of, for example, people who live in homophobic 
 




societies and who as a result of this are unable to come to terms with their sexual 
orientation as quickly as their heterosexual peers.  
In the context of asylum applications on the basis of sexual orientation, 
the self-identification view is also problematic because it is restrictive in terms of 
the number of cases it can account for. The view is restrictive because it is only 
able to account for one sexual orientation marker, self-identification, and fails to 
account for other markers typically associated with sexual orientation, such as 
behaviour. Most countries that criminalise homosexuality criminalise what they 
call ‘homosexual behaviour’. People with an LGBTQI+ sexual orientation who have 
been accused of engaging in ‘homosexual behaviour’ are oftentimes subjected to 
extreme violence and in some cases, death. It seems that in cases like this part of 
the basis for which people are being persecuted for has to do with the behaviour 
or assumed behaviour that they are thought to be engaging in and not because 
they identify with ‘X’. For example, it is possible for a woman to be persecuted for 
engaging in sexual behaviour with other women while not identifying as a lesbian 
(because maybe that concept is not available in her context).  The self-
identification view is problematic because it is unable to account for the kind of 
hate and discrimination that people in these situations are and have been 
subjected to.  
 
5.3.2. Behaviourism   
Another way of understanding sexual orientation is in terms of sexual behaviour. 




sexual behaviour. According to Stein, this is the idea that one’s sexual behaviour 
determines one’s sexual orientation (Stein, 2001).  
This view runs into three main problems. The first is that it is not able to 
account for the fact that one’s sexual desires and fantasies might be in conflict 
with one’s actual sexual behaviour. For example, LGBTQI+ people living in 
extreme situations, like in Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Yemen, might find that 
they are not able to express their sexual orientation through behaviour without 
putting their life at risk. The opposite is also true. There is a possibility that 
LGBTQI+ people living in these places might actually be engaging in sexual 
behaviour that does not reflect their sexual orientation. While these situations 
might sound extreme or only applicable to countries where homosexuality is 
criminalised, this is not the case. There is social pressure to avoid LGBTQI+ 
relationships, and enter heterosexual ones, even in countries where 
homosexuality is not criminalised. A good example are forced heterosexual 
marriages, where sexual behaviour is often expected. Consider the case of British 
South Asian communities in the UK. According to the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), 
in 2017, 1,196 people reported or sought advice relating to a forced marriage. Out 
of these, 21 people identified as LGBT. But it is important to note that the number 
is probably higher because people are not always asked by the FMU for their 
sexual orientation and as a result, this information is not always collected. These 
are, of course, cases that have been formally reported, but there are plenty of 
others cases that go unreported. The experiences of the LGBTQI+ British South 
Asian community being forced into heterosexual marriages is well documented, 




who might be engaging in sexual behaviour that does not reflect their sexual 
desires and fantasies, even in countries where homosexuality is not criminalised.  
Another reason that a behavioural account of sexual orientation is 
problematic is that if one has never had sex, then one does not have a sexual 
orientation (Stein, 2001, p. 43). This doesn’t seem right because it seems possible 
that people can have internal manifestations of their sexual orientation, including 
sexual desires and fantasies that haven’t yet been expressed. 
Furthermore, this view is unable to account for a lot of the hate crimes 
and discrimination faced by the LGBTQI+ community on the basis of sexual 
orientation. LGBTQI+ people are often subject to hate crimes and discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation that might not have anything to do with sexual 
behaviour. Take for example, political lesbianism. This was (mostly) a feminist 
second-wave political movement that aimed to challenge male supremacy. The 
idea was that the most effective way to challenge and disrupt the political system 
that benefited men and oppressed women was to stop taking part in that system. 
Political lesbianism challenged the idea that women were inferior to men. They 
refused to be defined by men and instead redefined themselves. They put women 
first. For some women, this commitment included engaging in sexual and 
romantic relationships with other women. Under patriarchy, it was (and still is) a 
political act to love and prioritise women. Some of these women were already 
self-described lesbians and bisexual women, and some were self-described 
heterosexual women who wanted to make a political statement. Political 
lesbianism was and still is controversial because it disrupts, amongst others 




to exist is (sadly), still a radical idea. Two women in a relationship challenge 
assumptions about the role of men in society; it disrupts power balances that 
benefit men. In most social contexts, that is a political act. Lesbians are the subject 
of hate crimes and discrimination not just because of the assumed sexual 
behaviour they are thought to be engaging in. They are also the subject of hate 
crimes and discrimination because they challenge patriarchy, misogyny, and 
power relations that oppress women. Reducing sexual orientation to sexual 
behaviour fails to capture this complexity. This example, I think, highlights why it 
is a mistake to reduce sexual orientations to sexual behaviour. Homophobes are 
not just angry because lesbians are engaging in or thought to be engaging in sexual 
behaviour with each other. They are also angry because lesbians challenge 
heteronormative and patriarchal systems. An account of sexual orientation that 
reduces sexual orientations to sexual behaviour misses the bigger picture. And in 
doing so, it fails to account for many of the social injustices faced by the LGBTQI+ 
community. 
 
5.3.3. Ideal Dispositionalism    
A third way of understanding sexual orientation is through what Stein calls Ideal 
Dispositionalism. According to Stein: ‘[…] a person’s sexual orientation is based on 
his or her sexual desires and fantasies and the sexual behaviours he or she is 






‘Conditions are ideal if there are no forces to prevent or discourage a 
person from acting on his or her desires, that is, when there is sexual 
freedom and a variety of appealing sexual partners available’ (Stein, 2001, 
p. 45).  
 
This proposal, as pointed out by Stein, incorporates to a certain extent aspects of 
self-identification and sexual behaviour. It takes into account people’s sexual 
desires and fantasies, in a way that a behavioural account of sexual orientation 
does not. It also manages to take into account sexual behaviour through 
dispositions. In other words, sexual behaviour is relevant to this account because 
it reflects dispositions.  
The problems with this account, however, are many. First, this account 
assumes that there is something ‘deep’ about sexual orientation that remains 
constant in an ideal possible world. A related problem is that it is not clear if what 
remains constant are a person’s sexual desires, fantasies, sexual behaviours, 
social context, available sexual orientation categories, etc. Another problem with 
this account, and one that Stein acknowledges (although he later dismisses), is 
what he calls ‘the counterfactual problem’. According to ideal dispositionalism, in 
order for a person to know their sexual orientation, they need to know what they 
would do in a counterfactual situation (i.e. what they would do under ideal 
conditions). This, however, is difficult to assess because it is very difficult to know 
what one would do in a counterfactual situation. According to Stein, this is a 
problem but does not count against ideal dispositionalism because this account is 




an epistemological one. In other words, Stein argues that his proposal is a 
metaphysical one concerned with the way things are, and the epistemological 
problem posed by the counterfactual problem is one about what we can know. 
One could ask if Stein is justified in separating the metaphysical question from the 
epistemological question, but I think that this misses the point. Instead, I argue 
that whether Stein thinks this is a problem for ideal dispositionalism or not is 
beside the point. If we want an account of sexual orientation that is helpful in 
addressing the social injustices faced by the LGBTQI+ community, then an account 
in which one might never have epistemological access to one’s sexual orientation 
is not a very good one. An account in which one does not have access to one’s 
sexual orientation would not be helpful in this actual world, where LGBTQI+ 
people are in need of reporting a hate crime, seeking asylum, or reporting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It is not helpful in reporting and 
it is not helpful for government officials assessing these reports and claims. This 
is a good reason to dismiss ideal dispositionalism. 
 
5.3.4. Bidimensional Dispositionalism 
Another way of understanding sexual orientation is through what Dembroff calls 
Bidimensional Dispositionalism. According to them:  
 
‘A person S’s sexual orientation is grounded in S’s dispositions to engage 
in sexual behaviors under the ordinary condition[s] for these dispositions, 




gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage under these 
conditions’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 18). 
 
This account follows Stein’s account in that it appeals to dispositions. Contrary to 
Stein, however, Dembroff aims to move away from appealing to ideal conditions. 
Instead, they appeal to what they call ‘ordinary conditions’. Ordinary conditions 
are meant to fall somewhere in between ‘actual conditions’ and ‘ideal conditions’. 
Ordinary conditions, according to Dembroff, are ‘[…] conditions under which 
people in fact apply the term ‘sexual orientation’ (and relevantly associated 
terms)’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 15). The conditions under which people in fact apply 
the term, according to Dembroff, are three. The first condition is that, in order to 
ascribe a person a sexual orientation, that person must be attracted to persons 
because they are of a particular sex or gender (2016, p. 17). The second condition 
requires that there be a ‘[…] reasonable diversity of potential sexual partners’ 
(Dembroff, 2016, p. 17). This move intends to move Dembroff’s proposal away 
from Stein’s ideal conditions. Under Stein’s account, ideal conditions required 
that one have a ‘variety’ of sexual partners available. Dembroff aims to tone down 
this requirement, but not so much so that it reflects actual conditions in which 
people might have very limited options of sexual partners available. With this 
move, they seek to only capture sexual behaviours that arise when one has 
options, and not when one has limited options (like e.g. in prisons). The third 
condition requires that ‘[…] one is willing and able to sexually engage with other 
persons’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 17). This condition is meant to restrict the kinds of 




orientation. According to Dembroff’s proposal, non-consensual sexual behaviour 
would not count as relevant to ascribing sexual orientation. Sexual orientation 
would also not be ascribed to those who are physically or psychologically unable 
to engage in sexual behaviour (Dembroff, 2016). These three conditions make up 
the ‘ordinary conditions’ under which we would ascribe sexual orientation under 
Dembroff’s proposed bidimensional dispositionalism.  
Another important departure from Stein’s ideal dispositionalism is that 
Dembroff treats sex and gender as different categories. Stein avoids making any 
specific distinction between the two and instead uses ‘sex/gender’ as a 
placeholder to talk about sexual orientation. Dembroff treats them as separate 
categories. They argue that people can be attracted to people on the basis of 
certain sex[es] and gender[s], and that these two categories won’t necessarily 
align like they do under an account which takes one of these categories to 
determine the other.  That is, some philosophers argue that the category of sex 
determines the category of gender. While other philosophers argue that the 
category of gender determines the category of sex. Dembroff calls the first the 
‘cisnormative view’ and the second the ‘unification view’. Under these accounts, 
sex is taken to be a biological category and gender a social category (along the 
nature/culture binary divide). Dembroff rejects both the cisnormative view and 
the unification view. They argue that sex does not determine gender and that 
gender does not determine sex. They argue that there is a distinction between 
the two, although not one along the nature/culture binary. On their view, both of 
these categories (sex and gender) are ‘[…] (at least partially) socially constructed 




seem to be committed to the idea that the category of sex tracks biological 
features (it is not clear what these features are), that the category of gender tracks 
social features, and that both of these are in some sense socially constructed. The 
reason this distinction is important when thinking about sexual orientation is 
because the way in which we account for sex and gender will determine, in part, 
how we account for sexual orientation.  
According to Dembroff, if we do not distinguish between sex and gender, 
the sexual orientation account that will follow will be a one-dimensional account 
that will only ever be able to account for either 1) sex-attraction or 2) gender-
attraction. Under a cisnormative view and a unification view, this means that we 
will only ever be able to treat the categories of sex and gender in relation to each 
other, but never independently of each other (because under these views, one 
category determines the other). This is a problem for Dembroff who not only 
argues that the cisnormative view and the unification view have got it wrong, they 
also argue that it makes more sense to treat these categories as independent 
because it gives us the conceptual tools to account for the gender identity and/or 
anatomical transition of, for example, genderqueer and trans people. Dembroff 
wants to allow for the possibility that these categories can be combined in a 
variety of ways.  Under their view, sexual orientation tracks both sex and gender, 
as independent categories. This makes their view bidimensional, instead of 
unidimensional. 
Dembroff’s account also makes an important move away from ideal 
dispositionalism by proposing that sexual orientation is grounded in the sex[es] 




and gender. The thought is that this move will do away with the assumption that 
cisheterosexuality is the norm and that all other sexual orientations are deviant. 
In order to carry this out, Dembroff proposes that we rearrange people into new 
sexual orientation categories that do not assume a distinction between 
cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations (Dembroff, 2016).  This means 
that under bidimensional dispositionalism, we end up with a completely new 
taxonomy of sexual orientation categories. Current understandings of sexual 
orientation categories such as heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual, etc., disappear 
under bidimensional dispositionalism. Take for example, Alfonso, who is a cis 
heterosexual man. Under bidimensional dispositionalism, he would have the 
same sexual orientation as Margarita, who is a cis lesbian woman. This is a big 
move away from current western understandings of sexual orientation. It’s also a 
big move away from how we account for political distinctions that are able to 
bring light to certain forms of oppression. Under our current view, for example, it 
seems right that lesbians and heterosexual men have different sexual orientations 
and that we continue accounting for these sexual orientations in this way because 
lesbians and heterosexual men do not share the same political struggles. 
However, under Dembroff’s proposed view, these two groups would share the 
same sexual orientation.   
I think that, although this account raises important questions and worries 
about our current western understandings of sexual orientation, it ultimately fails 
to address the many social injustices that the LGBTQI+ community faces, 
something which Dembroff wants to achieve. According to them, a new concept 




establishing legal and social protections for persons who have queer sexual 
orientations’ (Dembroff, p. 5). In what follows, I will argue that the bidimensional 
dispositional account of sexual orientation does not achieve this goal. First, I will 
argue that the concept of sexual orientation put forward by Dembroff is ultimately 
unhelpful for establishing protections for people with an LGBTQI+ sexual 
orientation.  Second, I will argue that, contrary to Dembroff’s proposal, one’s sex 
and gender should play an important role in understanding sexual orientation.  
 
5.3.4.1. Problems with Bidimensional Dispositionalism  
According to Dembroff, sexual orientation is ‘explained by’ a person’s dispositions 
to engage in sexual behaviours. However, saying that sexual orientation has to do 
with a person’s dispositions to engage in sexual behaviours is not enough to 
explain the concept of sexual orientation. This is because an appeal to dispositions 
does not specify the conditions under which these dispositions manifest. This is 
why Dembroff further specifies that the relevant conditions for the manifestation 
of these dispositions are ‘ordinary conditions’. This concept is supposed to explain 
the conditions under which these dispositions manifest and by doing that, offer 
further clarification about the concept of sexual orientation. Dembroff’s three 
conditions corresponding to the concept of ordinary conditions, however, offer 
no such clarification. 
The first condition, for example, stipulates that ‘(1) The operative concept 
assumes attraction to persons of a certain sex or gender (at least partially) 
because they are that sex and/or gender’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 17). In the beginning 




dispositions to engage in sexual behaviours: ‘To this end, talk of attraction in what 
follows generally can be understood as shorthand for dispositions to engage in 
sexual behaviours’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 7). If we plug in this information to the first 
condition, it reads something like this: ‘(1) The operative concept assumes 
dispositions to engage in sexual behaviours to persons of a certain sex or gender 
(at least partially) because they are that sex and/or gender’. The problem with this 
is that the dispositions mentioned in this condition are part of what Dembroff is 
trying to explain in these conditions in the first place. To put it another way, under 
Dembroff’s account, sexual orientation is explained by a person’s dispositions to 
engage in sexual behaviours under ordinary conditions. However, when putting 
forward their account of ordinary conditions, Dembroff appeals to dispositions to 
engage in sexual behaviours in order to explain ordinary conditions. This is a 
circular move. The problem with this is that dispositions to engage in sexual 
behaviours is what is meant to be explained by ordinary conditions in order to 
help explain what sexual orientation is.  
 Condition two faces similar problems. According to Dembroff, ‘(II) The 
operative concept assumes attraction to certain persons while having a 
reasonable diversity of potential sexual partners’ (2016, p. 17). This condition also 
appeals to dispositions in order to explain sexual orientation, when this condition 
is in fact supposed to be doing part of the explanatory work. In addition to this 
problem, I would like to highlight two further problems with this condition. The 
first of these two problems is that this condition leaves unclear who one is 
supposed to be ‘attracted to’ in order to be able to ascribe a sexual orientation. 




persons[…]’ (2016, p. 17). However, it is unclear who these ‘certain persons’ are 
or who counts as a certain person. Without a clarification, ‘certain persons’ could 
be taken to refer to persons without tracking the fact that these persons have 
their sex and gender in common. One way of clarifying this issue would be to say 
something along the lines of: ‘The operative concept assumes attraction to 
persons of a certain sex or gender while having a reasonable diversity of potential 
sexual partners ‘. However, it is unclear if this is what Dembroff aims to capture. 
If ‘certain persons’ was employed by Dembroff with the intention of remaining 
ambiguous, then a different issue arises: this condition fails to capture details that 
are significantly relevant to our everyday concept of sexual orientation, 
something which Dembroff is also committed to preserving. Namely, that sexual 
orientation seems to refer to a person’s attraction to persons at least partly 
because of their sex and gender. For this reason, more clarification is needed.  
Leaving this issue aside, there is another problem that I would like to draw 
our attention to. This problem has to do with the vagueness of the second 
condition when it comes to stipulating the amount of potential sexual partners 
that are required in order to be able to ascribe sexual orientation. As I mentioned 
in the previous paragraphs, ‘reasonable’, in this condition, aims to seek some kind 
of middle ground between conditions in which one might have a very limited 
amount of potential sexual partners available and conditions in which one might 
have an ‘unrestricted’ amount of potential sexual partners available. I take the 
point that these conditions are not meant to stipulate any necessary and sufficient 
conditions. However, if we want an account of sexual orientation that ‘(iv) Is 




sexual orientations’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 5), then we need more detail about what 
‘reasonable’ is supposed to capture here. Dembroff argues that a concept of 
sexual orientation should not capture sexual behaviour that arises in situations in 
which there is a very limited amount of potential sexual partners available. This is 
because these sexual encounters will oftentimes not be reliable markers of a 
person’s sexual orientation.  However, while it might be clear that a prison setting 
does not have a ‘reasonable’ amount of potential sexual partners available, it is 
not clear what counts as reasonable outside of circumstances like these. How big 
of a community does one need to be in in order to meet this condition? How big 
does a town, for example, have to be before it is able to meet this second 
condition? This might sound irrelevant, but it is important if this is a condition that 
must be met in order to assign a person a sexual orientation. Actual cases hang 
on this distinction. Often, people applying for asylum on the basis of sexual 
orientation come from small towns and so, if this is to be a condition for an 
account of sexual orientation that is meant to be conductive to establishing legal 
protections for people with queer sexual orientations, then it is important that we 
re-evaluate this second condition so it is able to capture the experiences of people 
who might not clearly meet it, but are in need of protection on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  
 Many of these worries apply to condition number three. According to 
Dembroff, ‘(III) The operative concept assumes that one is willing and able to 
sexually engage with other persons’ (Dembroff, 2016, p. 17).  In this condition, it 
is also unclear who these ‘other persons’ are supposed to be. Again, if Dembroff 




capturing details that are important to our everyday concept of sexual 
orientation. The second problem that I would like to highlight has to do with the 
explanatory work that ‘willing’ is tasked with carrying out. I agree with Dembroff 
that a concept of sexual orientation should not count nonconsensual sexual 
behaviour as reflective of a person’s sexual orientation. The problem is that 
Dembroff does not provide us with the conceptual tools that we need in order to 
stipulate what counts as ‘willing’ in situations in which people have given their 
consent. Consider the case of a lesbian woman who is seeking asylum on the basis 
of her sexual orientation. This woman has only ever engaged in sexual behaviour 
with men. The behaviour was consensual, but according to the woman, this sexual 
behaviour is not reflective of her actual sexual orientation. She goes on to explain 
that when the opportunity to engage in said sexual behaviour arose she thought 
to herself ‘why not’. In this case, it is not clear what sexual orientation one would 
ascribe her. According to Dembroff, ‘We refuse to ascribe sexual orientations to 
someone on the basis of their actual sexual behaviors if (e.g.) they are voluntarily 
celibate, subject to sexual contact without consent, or possess a prohibitive 
medical condition’ (2016, p. 17). The woman in our example, however, did 
consent and was willing to engage in said sexual behaviour. Dembroff’s account 
does not give us the conceptual tools to be able to clearly claim that this is a 
lesbian woman. Under a strict reading of condition number three, this woman’s 
sexual behaviour would correspond to that of a heterosexual woman because she 
was willing to engage in sexual behaviour with men. This, however, is undesirable 




problem for Dembroff’s account, which aims to protect people with LGBTQI+ 
sexual orientations. 
 Another main issue with bidimensional dispositionalism has to do with its 
narrow focus on dispositions to sexual behaviour. Because Dembroff’s account 
narrowly focuses on sexual behaviour, it fails to account for hate crimes and 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that might not have anything to 
do with sexual behaviour. The political lesbian example discussed in the 
behaviourism section is a good example of this. This is a problem if we want an 
account of sexual orientation that is going to be able to help in addressing these 
issues.  
 Because of this and all of the unclarities that I have drawn attention to, 
Dembroff’s view is undesirable and ineffective when it comes to addressing 
problems that some of the most marginalised groups in the LGBTQI+ community 
face. I have chosen to focus on issues to do with asylum because I consider asylum 
to be one of these such issues. However, I take this to be only one example out of 
many. The problems that I outlined also arise when we apply them to other 
situations in which people with an LGBTQI+ sexual orientation face hate and 
discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. 
 
5.4. Political Cluster Concept Approach 
With the aim of addressing the concerns of some of the most marginalised groups 
in the LGBTQI+ community, I propose a new way of thinking about sexual 
orientation: a political cluster concept approach. This political cluster concept 




(sexual but also romantic), and internal manifestations, such as desire, attraction, 
and fantasies. I propose that the weight of each of these markers should rely 
heavily one’s social and political context.  
 My proposal has the advantage of having the conceptual capabilities to 
account for more than one sexual orientation marker. A reductive approach that 
only focuses on one marker, fails to account for people in vulnerable situations 
who might not be able to express their sexual orientation through that one sexual 
orientation marker. Furthermore, a reductive approach that only focuses on one 
marker, fails to account for social injustices on the basis of sexual orientation that 
fall outside of the scope of that one sexual orientation marker. For these reasons, 
my proposal seeks to account for three main sexual orientation markers that are 
typically associated with sexual orientation, self-identification, behaviour, and 
internal manifestations. The hope is that this proposal will expand the number of 
conceptual tools available to people with an LGBTQI+ sexual orientation, so that 
they are better prepared to report a hate crime and or seek protection, should 
they need to.  
 According to this cluster concept approach, it is an a posteriori question 
what sexual orientation markers will count towards ascribing someone a 
particular sexual orientation. This ascription will depend largely on the social and 
political context. However, under this approach, as with other cluster concept 
accounts, there will sometimes be sexual orientation markers that people with a 
particular sexual orientation will have in common with each other, and which will 
help us to identify them as being a member of a particular sexual orientation 




in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, we ascribe sexual orientation in 
terms of factors that might be relevant to assessing a person’s sexual orientation. 
The aim is that this proposal will provide us with a much more flexible framework 
by 1) not necessarily requiring any one sexual orientation marker in order to 
ascribe sexual orientation and by 2) allowing for the possibility of taking into 
account the social and political context of those reporting their own sexual 
orientation and of those assessing a person’s sexual orientation. The three factors 
are: 
 
1. That a person self-identify with a sexual orientation. 
2. That they have desires and fantasies about other people at least partly 
because those people are of a particular sex[es] and gender[s].  
3. That they’ve engaged in consensual sexual or romantic behaviour with 
other people at least partly because they are of a particular sex[es] and 
gender[s].  
 
This account is able to account for intuitive cases in which all three of these sexual 
orientation markers line up. Consider the case of a woman who is a self-described 
lesbian. This woman only desires and fantasises about women and has only 
engaged in sexual behaviour with other women. This woman would count as a 
lesbian under this account. This account would also be able to account for the 
sexual orientation of people whose sexual orientation markers don’t all line up. 
Consider the case of another woman. This woman also self-identifies as a lesbian 




fantasises about women, but due to the criminalisation of homosexuality in her 
country, she has never engaged in sexual behaviour with other women. Under 
this cluster concept approach, and according to her social and political context, 
we would assign her the sexual orientation she identifies with and that 
corresponds with her desires and fantasies. A woman who has only engaged in 
consensual sexual behaviour with women, only desires and fantasises about 
women, but who does not self-identify as a lesbian (because perhaps she lacks 
the concept, due to her oppressive social context), would be able to be accounted 
for as a lesbian under this proposal. 
 This cluster concept approach is not designed to clearly demarcate 
between all possible cases. It admits that there might be borderline cases that 
might be hard to pin down, but as far as I am concerned, this is not a big problem. 
This is because this approach does not seek to find out ‘what really makes one a 
heterosexual’ or ‘what really makes one gay’. This approach aims to find out what 
account of sexual orientation is best equipped to address social injustices faced 
by some of the most marginalised groups in the LGBTQI+ community.   
 
5.4.1. Sex and Gender 
Furthermore, I propose that a person’s sexual orientation is based both on sex 
and gender. I follow Dembroff on this point and agree with them that sex and 
gender are independent categories that are (at least partially) socially 
constructed. This theoretical move allows us to expand our current sexual 
orientation taxonomy. For example, on a binary account that takes sex to 




to no conceptual resources for trans, genderqueer people, and people who 
identity outside of this binary to map their sexual orientation. This is because the 
categories of sex and gender, under these accounts, will always line up with each 
other, and so will not be able to account for someone whose sex doesn’t line up 
with their gender or with someone whose sex and gender identity lie outside of 
this binary model. Since my aim in this chapter is to advance the rights for some 
of the most marginalised groups in the LGBTQI+ community, including trans and 
genderqueer people, it is important that an account of sexual orientation be able 
to provide this community with the conceptual resources that are needed in order 
for these groups to be able to report social injustices and seek protection on the 
basis of sexual orientation. An account that allows these two categories of sex and 
gender to come apart is in a better position to be able to account for trans and 
genderqueer people whose sex and gender might not necessarily line up. An 
account like this would allow that someone could be attracted to someone on the 
basis of their sex and gender, independently of each other.  
I disagree, however, with Dembroff’s argument that one’s own sex and 
gender should not play a role in understanding sexual orientation. For many 
people, their sex and gender play an incredibly important role in understanding 
their sexual orientation (Bettcher, 2014). In addition to this, getting rid of this 
component would weaken our account of sexual orientation because it would 
leave us without the conceptual tools required to address many of the current 
social injustices faced by the LGBTQI+ community. This is because understanding 
sexual orientation only on the basis of the sex[es] and gender[s] one is attracted 




taxonomy and lead us towards a completely new one. For example, under a sexual 
orientation taxonomy that does not take into account one’s own sex and gender, 
men who are attracted to women and women who are attracted to women would 
share the same sexual orientation. That is, heterosexual men would share the 
same sexual orientation as lesbian women. This is the same for women who are 
attracted to men and men who are attracted to men. They would share the same 
sexual orientation in virtue of being attracted to same sex and gender. This means 
that heterosexual women and gay men would also share the same sexual 
orientation. This is not helpful in addressing some of the current discrimination 
faced by lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Consider the following cases. (1) The 
recent homophobic attack on two women on board a London bus. According to 
the women, they were physically beaten in a homophobic attack for refusing to 
kiss for a group of young men (The BBC News, 2019).  (2) The recent case of a 
young lesbian attacked in Hull, in virtue of being a lesbian (Sky News, 2019). (3) A 
recent report which found that LGBT employees in Britain earn 16% percent less 
(on average) than their heterosexual peers (Milne, Amber, 2019). This specific 
kind of hate and discrimination is not experienced by heterosexual men. 
Heterosexual men do not experience hate and a pay cut for being heterosexual 
men. Lesbian women do, to note one example. If we lump heterosexual men and 
lesbian women together into one category in virtue of their desires, sexual 
behaviour, etc., we lose important conceptual tools that allows us to draw 
attention to these kind of problems.  Furthermore, if we apply this model to 
asylum applications on the basis of sexual orientation, we end up with really odd 




community. If heterosexual men and lesbian women share the same sexual 
orientation, then this would either mean that heterosexual men could get asylum 
on the basis of sexual orientation or, if we reject this, that lesbian women would 
not be able to get asylum. I propose that in order to be in a better position to 
address these kind of social injustices faced by the LGBTQI+ community, we keep 
one’s sex and gender as an important component of sexual orientation. This will 
allow us to keep the sexual orientation categories that we already have.  
In addition to keeping some of our current sexual orientation categories, 
this proposal would also allow us to account for new sexual orientation 
categories. This is because if we take sex and gender to come apart, this allows us 
to able to account for people who are attracted to various combinations of sex 
and gender. I admit that this model is more complicated than the common 
unidimensional account and requires a lot more work. Up until now, many issues 
remain unresolved as regards the categories of sex and gender. For example, I 
have not said anything about how many sexes and genders there are and whether 
these are discrete or continuous categories. This topic deserves full attention on 
its own, which I am not able to do here. I will say, however, that in order to move 
towards an account of sexual orientation that is better prepared to deal with 
social injustice issues faced by some of the most marginalised groups of the 
LGBTQI+ community, we need an account of sex and gender that is flexible 
enough to capture existing sexual orientation categories as well as provide the 
conceptual tools to be able to account for new sexual orientations. I have argued 
that the first step in being able to do this is through an account of sexual 




understood as independent of one another and socially constructed. I have also 
argued that we should understand sexual orientation not only on the basis of the 
sex[es] and gender[s] one is attracted to, but also one the basis of one’s own sex 
and gender.  
 
5.5. Conclusions 
I have put forward a political cluster concept approach of sexual orientation and 
argued that this account would be better suited than self-identification, 
behaviourism, ideal dispositionalism, and bidimensional dispositionalism to 
address some of the social injustices faced by some of the most marginalised 
groups in the LGBTQI+ community. This cluster concept includes three main 
sexual orientation markers: self-identification, behaviour, and internal 
manifestations of one’s sexual orientation such as desires and fantasies. 
According to the cluster concept approach, no one sexual orientation marker is 
necessary for ascribing sexual orientation and the weight of each of these markers 
is dependent on the social and political context of those ascribing sexual 
orientation. I have also argued that both sex and gender, understood as 
independent and socially constructed categories, are relevant when ascribing 
sexual orientation, this includes one’s own sex and gender. 
 There remain some important questions about the nature of the 
categories of sex and gender and how these will impact our resulting cluster 
concept sexual orientation categories. While I don’t have the space to explore the 
issue of whether sex and gender categories are discrete or how many sexes and 




to allow that we are both able to keep some of our existing sexual orientation 
categories and expand our conceptual tools to map new sexual orientation 
categories. An account of sex and gender that gets us closer to being able to 
capture these experiences will be better equipped to deal with some of the hate 
and discrimination that some trans, non-binary, and genderqueer people face. 
With this in mind, I leave open the question of whether we should understand the 
categories of sex and gender as discrete or how many sexes and genders there 
are. I do, however, think that the cluster concept offers a flexible framework and 


















The aim of this thesis has been to offer a new way of thinking about the role that 
feminist values can play in science. In the first chapter, I considered a prominent 
approach amongst feminist philosophers of arguing for this role by appealing to 
underdetermination. One of the first issues I focused on was the difference 
between Duhem’s and Quine’s proposals. I argued that Duhem’s 
underdetermination proposal might be of little value to feminist scholars since his 
focus is solely on physics. In contrast, and in addition to physics, feminist scholars 
seem to be interested in other scientific disciplines. Furthermore, Duhem was 
committed to the idea that ‘passions and interests’ should not fill in the gap in 
cases of underdetermination. The problem is that this is exactly the claim that 
feminist philosophers want to be able to make. Feminist philosophers want to be 
able to claim that feminist considerations can contribute to good science in cases 
in which theory is underdetermined by the data. In Quine’s underdetermination 
proposal, we found a proposal that was a little friendlier to feminist aims. This was 
because Quine extended his account to cover all knowledge claims. This means 
that it was able to cover other scientific areas that might be of interest to feminist 
philosophers. The problem with Quine’s proposal, however, was that he argued 
that there was a sharp boundary between science and the kind of political 
considerations that feminist philosophers are interested in. This is all of little use 
to feminist philosophers who appeal to both Duhem and Quine in order to argue 
for a role for values via underdetermination. I hope I’ve managed to convince my 
reader that even if we ignore these problems, underdetermination is still not very 




values. This role comes in only after all empirical considerations have been 
exhausted. 
 A better strategy is to argue for a role for values throughout the scientific 
research process. I reviewed two proposals that did just that. The first was 
Kourany’s proposal that we should implant egalitarian social values into science 
and that these values, along with epistemic values, should control every aspect of 
the scientific research process. As it stands, I argued that Kourany’s proposal is 
not very useful for scientists because it leaves them without sufficient guidance 
about the relationship between these values, how they should weigh up these 
values, and about whether these values should be playing a direct or indirect role 
throughout the scientific research stages. Douglas’ proposal proved to be more 
efficient in terms of being able to provide more guidance in these areas. In this 
sense, I argued that it was a preferable account. However, in thinking about the 
usefulness of this account for feminist philosophers, I proposed some changes to 
two crucial stages of the scientific research process: problem selection and 
methodology selection.  
In the problem selection stage, Douglas argued that values should be able 
to play a role when trying to decide what research problem to pursue and what 
research project to fund. According to her, ‘We choose to fund areas of research 
about which we care to know more’ (2009, P. 99). I argued that the process of 
selecting a research project and securing funding were a little more complicated 
to what Douglas suggests. To illustrate this point, I gave the example of the NIH 
political scandal, which showcased 1) the political pressure that scientists were 




community and 2) that showed how difficult it can be to secure funding for a 
research project that the scientist or social community might value.  To aid with 
these complications, and following Kourany (2003), I proposed that what was 
needed is a more direct approach. This includes 1) pushing for legislation that 
ensures that research projects that are beneficial and of interest to minority 
groups (e.g. the LGBTQI+ community) get the funding they need and 2) that these 
groups are included in the scientific research.  
In the methodology selection stage, Douglas argued that values should be 
able to play a role when it comes to answering questions about the ethical 
acceptability of such methodology. I agree that this is a good role for values to 
play. However, what I thought was missing was a discussion about the additional 
role that values seem to play as far as the choice of concepts that are embedded 
in the methodology. To explore this idea, I developed a case study that looked 
into genetic explanations of sexual orientation. In the case study, I pointed to 
specific instances where queer feminist values could come in to shape concepts. 
In this sense, I argued that another key area where feminist values could play a 
key role is in the choice of concepts, and that this choice would be determined by 
the goals that one has. 
To demonstrate this, I showed how different concepts are needed for two 
different goals: carrying out genetic studies and helping asylum seekers. This is 
perhaps one of my most original contributions. In my proposal for thinking about 
sexual orientation in the context of genetics, I challenged the concepts, study 
design, data collections, and interpretation of results. This is an area of research 




proposal maps out a potential new area for values but also provides geneticists 
with a new way of understanding sexual orientation. However, due to space 
restrictions, I was unable to explore many issues. This includes issues to do with 
what specific inner states geneticists should take into account. The hope is that 
my proposal will serve as a starting point to start thinking about these kind of 
issues in future research.  
I also proposed a new way of understanding sexual orientation for 
addressing social injustices: the political cluster concept approach. Although the 
general aim of this dissertation was to focus on the role that values play in science, 
I was very happy to have the opportunity to propose a new understanding of 
sexual orientation that might help in thinking about how to address the many 
social injustices that the LGBTQI+ community faces around the world, especially 
its most vulnerable and disadvantaged members. My proposal offers a starting 
point to start thinking about how we might be able to address some of these 
issues. I focused on asylum seekers because this is one of the most pressing issues 
of our time, but this is not the only one. Hate crimes on the basis of sexual 
orientation continue to rise at an alarming rate around the world and some of the 
most vulnerable groups are people of colour, trans women, non-binary people, 
and genderqueer people. It is for this reason that I centred my discussion on issues 
that affect them. As with my previous sexual orientation proposal, there are many 
issues that I was not able to explore. This includes questions about the nature of 
the categories of sex and gender such as whether we should understand these 




hope that the political cluster concept approach frames the discussion in which to 
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